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1 
INTRODUCTION 
Democracy is a form of government dating back to Greek Antiquity. The word 
democracy consists of the two following terms, demos meaning the people and kratos which 
translates as power. Most European democratic governments consolidated their democratic 
status in the middle of the 20
th
 century following World War II, although exceptions exist 
such as France with its first democratic attempt in 1789. Currently, 93 regimes qualify as 
democracy (Freedom House, 2013), even if the democratic commitment varies from country 
to country. Democracy is subject to various interpretations: some people acknowledge 
democracy to be a political ideal, for example Aristotle; other people see democracy as a 
public institution.  
In the academic sphere, democracy remains a much discussed theory. This fact is due 
to the existence of a variety of democratic theories. Robert Dahl (1956) already highlighted 
the multiple existences of democratic theories, which nonetheless, appear to share one 
common point: democratic rule should not be subject to the rule of a few, but should reflect 
people’s different opinions in the democratic governance. Moreover, it is supposed that 
rational capacities characterize the members of any political community in order to be able to 
assess the government’s activity. For rational capacities to unfold, citizens of democratic 
governments have to enjoy some freedoms such as conscience, speech and assembly 
(Terchek and Conte, 2001). 
A first distinction in democratic theory that can be made is a minimal and a maximal 
conception. The minimal conception represents the political sphere’s detentions in the hands 
of a small delineated group of people while the maximal conception postulates the 
involvement of as many citizens as possible in the political decision-making process (Terchek 
and Conte, 2001). A minimal conception of democracy bears the risk of the government 
developing secret intentions while its officials begin to exhibit manipulative traits. Given that 
the political power runs the risk of remaining outside the public sphere and outside public 
policy, citizens are expected to become aloof from politics. This process results in the 
common good becoming phantasmal for the following reason: as public policies in particular 
and politics in general remain outside the sphere of citizens’ sphere of decision making / 
influence, government officials exclusively decide about policies serving their interest 
(Terchek and Conte, 2001). By taking one’s own profitable interest as guideline for public 
policies, the likelihood decreases for common goods to arise as in its nature they intend to 
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serve a community rather than an individual. It seems as democracy should be more inclusive 
in its character in terms of involving a greater quantity of people in its decision-making 
process while also enlarging its scope of democratic control. Risks born by the maximal 
conception of democracy revolve around the rule of a minority for example. It seems as if the 
maximal conception of democracy, nevertheless of its flaws, bears the highest level of 
democratic idealism as its goals centre on making public power subject to public approval as 
well as aiming at law to mirror public preferences (Terchek and Conte, 2001).  
Another approach to democracy theories is judging them from a normative angle. 
Normative democratic theory aims at outlining the most morally desirable forms of 
democracy in which context at what time. As first example to illustrate the meaning of 
normative democratic theory serves Schumpeter’s account on democracy: he (1956) declares 
the most desirable form of democracy to be a formal version in which members of competing 
elites can be elected by the citizenry. Schumpeter sees equality in democratic regimes as a 
likely carrier of danger. On the contrary, Rousseau (1762) argues that formal democratic 
regimes are in line with slavery lacking political legitimacy which is not the case for 
egalitarian democracies.  
The question which kind of democracy is morally more desirable in a given time and 
space links directly to issues surrounding democratic citizenship. This link raises the question 
whether ordinary citizens can, or not, rule over a given society (Christiano, 2006). Elite 
theorists hold the view that a high level of citizens’ participation in elections generally leads 
to poor legislation reflecting citizens’ ignorance and feelings. As such, these theorists 
welcome citizens’ political apathy in order to avoid the before mentioned outcome. 
Schumpeter (1956) represents the elitist view on democracy by stressing the importance of 
political leadership which should avoid by any means emotionally and disputatious topics for 
instead enacting law and making political decisions. Although citizens play a significant role 
in electing a government, Schumpeter (1956) thinks that political repercussions are only 
experienced by the citizenry to a minor degree due to the citizens’ lack of knowledge. 
Nonetheless, some persons believe that this form of democracy combined with democratic 
citizenship protects society from poorly performing, or corrupt, politicians.  
Dahl’s (1959) pluralist account of interest groups both attempts to tackle the problem 
posed by democratic citizenship and opposes the elitist view by declaring that “In a rough 
sense, the essence of all competitive politics is bribery of the electorate by politicians… The 
farmer… supports a candidate committed to high price supports, the businessman…supports 
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an advocate of low corporation taxes… the consumer…votes for candidates opposed to a sale 
tax” (Dahl 1959, p. 69). In the light of each citizen belonging to a different interest group, the 
elitist argument of poorly informed citizens does not hold true given that according to Dahl’s 
account citizens feature particular interest emanating from their lives. As such, democracy 
does not count as rule of a particular minority, but as a combination of different minor 
interests. The interest group’s bargaining settles discussions on laws and policies. In 
comparison to the elitist democratic perspective, Dahl’s angle comes close to ideal of 
egalitarian democracy (Christiano, 2006). 
The last approach resulting from the problem of citizenship turns out to the most 
significant for this thesis. Buchanan and Tullock (1965), both public choice theorists, 
established the neo-liberal theory of democracy. Neo-liberal democratic theorists dismiss 
both elitist’s and group pluralist approaches respectively for the following reasons: first, 
elitist approaches to democracy are likely to end in the elite using government and policy 
facilities for their own ends representing a disadvantage for the general public. This scenario 
has to be avoided, wherewith Buchanan and Tullock (1965) argue for limiting the elite’s 
power. Second, Buchanan and Tullock (1965) claim that Dahl’s emphasis on citizens’ 
participation as interest group is mistaken given that the problem of participation affects both 
interest groups in particular and the citizenry in general. Therefore, interest groups do not 
emerge as easily as anticipated while those characterized by strong economic interest are 
supposedly better in conveying their cause to the government. In short, only a delineated 
group of interest is likely to influence government policies. Again, these interest groups 
collaborate with the ruling elite resulting in an inefficient government while attempting to 
further their interest, the costs are born by others. This is the reason why policies then are 
expected to be more costly due to their imposition onto the whole citizenry although these 
policies are exclusively beneficial to this economic group of interest and to the ruling elite. 
The reason for outlining the different approaches to democracy relates to introduce 
the topic of my thesis: post-democracy. In my thesis I approach democracy by investigating 
the state of 20th century democracy according to two different perspectives: one blaming the 
international economy hollowing out domestic politics, while the other one blames left 
ideology and politics for the post-democratic times we supposedly live in.  
The term post-democracy has first been coined by Colin Crouch in 2004. His book 
bearing the same name is an extended sequel to the predecessor entitled Coping with Post-
Democracy published by the Fabian Society in 2000. The sequel in turn has a successor, The 
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strange non-death of Neo-liberalism dealing with the continual perpetration of neo-liberal 
ideology, even in the aftermath of the 2008 financial crisis demonstrating the sheer 
consequences of unlimited financial capitalism. For Crouch, post-democracy amounts to the 
infiltration of the firm into the government. By this infiltration, the government is little by 
little hollowed out and becomes the firm’s lackey. Therefore, politics lose their content while 
economic interests fill in the void bearing important repercussion for the citizenry such as a 
decreased say in governance.  
To amplify the discussion on post-democracy and prove its relevance, Matthieu 
Baumier’s (2007) post-democratic scenario is depicted in the following section. Similar as 
Crouch, Baumier (2007) dismisses the progressive and unilinear myths of democracy and 
intends to reveal its intrinsic disagreements. Baumier starts by evoking principles enounced 
for the first time by the political philosopher A. Tocqueville, such as equality’s and liberty’s 
significance for a regime for contrasting it with current dominant characteristics such as 
individuality and oligarchy. Moreover, Baumier also defines the prefix ‘post’ not as an 
alteration of democracy beyond itself but within its own scope. The advent of neo-liberal 
market capitalism from the 1970s onwards saw the rise in tension of both equality and liberty. 
Referring to the historian Aron, Baumier (2007, cited in Pabst, 2010) notices the constraining 
aspects of a unique definition of the term ‘liberty’ given raise to two different highly 
paradoxical situations: on the one hand, it can be at the origin of legitimating oppression 
under democratic provision; on the other hand it can pave the way for oppressive liberation 
overlooking the dearth of liberty for a specific segment of society. Baumier (2007, cited in 
Pabst 2010) caries on by stating that society neither can be regarded as good nor free but as 
servile and inquires by the same token which other tension could be used as the basis for 
democracy instead of the perceived uneasiness between equality and liberty. Baumier’s 
analysis exhibits strong parallels between post-democracy in general and totalitarian 
democracy in particular. Therefore, inquiring whether post-democracy is not another 
denomination of this particular kind of democracy is important as well as accounting for the 
process of de-democratization. 
Two other rival theories of post-democracy have respectively been developed by 
Sheldon Wolin (2008) and Jacques Rancière (1998). Wolin declares the compatibility 
between ever globally expanding democratic regimes with a significant dearth in popular 
participation. This situation further worsens considering that the increasing monopoly of 
power enjoyed by a small delineated group of new classes as well as old elites which favour 
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corporate business’ interests equalling to a lack in creating and enforcing public goods. This 
last point is well depicted by “the political coming of age of corporate power and the political 
demobilization of the citizenry” (Wolin, 2008, cited in Pabst, 2010) contributing to the 
reversing of democracy paving the way for ‘inverted totalitarianism’.  
Rancière in turn acknowledges the existence of post-democracy as an absolute 
consensus democracy, “a political idyll of achieving the common good by an enlightened 
government of elites buoyed by the confidence of the masses” (Rancière, 1998, p. 93) and 
maintains the notion of the ‘political’ lying at its heart demonstrating strong ties with the 
concepts of identification and subjectivization. First, Rancière defines the political as “the 
encounter between two heterogeneous processes. The first process is that of governing, and it 
entails creating community consent, which relies on the distribution of shares and the 
hierarchy of places and functions. I shall call this process policy.” (Rancière, 1992, p.58).  
A critic of Crouch’s post-democracy can be found in Welch’s (2013) 
Hyperdemocracy. For Crouch (2004) post-democracy amounts to the hollowing out of the 
state by the global firm, which Crouch applies to European countries such as the United 
Kingdom and Italy. Welch defines hyperdemocracy as “…not just democracy, or an excess of 
democracy; it is the phenomenon of democracy undermining itself. It arises from the 
conditions all democrats […] would approve of- the freedom to think, to challenge, and to 
ask the person who pretends to be an authority, “who are you to say?.” (2013, p.xi). Another 
way to describe hyperdemocracy is “the problem of a democratic threat to democratic 
decidability […]. It is a problem that, once it is picked out, begins to show itself widely.” 
(Welch, 2013, p.xi/xii). The term hyperdemocracy has been coined by José Ortega y Gasset 
(1993). Ortega y Gasset described by the term the condition in which “the mass [of people] 
acts directly, outside the law, imposing its aspirations and its desires by means of material 
pressure.” (Ortega y Gasset, 1993, cited in Welch, 2013, p.1).  
The criticism by Welch with respect to Crouch’s post-democracy centres on Crouch’s 
lack of discussing how democratic means can bring to a halt and reverse the deterioration of 
democracy. Moreover, Welch claims that “Crouch’s theory of post-democracy fails to grasp 
the full magnitude of the problem” (Welch, 2013, p.90). Welch discerns the problem of 
Crouch’s analysis as: “If the root of the problem lies with capital, and if capital has learnt to 
fend off the democratizing pressures it faced at mid-century, only the revolutionary 
overthrow of the capital would seem to be a viable solution. Crouch seems to entertain the 
idea that better political leaders might not have entered into such close relationships with the 
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corporate world, and might, if in the future they made better choices, tap into the “potential 
radical and democratic agenda,” […]” (Welch, 2013, p.90). Welch finally notes that “Crouch 
touches on a possible hyperdemocratic diagnosis of the problem when he says that “we have 
gone beyond the idea of rule by the people to challenge the idea of rule at all,”[…] The thesis 
of hyperdemocracy also funds this regrettable, on the basis that democracy is a form of rule. 
But in contrast to Crouch, the thesis makes that regrettable condition central to its analysis 
[…]” (Welch, 2013, p.93).  
I support Crouch’s view because of my political convictions and my shared opinion 
with respect to politics, economics and the repercussions ensuing from the political-economic 
scenario we live in. Repercussions stretch from citizens’ silence to politics being a delineated 
area of action of the elite among others. I am not positive that Crouch’s post-democracy and 
Welch’s hyperdemocracy can be compared to another given that Crouch’s theory is written 
from a political and economic inception while Welch combines psychology and democratic 
theory.  
This thesis will analyze Crouch’s and Baumier’s post-democratic theories. The reason 
for using Baumier’s writing is to oppose a French conservative (Baumier) view on post-
democracy to a British socialist perspective (Crouch) due to their contrast. The thesis is 
divided into three chapters. Chapter one and two deal with Crouch’s post-democratic scenario 
and actors, while chapter three outlines Baumier’s conception of post-democracy. The aim of 
the thesis is to oppose two different political opinions of post-democracy. The novelty of the 
thesis lies in introducing M. Baumier’s theory of post-democracy to the English speaking 
world. Baumier’s book entitled The totalitarian democracy, Conceptualizing the post-
democratic modernity is exclusively available in French and has so far not been translated 
into English. 
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CHAPTER 1:  CROUCH’S POST-DEMOCRATIC STATE 
In order to nail down the meaning behind Crouch’s theory of post-democracy, the 
different constituent elements intrinsic to his conception first have to be exposed. These 
elements stretch from observations made about society such as the indifference and apathy of 
citizens in a post-democratic setting, to the economic takeover of politics which then turns 
into a spectacle that no longer exhibits any political programme worth implementing. 
Crouch’s theory of post-democracy not only applies to the political sphere, but also draws on 
aspects from other domains such as sociology and media studies in order to support his 
theory. Throughout the book no quantitative evidence is provided or other proof, such as 
examples of laws and studies, suggesting the validity of Crouch’s depiction. The reader is left 
with a purely qualitative account of post-democracy that touches upon different concepts and 
theories. These concepts and theories (such as those concerning sound bites and Neo-
liberalism) are explained by Crouch even if he does not extensively make reference to other 
scholars’ work. Crouch seems to presuppose knowledge and interest from his readership in 
the field of democracy, economics and sociology. The dearth of references renders the text 
less academic than standard academic books and articles. This does, however, make the book 
accessible for a readership outside academia.  
This chapter is divided into two different parts: first, Crouch’s account of post-
democracy is explained. As noted before, different domains are interrelated. At the 
beginning, several moments depicting post-democracy are listed before moving on to 
Crouch’s discussion of the spectacular character of elections and Left politics in particular. 
The post-democratic development of Left politics is then situated and analyzed within a 
broader political-economic context making references to both new and old public policies. 
Following this political section, the next section deals with sociological and media related 
aspects of post-democracy: sound bites, political communication and the demise of quality 
journalism. With citizens blinded by politicians’ self-staging, the elite acts as it wants to for 
example in cutting back on citizens’ rights. This cutting back in civil rights and the stress on 
negative citizens’ rights, such as the right to property, is also reflected in the move from ‘old’ 
institutionalism to a ‘newer’ version. This ‘newer’ version turns out to be indebted to models 
of firm organization. The second part of this chapter deals with Crouch’s implicit 
understanding of democracy and the time of its most developed embedding, that is to say 
during the height of public management in the 1960s. This then leads to a discussion as to 
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whether this particular political-economic order could have been sustained or not by 
evaluating its limits. By investigating Keynesian demand management, which is a form of 
corporatism, it turns out that Keynesian public demand management also had characteristics 
that could alienate the citizenry from politics. In order to verify this statement, the 
relationship between Keynesian demand management, corporatism and bureaucracy is 
outlined. Moreover, Keynes, the founding father of the public management, is shown to be 
less of a socialist than some anticipated, which also becomes subject of debate later in this 
chapter. Finally, the relevance of Keynesianism in the 21
st
 century is explained even at the 
seemingly high tide of Neo-liberalism.  
1.1 POST-DEMOCRACY ACCORDING TO CROUCH 
Colin Crouch identifies the post-democratic state as a “...situation[s] where boredom, 
frustration and disillusion have settled in after a democratic moment; when powerful minority 
interests have become far more active than the mass of ordinary people in making the 
political system work for them; where political elites have learned to manage and manipulate 
popular demands; where people have to be persuaded to vote by top-down publicity 
campaigns.” (Crouch, 2004, p. 20). This situation features a wide range of different 
characteristics, stretching from the dominance of economics over politics to social policy that 
in one way or the other had a negative effect on the British welfare state by reducing its size: 
“But, while being part of the debate over the future of the welfare state, these issues were also 
relevant to discussions of problems of democracy. The rising political importance of the 
global firm, the vacuum left by the decline of the working class, and the way in which a new 
political class of political advisers and business lobbyists was filling that vacuum all helped 
explain why the government social policy was becoming increasingly obsessed with giving 
work to private contractors. This debate was also part of the post-democratic debate, and in 
fact provided a major example of the practical consequences of post-democracy.” (Crouch, 
2004, p. x). Regarding the basic features of post-democracy, Crouch outlines elements from 
both pre- and democratic times: “We should also expect the removal of some fundamental 
supports of democracy and therefore a parabolic return to some characteristics of pre-
democracy. The globalization of business interests and fragmentation of the rest of the 
population does this, shifting political advantage away from those seeking to reduce 
inequalities of wealth and power in favour of those wishing to return them to levels of the 
pre-democratic past. Some of the substantive consequences of this can already be seen in 
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many countries. The welfare state gradually becomes residualized as something for the 
deserving poor rather than a range of universal rights of citizenship...At least in western 
societies, unregulated private power was as much a feature of pre-democratic societies as 
unregulated state power” (Crouch, 2004, p. 22/3). Post-democracy seeks to highlight a 
tension in reality.  
a) Post-democracy’s Spectacular Character: Elections in General, Politicians 
in Particular 
Crouch sees post-democracy as a particular state of affairs in which “elections 
certainly exist and can change governments, [but where] public electoral debate is a tightly 
controlled spectacle, managed by rival teams of professional experts in the techniques of 
persuasion, and considering a small range of issues selected by those teams.” (Crouch, 2004, 
p. 4).  
This ’managed’ character of post-democracy also articulates itself in the controlling 
of public election campaigns, voiding them of any sense and reinforcing their theatrical 
character under the supervision of so-called ‘spin doctors’. Neither authentic political agenda 
nor co-operation can emerge giving way to a high degree of politicians’ personalization 
reminiscent of the personality cults practiced by people such as Stalin or Mussolini. Citizens 
adopt a passive, apathetic and intimidated attitude wherewith attempts to form associations 
fall short. “The mass of citizens plays a passive, quiescent, even apathetic part, responding 
only to the signals given them” (Crouch, 2004, p. 4). The restricted political arena becomes 
the new playground of the political process where only the government and the elite, 
synonym for economic actors’ interests, delineate political matters. “Behind this spectacle of 
the electoral game, politics is really shaped in private by interaction between elected 
governments and elites that overwhelmingly represent business interests.” (Crouch, 2004, p. 
4). Crouch’s main preoccupations revolve around the following scenario: “Under the 
conditions of a post-democracy that increasingly cedes power to business lobbies, there is 
little hope for an agenda of strong egalitarian policies for the redistribution of power and 
wealth, or for the restraint of power interests” (2004, p. 4). This situation would mostly affect 
left political parties’ legitimacy regarding their future existence as a Left party “will be 
experiencing a transformation that seems to reverse most of its achievements during the 
twentieth century.” (2004, p. 4).  
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Chapter two deals with the fate of political parties, in particular the British Left, under 
post-democracy. Nevertheless, it is important to note here that the transformation undergone 
by the political Left evidences the parabolic character of both democracy and the working 
class. First, regarding democracy Crouch outlines its shape by stating that: “…democracy has 
moved in a parabola. […] The parabola can be seen most clearly in the British case, and 
perhaps also that of Australia: the rise of working-class political power there was gradual and 
extensive; its decline has been particularly steep” (Crouch, 2004, p. 5). The parabola of 
democracy can be understood as the intensity of democracy undergoing varying degrees, 
while in contrast the working-class politics parabola serves as analysis in terms of 
disappearance: “ I [Crouch] had in mind that how, during the course of the twentieth century, 
that class moved from being a weak, excluded, but increasingly numerous and strong force 
banging on the door of political life; through having its brief moment at the centre, in the 
period of the welfare state, Keynesian demand management and institutionalized industrial 
relations; to end as a numerically declining and increasingly disorganized grouping being 
marginalized within that life as the achievements of the mid-century were booted out after it.” 
(Crouch, 2004, p. 5). Following this quotation, it appears as if the degree/level of democracy 
and the existence of a working class were closely linked together with the former being 
dependent on the later. The high tide of Crouch’s perceived democracy coincided with 
Keynesianism, a time when the democratic and working class parabola still exhibited strong 
upward tendencies towards more egalitarian politics and support for democratic participation. 
Crouch situates the moment of democracy’s highest point within the same period of 
time as when Keynesian policies led the economy. He states that “in most of Western Europe 
and North America we had our democratic moment around the mid-point of the twentieth 
century: slightly before the Second World War in North America and Scandinavia; soon after 
it for many others. […] political change moved in tandem with major economic development 
which made possible the realization of many democratic goals. For the first time in the 
history of capitalism, the general health of the economy was seen as depending on the 
prosperity of the mass of wage-earning people. This was clearly expressed in the economic 
policies associated with Keynesianism, but also in the logic of the cycle of mass production 
and mass consumption embodied in so-called ‘Fordist’ production methods.” (Crouch, 2004, 
p. 7). 
Bearing in mind the broader context in which Keynesianism was embedded, that is to 
say a liberal and open trade system advocated by the United States of America, countries 
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which adhered to these economic structures experienced “a certain social compromise […] 
between capitalist business interests and working people. In exchange for the survival of the 
capitalist system and the general quietening of protests against the inequalities it produced, 
business interests learned to accept certain limitations on their capacity to use their power. 
And democratic political capacity concentrated at the level of the nation state was able to 
guarantee those limitations, as firms were largely subordinate to the authority of national 
states. This pattern of development was seen in its purest form in Scandinavia, the 
Netherlands and the UK” (Crouch, 2004, p. 7/8). However, with the oil crises in the 1970s, 
“the global deregulation of financial markets had shifted the emphasis of economic 
dynamism away from mass consumption, and on to stock exchanges. First in the USA and 
the UK, but soon spreading in eager imitation, the maximization of shareholder value became 
the main indicator of economic success” (Dore, 2000, cited in Crouch, 2004, p. 10). 
Keynesianism turns out to be as central to Crouch’s conception of democracy as 
Monetarism and subsequent Neo-liberalism is for Crouch’s post-democratic state analysis. 
Indeed, the Keynesian state seems to be in Crouch’s view at the centre of egalitarian and 
social policies during the era of public management, so that the decline of such management 
means that “politics and government are increasingly slipping back into the control of 
privileged elites in the manner characteristic of pre-democratic times; and that one major 
consequence of this process is the growing impotence of egalitarian causes” (Crouch, 2004, 
p. 6). The Keynesian era also witnessed the spread of socialist governments throughout the 
Western world; for instance, B. Kreisky’s government lasting from 1970 until 1983 in 
Austria, as well as W. Brandt’s government lasting from 1969 until 1974 in Western 
Germany. 
Crouch blames, among other factors, the demise of Keynesianism and its replacement 
by Monetarism/Neo-liberalism for the emergence of post-democracy. In fact, the state as well 
as the British political Left reflects to a great degree the tensions of this alteration. However, 
this implicit suggestion regarding the social superiority of Keynesianism has to be assessed 
not in terms of the quality of its egalitarian outcomes, but on whether this economic regime 
could have been sustained after the 1973 oil crisis and subsequent related events such as the 
coming to power of conservative governments, the American stock market crash and the rise 
of Neo-liberalism.  
i) Personalization of Politics 
12 
 
The revival of personalization in politics is said to date back to the era of M. Thatcher 
and R. Reagan, both charismatic and strong politicians whose popularity outshone their 
respective party’s existence (McAllistar, 2005, p. 1). Nonetheless, other sources point to the 
Canadian 1968 Prime Minister P. Trudeau as the origin of post-World War Two 
personalization with his phenomenon of ‘Trudeaumania’. This phenomenon is described as 
an excessive enthusiasm for the Canadian politician Pierre Trudeau from the late 1960s. In 
general, it is assumed that the personalization of politics limits itself to presidential systems 
featuring a strong president. The president embodies both functions of head of government 
and head of the state. J. Linz (1990, p. 52) claims that this particular regime type is prone to 
failure due to the lack of clear power separations.  
The traditional environment of personalized politics in presidential regimes has 
expanded to different political systems such as parliamentary democracies. The attention 
brought to politicians in parliamentary systems much expanded during the last three decades 
leading to the following expressions: ‘presidentialization of politics’ even within the 
parliamentary system (Mughan, 1993; Poguntke and Webb, 2005, cited in McAllistar, 2005, 
p. 1), ‘presidential parliamentarism’ (Hazan, 1996, cited in McAllistar, 2005, p. 1) and 
‘institutional presidentialization’ (Maddens and Fiers, 2004, cited in McAllistar, 2005, p. 1). 
These various denominations suggest that the functioning of democracy undergoes alteration 
while the formal and institutional characteristics remain in place.  
The significance of electoral appeal studies came about when academic research 
acknowledged the important dimension of voter information gathering with respect to 
political candidates, in both their private and public lives, in order to decide whether or not to 
support the candidate. Surveys regarding American presidential candidates indicate that 
qualities such as reliability, competence and integrity gradually gained in importance whereas 
“the overall basic structure employed in candidate appraisals” (Miller et al’s, 1986, cited in 
McAllistar, 2005, p. 2) persisted. These statements apply to presidential systems. Bean (1993, 
p. 129, cited in McAllistar, 2005, p. 3) declares that the same statements hold true for 
parliamentary systems by giving the examples of New Zealand and Australia. In fact, in 
parliamentary systems, political parties play a greater role in the political sphere/life, their 
leaders are more prone to be judged upon their apolitical and personal traits.  
The spectacular features of politicians reinforced themselves with the development of 
the American advertising industry, which “began to develop its skills, with a particular boost 
coming from the development of commercial television. The persuasion business was born as 
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a profession […], but politics and other users of persuasion tagged along eagerly behind, […] 
making themselves as analogous as possible to the business of selling products so that they 
could reap maximum advantage from the new techniques” (Crouch, 2004, p. 25). The 
persuasion mentality and technique resulted in the people “hav[ing] become so accustomed to 
this that we take it for granted that a party’s programme is a ‘product’, and that politicians try 
to ‘market’ us their message” (2004, p. 25). The transformation of citizens into consumers 
will be discussed below.  
A further development of the corrosion of political communication is the increasing 
personalization of electoral politics. Crouch sees this development with apprehension and 
draws parallels with totalitarian regimes: “Totally personality-based election campaigning 
used to be characteristic of dictatorships and of electoral politics in societies with weakly 
developed systems of parties and debate. […] Promotion of the claimed charismatic qualities 
of a party leader, and pictures and film footage of his or her person striking appropriate poses, 
increasingly take the place of debate over issues and conflicting interests” (2004, p. 26). 
Examples of the following politicians are provided: first, the former centre-right Italian Prime 
Minister S. Berlusconi with his juvenescent pictures; second, the former Republican 
Governor of California, A. Schwarzenegger who owes his election victory to his Hollywood 
fame; third, and the Dutch right wing politician P. Fortuyn (2004, p. 26/7).  
For the purpose of this thesis, the personalization of politics will be used for testifying 
an additional trait of post-democracy: political communication depicted by entertainment 
television programmes, also labelled as ‘paparazzi democracy’ (Cosentino, 2011). With the 
ascension of Berlusconi, an on-going media tycoon, political matters and television 
entertainment converged bringing about a new paradigm with important ramifications for 
Italian democracy (Abruzzese, 1994; Musso, 1994; Statera, 1994; Padovani, 2005 cited in 
Consentino, 2011, p. 3). These repercussions announce a new democratic paradigm in the 
Italian context: ‘the Paparazzi Democracy’. This paradigm refers to the intrusive attention 
brought by entertainment television programmes to closed information bearing significant 
political results (Consentino, 2011, p. 14). One of the outcomes is the gradual blurring of the 
distinction between private and public spheres contributing to television entertainment 
programmes’ and political communication’s merger. This coming together became distorting 
for conveying political content and information. Therefore, Crouch’s post-democratic 
scenario in Italy holds true not solely because of Berlusconi political and economic 
affiliation, but also due to his political party which reflects the tensions arising from this 
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mismarriage of politics and economics. In fact, most members of Forza Italia, Berlusconi’s 
political party, originate from the economy and even assumed minister posts without any 
former political education. 
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ii) Decline in the Quality of Political Communication 
Regarding political communication Crouch states that “we have become accustomed 
to hear politicians not speaking like normal people, but presenting glib and finely honed 
statements which have a character all of their own. We call these ‘sound bites’…’” (2004, p. 
24). With these changes in political communication, the voidance of content only turned out 
to be a question of time. Crouch further notes the changing style of journalism: “Popular 
journalism, like politics, began to model itself on advertising copy; very brief messages 
requiring extremely low concentration spans…” (2004, p. 26) while the writing style of 
official documents also underwent a devaluation “…mass-circulation newspaper discussion, 
government material aimed at the mass public, and party manifestos are totally different. 
They rarely aspire to any complexity of language or argument” (2004, p. 24).  
The semantic changes in policy-reports and related government documents also have 
to be evaluated from a different perspective. The trivialization of semantics used in official 
documents carries a positive effect regarding their accessibility: in fact, by using a simplified 
diction, these official documents also become available to segments of society that remain 
detached from secondary as well as higher education.  
b) The Sociology of Media: Habermas (1991) and Debord (1967) Accounts 
on Spectacular Media 
Jürgen Habermas’ doctoral thesis entitled The Structural Transformation of the Public 
Sphere (1991 date of the English publication; originally published in 1962) relates to the 
discussion on post-democracy in general, and post-democratic media in particular, by 
offering insights into debates surrounding the public spheres. How these debates are relevant 
to contemporary societies, and to post-democracy in particular, will be explained at the end of 
this section. Habermas (1991) claimed a bourgeois public sphere arose during the 18
th
 and 
early 19
th
 century. In the 18
th
 and early 19
th
 centuries public sphere, individuals would meet 
up in order to discuss politics as well as the powers of state. In Habermas’ conception (1991), 
this bourgeois space emerged as an antipode to despotism. With the advent of the industrial 
revolution and capitalism, institutions different from the private economy and state politics 
emerged that served the bourgeoisie as places of intellectual exchange. These institutions 
came in different forms such as debating societies, newspapers as well as coffee houses. 
Habermas himself rightly points out that the public sphere was delineated and therefore not 
accessible to anyone. In fact, in order to gain access to the 18
th
 and early 19
th
 century public 
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sphere, one had to be literate and belong to the property owning class. Habermas (1991) 
further states that the emergence of the bourgeois public sphere occurred simultaneously with 
the distinction between the private and public spheres, known as the institutionalization of 
privateness. The crucial transformation was that the bourgeoisie became privately wealthy, 
state dominant and hence its media became consumer orientated. 
This 18
th
 and early 19
th
 century public sphere soon declined. Phenomena such as 
industrialization, increases in literacy and popular press as well as social developments all 
contributed to the public sphere’s demise. Dahlgren (1995) concludes that the decline of the 
public sphere led to “a blurring of the distinction between public and private in political and 
economic affairs, a rationalization and shrinking of the private intimate sphere (family life) 
and the gradual shift from an (albeit limited) public of political and cultural debates to a 
public of mass consumers.” (Dahlgren, 1994, p. 4). Consumption and mass media debates 
replaced the public sphere characterized by rational-critical debates. In Habermas’ view, the 
public sphere continued to exist, however as a sheer shadow of itself and exclusively as an 
appearance.    
The emergence of the welfare state counts as another milestone in the public sphere’s 
transformation (Habermas, 1991). In the heyday of public demand management that also saw 
the emergence of the welfare state, newspaper / media reached a new record high in terms of 
quantity. The new record high of mass media turned to be the new basis of public opinion, 
replacing the public sphere as domain of public opinion. Habermas further states that with the 
advent of mass media, the public sphere transformed into an advertisement platform while 
media turned into trade. The new public sphere has two key processes at its heart: first, the 
encroachment of legitimate power by communicative tools; and, second, the usage of mass 
media in order to foster mass loyalty, consumer demand beside compliance with the newly 
public sphere (1993, p. 452). 
Habermas suggests using a discourse-centred theory of democracy in order to avoid 
the before mentioned pitfalls. In this theory, decisions would be “rationally motivated but 
fallible result of a discussion concerning the judicious resolution of a problem, a discussion 
that has come temporarily to a close because coming to a decision could no longer be 
postponed (Habermas, 1993, p. 450).  
Habermas (1991) notes like Crouch (2004) that the media no longer aim at 
representing reality, but actually turn citizens into consumers. Habermas declares that 
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“instead of doing justice to reality, [journalism] has a tendency to present a substitute more 
palatable for consumption and more likely to give rise to an impersonal indulgence in 
stimulating relaxation than to a public use of reason.” (1991, p. 170). The advent of radio and 
television in the 1930s and 1950s, was another milestone in the deterioration of the then 
(pseudo) public sphere: “In comparison with printed communications the programs sent by 
the new media [radio and television] curtail the reactions of their recipients in a peculiar way. 
They draw the eyes and ears of the public under their spell but […] place it under “tutelage” 
which is to say they deprive it of the opportunity to say something and to disagree” (1991, p. 
170). In sum, Habermas views publicist institution to be at the mercy of media that is 
characterized by high economic concentration as well as by technological-organization. In 
fact, the former liberal public sphere is reversed.  
Habermas’ account does not go without criticism. The three main points of criticism 
are: first, the dearth in a gendered approach to the (liberal or pseudo) public spheres 
(Jameson, 1993, cited in Robbins, 1993; Polan, 1993, cited in Robbins, 1993); second, the 
dearth in discussing alternative forms of public sphere than the 18
th
 and early 19
th
 century 
bourgeois liberal one (Fraser, 1993; cited in Robbins, 1993); and, third, in academic 
scholarship Habermas’ claim of a public sphere remains debated as it is questionable whether 
a public and a single public sphere ever existed (Robbins, 1993).     
Debord’s (1967) The Society of Spectacle echoes Habermas’ claim that social life has 
been replaced by its sheer representation. Debord defines as spectacle “[the] concrete 
inversion of life, and, as such, the autonomous movement of nonlife.” (1967, p. 5). He further 
states that “The spectacle appears at once as society itself, as a part of society and as a means 
of unification. As a part of society, it is that sector where all attention, all consciousness, 
converges.” (1967, p. 5). Debord attributes to the media the role of sustaining the society of 
spectacle “If the spectacle understood in the limited sense of those "mass media" that are its 
most stultifying superficial manifestation seems at times to be invading society in the shape 
of a mere apparatus, it should be remembered that this apparatus has nothing neutral about it, 
and that it answers precisely to the needs of the spectacle's internal dynamics.” (1967, p. 24). 
By falling prey to the images circulated by the media, the society no longer relates to its 
historic trajectory / past (Bunyard, 2011), but to the images circulated by mass media at the 
command of those that ran the spectacle.  
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Both Habermas’ (1991) and Debord’s (1967) accounts address the spectacular 
character of society at the beginning of the 20
th
 century. Their accounts situate the decay of 
the public sphere within the context of mass media development. As such, they coincide with 
Crouch’s (2004) analysis of mass media’s contribution to poor quality journalism, politicians’ 
frequent use of sound bites, the advent of the citizen-consumer and politics exclusive 
character by being accessible only to a delineated group of people. Nonetheless, Habermas’ 
(1991) and Debord’s (1967) analyses locates the decline of public / political life much earlier 
than Crouch’s Post-democracy. The problem is that Habermas (1991) and Debord (1967) 
suggest the colonziation of media by business happened at the point Crouch sees as the high 
point of democracy. What Crouch (2004) sees as a fall from the 1950s to the 1970s is for 
Habermas and Debord what already existed for them before. As such, Crouch’s claim of the 
media’s role in rendering the political arena less accessible to the wider public is not novel. 
The highest point of democracy for Crouch (2004), is for Habermas (1991) and Debord 
(1967) is the very moment of politics and mass media colonization by commercial 
imperatives. Still, Crouch’s (2004) analysis goes beyond Habermas’ (1991) and Debord’s 
(1967) by addressing the role of left political parties in bringing about post-democracy for 
instance.    
c) From Citizen to Consumer 
Crouch dedicates chapter 5 to the commercialization of citizenship. First, Crouch 
retraces the history of the emergence of citizenship and the welfare state by highlighting their 
significant role in democratizing politics (2004, p. 78). However, their respective 
establishment was in line with struggles given that rights and the welfare state had to be 
fought for. With the consolidation of democracy in the second half of the 20th century, social 
citizenship became increasingly dependent on the quality of public services (2004, p. 78).  
The expansion of capitalism slowly drew different spheres of human life within its 
area of influence; however, an implicit agreement to leave aside social citizenship and the 
welfare state from the market principles existed. However, the abandonment of public 
management and its replacement by rational choice and public choice theories in the 1980s 
resulted in the commercialization of citizenship (2004, p. 82/86). Crouch uses this specific 
terminology “because each [practice] is premised on the assumption that the quality of public 
services will be improved if the existing practices and ethos of public service are partially 
replaced by those typical of commercial practice.” (2004, p. 80). Moreover, Crouch claims 
that “this concept [commercialization] is more accurate than marketization, for some of the 
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processes now being introduced involve distortions of the market rather than its purification.” 
(2004, p. 80). The last feature denoted by Crouch vis-à-vis the concept in question is its 
generality in comparison to privatization: indeed, he acknowledges privatization as the mere 
alteration of ownership.  
The reason for the commercialization of citizenship lies in the profitability of the 
welfare state: considering the rise in the wealthier segment of the population back in the 
1960s and to some lesser extent in the 1970s, the demand for services drastically increased 
and did not stop at educational, legal and health services (2004, p. 82). The welfare state had 
been protected from market principles by industrial capitalism. However, the succeeding 
post-industrial variant of capitalism currently aims at reversing agreements with the support 
by the World Trade Organization (WTO) for instance. For Crouch, the WTO also emerges as 
a key post-democratic institution due to its unique focus on commodification of areas 
formerly isolated from the market, see the liberalization of international exchange with 
respect to goods and services, while ignoring human priorities (2004, p. 83). The welfare 
state turns out to be the main area of interest of commercialization, a fact already addressed 
by other scholars (Hatcher, 2000; price, Pollock and Shaoul, 1999, cited in Crouch, 2004, p. 
83).  
The consequence of commercializing citizenship is residualization. This notion 
postulates the disinterest of the private sector for specific kinds of public services (2004, p. 
89). The state then deals with these services which then become residual and characterized by 
poor quality. The decrease in quality is due to their exclusive usage by the poor and political 
ineffective segment of society. Crouch declares that “public services of this kind cannot be 
described as ‘citizenship’: access to them is more a penalty than a right; and the essential 
citizenship mechanism of voice must not be made available to residualised recipients or they 
might seek improvements that would break the rule of no competition with market provision” 
(2004, p. 89/90). 
Besides the commercialisation of citizenship and the residualisation of the receivers, 
Crouch also denotes the consumerist character of citizens: “we take for granted that a party’s 
programme is a ‘product’, and that politicians try to ‘market’ us their message” (2004, p. 25). 
The progression from citizen to ‘citizen-consumer’ serves as another proof of the change 
from Keynesianism to Neo-liberalism and the advent of post-democracy. During the époque 
of Keynesianism, class consciousness and political actions still enjoyed a high level of 
support from the citizenry, although the enthusiasm following WWII slowly declined. The 
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encroachment of Neo-liberalism, the introduction of free-market principles in economics and 
the coming about of illiberal liberalism in politics forged the ‘citizen-consumer’. This 
expression is also summed up by the description ‘marketization of citizenship’.   
The emergence of the citizen-consumer in the United Kingdom relates directly to the 
modernization, reform and ‘improvement’ of public services. These modifications 
encompassed funding, evaluation and scrutiny regimes, and led to a further 
rapprochement/confusion between the private and public spheres. Vidler and Clarke (2005) 
state these changes emanate from the intention to reward the citizen-consumer. Adhering to 
this view also means that society is conceived as the sphere of consumerism putting pressure 
on public services to keep up with rising expectations. However, investigating whether public 
service usage is made on a voluntarily, involuntarily or coerced basis turns out to be crucial. 
The public service reforms under New Labour, according to Vidler and Clarke (2005), 
provide different ways in assessing the social sphere. By approaching the changes in the 
social sphere from a political economic perspective, the two concepts of citizen and consumer 
stand in opposition by reflecting the antagonism encountered between the market and the 
state.  
d) Changes in the Government: The Firm as an Institutional Model to be 
Followed 
For Crouch, ‘old’ institutions existed in public management under Keynesianism, 
while the newer version is embodied by the institutional model provided by the firm (Crouch, 
2004, p. 39). The enterprise, characterized by both its flexibility vis-à-vis responding to 
demand as well as in employing or laying off members of its work force (2004, p. 36) and 
phantasmal existence with respect to rapid fusions, changes of identity and internal 
reorganizations (2004, p. 36), regularly alters its production according to customers’ 
demands. These continuous changes result in innovative turmoil in the economy. 
Nevertheless, this model does not meet all needs. This is the point when the state traditionally 
stepped in to provide services which are not considered to be lucrative enough for the free 
market (2004, p. 39). The lines between public and private sector were formerly discernible; 
see the antagonism of the requirement for public services being universally accessible versus 
services offered on a commercial basis.  
With the emergence of post-democracy, the government encounters difficulties in 
distinguishing the public from the private sphere, as concepts from the late 19
th
 and early 20
th
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centuries such as (old/past) public services and citizen entitlements face (new) 
commercialization. The decline in differentiation according to Crouch reveals the fact that 
“…governments envy the phantom firm its flexibility and apparent efficiency, and try to 
imitate it almost heedlessly….government increasingly renounces any distinctive role for 
public services (which stresses a duty to provide citizens with more or less equal services to a 
high standard), and requires its departments to act as firms (which stresses a duty providing a 
service to that quality which is required by the meeting of financial targets).” (Crouch, 2004, 
p. 40). Means of reaching this post-democratic public sector situation are privatisation, 
contracting out public services to firms and forcing public sector services to behave as if they 
belonged to the private sector (2004, p. 40/1). A similar behaviour of the firm manifests itself 
in the government: the government no longer takes responsibility for the quality of public 
services so as to escape negative criticism wherewith services that once exclusively were 
executed under its command lose their public sector character and belonging (2004, p. 41). 
This development is represented by its advocates as further proof that in post-democracy the 
private sector deals best with public services due to their expertise.  
The firm as a new kind of leading institution has a direct psychological impact on the 
government: a sharp decrease in the administration’s self-confidence with respect to it 
providing public services. Reasoning according to the firm’s mode becomes self-justifying in 
the sense that the private sector gradually expands its services provided in the public sector 
resulting eventually in a loss of competence by the state (2004, p. 41). Crouch therefore 
characterises the government as an “institutional idiot, its every ill-informed move being 
anticipated in advance and therefore discounted by smart market actors.” (Crouch, 2004, 
p. 41). From this state of affairs results the current economic orthodoxy amounting to the 
state ensuring market freedom.  
Crouch points to the post-democratic reality of the rise in importance and power of 
the corporate elite: “The more powerful the firm becomes as an organizational form, the more 
powerful become the individuals who occupy these positions. They become even more 
powerful as government concedes to them the organization of its own activities and bows to 
the superiority of their expertise.” (Crouch, 2004, p. 43/4). From this development follow two 
observations: first, the corporate class further consolidates its dominant character in the 
government; second, the withdrawal of the state also translates into a dearth in funding 
organization with no lucrative goals which then turn to the corporate sector for funding. 
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Therefore, the corporate sector wins in terms of influence and can dictate the direction of 
non-lucrative organizations.  
The idea of the firm hollowing out the state is further treated in chapter three. 
Nevertheless, it has to be stated that Rhodes (1994) already described the firm’s take-over of 
state’s services in 1994. This new institutional model results from four interrelated trends 
leading to the state’s hollowing out: first, the diminishing of public intervention and the rise 
of privatization; second, the failure of both local and central governments to deliver services 
leading to alternative agencies taking on their former task; third, European Union institutions 
taking over the British state’s functions; fourth, reducing public servants’ responsibility by 
new public management while stressing managerial accountability and better distinguishing 
between administration and politics (Rhodes, 1994, p. 138/9). Because of this state of public 
affairs in 1994, Rhodes calls from the beginning for a potential, and possibly wishful, return 
of bureaucracy so as to reinforce the British state’s capacities.  
Crouch’s denounced intrusion of the private sphere into the public one following the 
demise of Keynesianism is assessed in a quantitative analysis by Rhodes (1994, p. 139) 
resulting in a mixed outcome. Rhodes assessed the scope of both government intervention 
and of the public sector by looking at government employment levels, the amount of public 
spending and the proportion of industries under public ownership. Bearing these three 
indicators in mind, Rhodes (1994, p. 139) draws the following picture of the British state 
after the abandonment of Keynesianism: from the mid-1980s to the early 1990s, public 
spending increased in real terms. Government expenditures rose and fell during the time 
period stretching from 1979 to 1992: first 43.3 per cent of the Gross National Product (GDP) 
was dedicated in 1979 to government expenditures. In 1986 government expenditure reached 
its lowest point when 39.5 per cent of the GDP accounted for these expenditures. In 1992, the 
expenditures rose for the first time again to 42 per cent. This is the reason why Rhodes claims 
that “There was no significant cut, therefore, although the fortunes of individual services 
within this total varied.” (1994, p. 139).  
Regarding privatization, its advancement is depicted by the following numbers: over 
half of the public sector in addition to 650,000 employees has been moved from the public 
sphere to the private one since 1979. Both decreases in nationalized industries and cuts in the 
civil service amount respectively to 4 per cent and 24 per cent during the time period 1979 to 
1992. Putting the cut in civil servants even more drastically, the decrease of non- and 
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industrial civil servants amounted to a drop from 732 thousands to 554 thousands (Rhodes, 
1994, p. 140). 
The underlying ideology for the privatization programme and the cuts in government 
expenditure emanated from the Conservative government: the government refused the 
“centralising, managerial, bureaucratic, interventionist style of government” (Rhodes, 1994, 
p. 140), it also refused to be a government that “t[old] people what their ambitions should be 
and how exactly to realise them” (Rhodes, 1994, p. 140) by further justifying their position 
by the fact that “optimism about the beneficent effects of government intervention had 
largely disappeared” (Rhodes, 1994, p. 140). Therefore the population was required “to put 
its faith in freedom and free markets, limited government and strong national defence” 
(Rhodes, 1994, p. 140).  
This short outline of government expenditure, privatization programmes and the cuts 
within civil servant staff evidences the fact that the reducing of the public sector has been 
underway for a while given that this reducing counts as a long-term policy goal. As such, 
Crouch’s claim about the state’s hollowing out following the abandonment of Keynesianism 
in terms of job cuts is supported by Rhodes’ account while Crouch’s statement on state 
expenditure is not shared by Rhodes. Comparing Crouch’s to Rhodes’ depiction of the state’s 
demise, the latter’s account appears to support Crouch’s analysis with quantitative data.  
Moreover, the public sector has been contracting out its services to the private sector 
since Harold Wilson’s Labour government “when [in 1968] private firms were brought in to 
clean government departments, producing an estimated saving of 35,000 jobs and £500 000 a 
year” (Rhodes, 1994, p. 140). Therefore, an element of post-democratic novelty, market 
testing, has been a reality in Britain since the late 1960s. The British contract state further 
consolidated under Thatcher’s Premiership as well as being expanded to services such as the 
National Health Service and to local government, see the 1988 Local Government Act 
resulting in “cuts in manual staffing levels in 57 per cent of the contracts let. The cuts were 
large for refuse collection (16.9 per cent), street cleaning (25.7 per cent) and building 
cleaning (18.5 per cent)” (Walsh, cited in Rhodes, p. 141). Although these cuts are generally 
perceived as harmful to the provided services, Walsh (cited in Rhodes, 1994, p. 140) declares 
that this mechanism induced a decrease in costs between six and seven per cent. Rhodes sees 
the contracting mechanism as a distinct feature between a central department and his/her 
agency executive.   
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Comparing Rhodes’ account to Crouch’s shows once more the supports of both 
scholars for democracy. The comparison, however, also calls post-democracy’s novelty into 
question. Rhodes depicts the developments that occurred in British public policy and within 
the state by providing quantitative data. The usage of quantitative data not only describes the 
situation but also allows analysing the beginning transformation of the British state in 1968. 
As such Rhodes seems to come to similar conclusion to Crouch vis-à-vis the hollowing out of 
the state. However, two facts set Rhodes apart from Crouch that cannot be overlooked: first, 
Rhodes acknowledges the benefits of contracting out some services while Crouch seems to 
condemn every attempt of contracting out; second, Rhodes’ account of the hollowed out state 
precedes Crouch’s post-democrat story by ten years. Therefore, asking how innovative 
Crouch’s post-democracy in fact turns out worth being asked.  
1.2 KEYNESIANISM AS THE FRAMEWORK FOR  
CROUCH’S DEMOCRATIC SUCCESS 
The reason behind investigating democracy in conjunction with Keynesianism is to 
scrutinize Crouch’s claim that Keynesianism embodied the high time of democracy with 
respect to its support from the population as well as with its social inclination, see expanding 
the Welfare State and ameliorating work conditions (Crouch, 2004, p. 5). He then claims that 
post-democracy emerged with the abandonment of public management and its replacement 
by Monetarism and subsequently Neo-liberalism. Crouch seems to advocate Keynesianism, 
understood as a socially inclined political economy, and a return to this form of economic 
management. First, an explanation of Keynesianism is given prior to dealing with its 
weaknesses. Subsequently, the risk carried by Keynesian public demand management to turn 
into a technocracy removed from the citizenry is addressed.  A discussion of whether Keynes 
can in fact be considered as a socialist, or rather as a liberal follows. Eventually, the 
relevance of Keynesianism in the 21
st
 century is highlighted.  
a) Keynesianism Explained  
Keynes aimed with the theory of macro-economics to prove classical economists 
wrong regarding their assumption that free markets will ‘naturally’ equilibrate at or near full 
employment, that is to say finding a balance between supply and demand. Keynes held the 
view that the economy as a whole was characterized by instability. Supply and demand could 
encounter an equilibrium that would not lead to full employment (Yergin and Stanislaw, 
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1998). The reasons for such disequilibrium lie in over-savings and defective investments 
stemming from feelings of uncertainty.  
In order to solve this problem, the state intervenes in the economy by financing the 
missing amount of investment. The money used in this process is borrowed; nevertheless, this 
deficit spending creates public jobs as well as raising the work force’s purchasing power 
(Yergin and Stanislaw, 1998), which stimulates growth and hence the ability to repay 
borrowings. Keynes envisaged a major role in the economy for the government. The 
government intervenes in an economy characterized by a managed and reformed capitalism 
discarding both extreme poles, that is to say socialism and free-market. The reason for the 
accentuation of the government’s role is due to its superiority in macro knowledge in 
comparison to the micro orientation of market agents (Yergin and Stanislaw, 1998).  
In times of negative growth or recession, the state has to intervene actively so as to 
ensure employment. This intervention requires borrowing money causing the public deficit to 
increase. This mechanism is known as deficit spending. Creating new jobs in public 
infrastructures, in housing and roads for example, contributes to both public income and 
wealth counteracting recessionary tendencies (Mahdjoubi, 1997, p. 3). As soon as the 
economy recovers after negative growth, and public revenues start to increase again, 
expenditures should gradually decrease.   
To sum up, Keynesian economics postulates that in times of economic crisis/hardship 
featuring a high level of unemployment, government has to intervene by borrowing money so 
as to keep the level of aggregate demand high. This is designed to maintain low inflation, 
avoid economic fluctuations and ensure full employment is maintained (Mahjoudbi, 1997, p. 
3).  
b) Weaknesses of Keynesianism 
As mentioned before, Keynesianism did not enjoy a unanimous support even in its 
heyday. The lack of support contributed to Keynesianism’s debilitation as well as to the 
economic system’s abandonment. The theory of income turned out to be a contentious issue 
even amongst Keynesian intellectuals (Palley, 2004). Keynesian theory postulates that the 
labour force receives as wages the value it represents for the firm. Making this assumption 
takes away the legitimacy of trade unions and other mechanisms to ameliorate the situation of 
labour in the economic market. Because demand is assumed to increase if stimulus spending 
is transferred into higher pay, the level of spending money increases. Still, the weakness of 
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Keynesianism resides in the lack of investigation with respect to production conditions.  Due 
to this lack, it is impossible to trace any influence and/or interaction on aggregate demand 
(Palley, 2004). 
Another weakness of this economic regime is related to the explanation of 
unemployment. Keynes did not pay enough attention to supply-side economics. Supply-side 
economics explain for several economists the breakdown of the Philips curve in 1970, 
besides the rise in both unemployment and inflation. According to Keynes, nominal wage 
rigidity paired with downward prices would account as factors for rising unemployment 
(Palley, 2004). Keynes’ idea stems from the 1940s economic situation and is explained as 
follows: lower prices emerge from lower nominal wages. This lowering would have a 
positive impact on the real value of money which subsequently rises. This increase 
encourages consumption and people would be inclined to spend their money. Aggregate 
demand also positively benefits from the rise of real money value. Moreover, real money 
supply increases due to lower wages reducing interest rates and encouraging investment. In 
this mode of reasoning, lower nominal prices and wages are seen as solution to 
unemployment (Palley, 2004).  
Another problem related to Keynes’s account of unemployment is his disregard for 
technological progress. Unemployment caused by technical progress therefore cannot be 
attributed to cyclical weaknesses but structural ones. In this case, deficit spending cannot 
alleviate the economic crisis but increases national debt (Schmid, Burh, Roth, Steffen, 2006, 
p. 90). Using tools of macroeconomic regulations and control is challenging due to problems 
raised by timing with respect to implement regulations and when control should be enforced. 
Still, finding the adequate time for implementing these regulations and controls is required 
for achieving procyclical instead of anti-cyclical effects. Moreover, the phenomenon of 
stagflation, the combination of high inflation and high unemployment, in the 1970s and 
1980s further triggered higher level of inflation and unemployment (Schmid, Burh, Roth, 
Steffen, 2006, p. 91).  
c) Keynesian Demand Management and the Risk of Technocracy 
Keynesian public demand management - has been acknowledged as a form of 
corporatism (Phelps, 2006; Crotty, 1999). Corporatism can be defined as the organization of a 
society by several significant interests groups. The market in the corporatist system is 
privately owned and has the following features: (i) monopolistic banks; (ii) labour unions 
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with a significant level of power; and, (iii) big employer confederations. These economic 
institutions are monitored and supported by a large state bureaucracy. Phelps (2006, p. 2) 
states that the main function of the corporatist system are to “to give voice and levers of 
power to a variety and range of social interests – “stakeholders” and the “social partners” in 
postwar terminology – so that they might be able to have a say or even a veto in market 
decisions that would harm them.” Stakeholders and social partners’ interests are represented 
by the state and carry a greater value than individual interests (Phelps, 2006).   
Phelps (2006) claims that Keynes’s political economy showed similarities with Italian 
corporatism (corporatismo), notably in industrial policy and organization theory. In contrast 
to American neoclassical microeconomics Keynes’ policy supported the government’s efforts 
to regulate cartels, trade associations, holding companies and monopoly power in general. 
Keynes’ supported state centred demand management and macroeconomics despite seeking 
to defend capitalism from socialist alternatives. Crotty (1999) notes that “In the 1920s at 
least, Keynes was unabashedly corporatist, supporting a powerful microeconomic as well as 
macroeconomic role of the state”. 
Corporatism rests on a bureaucratic apparatus to carry out functions. Such 
bureaucratic apparatus bears risks of alienating the citizenry from politics and Keynes’ 
corporatism created aloofness between the political arena and the citizenry; and turn into an 
undemocratic technocracy. The concept of bureaucracy can be defined as a “hierarchical 
organisation of officials appointed to carry out certain public objectives” (Etzioni-Halevyi, 
1983, p. 85) and is inspired by the ideas of power, domination and authority. Weber (1958), 
in his seminal work on The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism claims that 
bureaucracy can attain the highest degree of efficiency as well as rationality even whilst 
rendering the human individual a mere cog in the machine. In order to attain the alleged high 
degree of rationality and efficiency, the existence and use of authority is central. Halveyi 
(1983) enumerates the following three kinds of authority that exist within a given society: the 
traditional sort, which is legitimated by time, the charismatic one, see outstanding personal 
leadership and finally the legal rational one, which is the basis for bureaucracy. Theoretically 
bureaucracy and democracy develop at the same time. The simultaneous development does 
bear risks: the impact of bureaucracy on individuals is important as individuals are highly 
likely to turn into “Specialists without spirit, sensualists without heart; this nullity imagines 
that it has attained level of civilization never before achieved” (Weber, 1958, p. 182). 
Although the absence of emotion may, or not, pave the way for a rational approach within 
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bureaucracy, the lack of control by politicians over the bureaucracy should not be 
overlooked.  Bureaucrats are moreover supposed to adopt a neutral position and to participate 
in policy formulating; neutrality is rejected on the grounds that senior officials are in charge 
of allocating resources, wherewith lobbying can become very attractive. Crouch maybe 
overly enthusiastic in seeing corporation as a triangle between trade unions, an economic elite 
and the state. Nonetheless, Crouch’s idea of corporation is more egalitarian in the sense of 
attributing to trade union an important role in the corporation when compared to the present 
corporation where trade unions have been pushed out.  
d) Keynesianism’s Relevance in the 21st Century 
Today, Keynes is making a comeback. J. M. Keynes’s political-economic theory of 
public management has been first laid out in his 1936 book The General Theory of 
Employment, Interest and Money. Albeit replaced by Monetarism in 1973, Keynesian 
economics turns out to be still relevant to some particular economic schools of thought, such 
as Post-Keynesian as well as New-Keynesian economics. This is surprising in the sense of 
Keynesianism’s abandonment in the late 1970s. Another surprise is that the 2008 financial 
crisis sparked a renewed interest in Keynesian economics (Bowman, 2009; Reedy, 2009) 
both among policy-makers, see J. K. Galbraith and A. Darling and academics, see Crouch 
(2009).  
Before dealing with the renewed interest in Keynesian economics, it is first interesting 
to point to a discussion in academia regarding Keynes’ political affiliation. Considering that 
Keynes’ economics generally are contrasted with classic economics, a conclusion is all too 
quickly reached on Keynesianism’s political belonging: liberals embrace classic economics 
while socialists embrace Keynesianism. Without intending to label Keynesianism as 
belonging to this or that political ideology, pointing to discussions revolving around its 
ideological belonging evidence both social and liberal tensions. Finally, it has to be said that 
investigating Keynes’ political stance is relevant for unveiling the economist’s mind-set and 
opinions. However, to what extent these perspectives influenced Keynesian economics is 
both debatable and not subject to the following section. The reason for laying out Keynes’ 
political affiliation and role in fostering the post-WWII economic order is significant for 
acknowledging two other factors’ influencing apart the Great Depression the development of 
Keynesian economics.     
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Keynes’s influence on Anglo-American discussions during WWII cannot be 
overlooked, see his role in paving the way for the post-World War II order embodied by the 
Bretton Wood Accords, while academic discussions on Keynes’s adherence to social or 
liberal ideology never ceased to exist. Moreover, the economist himself added to this 
confusion by claiming to be a liberal in an ideological sense as well as a Liberal as 
understood to be a supporter of the then British Liberal Party (Raico, 2008, p.165). Scholars 
such as Bullock and Shock (1956, cited in Raico, 2008, p.165), E. K. Bramsted and K. J. 
Melhuish (1978, cited in Raico, 2008, p.165) even range Keynes in the tradition as A. Smith, 
T. Jefferson and J. Locke. The endorsement of values such as rationality and tolerance, his 
alleged strong belief in a free society further support the idea of Keynes as a liberal 
economist. The debate about Keynes’s ideological belonging has been further exacerbated by 
academics claiming that the economist aimed at remodelling past liberal ideas so as to adapt 
them to a new economic period of time (Raico, 2008, p.165).  
However, as Raico (2008, p.165) points out right from the beginning, these apparent 
liberal tendencies are not reflected in all aspects of Keynes’ political thought. On the 
contrary, he questions the liberal qualification by invoking Keynes’s endorsement of 
mercantilist doctrines, a point that had also been noted by the economist Hutt: “What struck 
him [Hutt] most of all was that this renowned economist [Keynes] would have us believe that 
the Mercantilists were right and their Classical critics were wrong (a position expounded in 
chapter 23 of the General Theory” (Hutt, 1936, cited in Raico, 2008, p.166). Keynes turned 
away from classical economics due to his disillusionment: the theory neither could explain 
1920’s high unemployment nor the Great Depression leading Keynes to assume that the 
undirected market was the cause for the economic problems. Following this ideological shift, 
“Keynes, discarding his “orthodox” predecessor (and contemporaries), aligned himself with 
what he himself dubbed that “brave army of heretics,” Silvio Gesell, J. A. Hobson, and other 
social-reformist and socialist critics of capitalism whom mainstream economists had 
dismissed as crackpots” (Friedman, 1997, cited in Raico, 2008, p.167). As early as 1934, 
Keynes already sympathized with Gesell and Hobson due to their rejection of “the idea that 
the existing economic system is, in any significant sense, self-adjusting….The system is not 
self-adjusting, and, without purposive direction, it is incapable of translating our actual 
poverty into our potential plenty.” (Keynes, 1973a, cited in Raico, 2008, p.167). Keynes’ The 
General Theory was written with the aim to offer an analytical context to legitimize this 
stance.  
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The second factor positioning Keynes’s even further from liberalism is his essay on 
National Self-Sufficiency published in 1933 positioning him closer to regimes with a strong 
state. Keynes affirmed in this essay that he “sympathize[d], […] with those who would 
minimize […] economic entanglement among nations. Ideas, knowledge, science, hospitality, 
travel--these are the things which should of their nature be international. But let goods be 
homespun whenever it is reasonably and conveniently possible, and, above all, let finance be 
primarily national.” (Keynes, 1933, p.759). Nevertheless, he also points to the dangers of 
dismantling a country in general and its economy in particular too quickly of its international 
trading partners. Still, Keynes acknowledges the advantages of this modification: “I am 
inclined to the belief that, after the transition is accomplished, a greater measure of national 
self-sufficiency and economic isolation among countries than existed in 1914 may tend to 
serve the cause of peace, rather than otherwise […] the age of economic internationalism was 
not particularly successful in avoiding war; and if its friends retort, that the imperfection of its 
success never gave it a fair chance, it is reasonable to point out that a greater success is 
scarcely probable in the coming years” (Keynes, 1933, p. 759).  
Ikenberry (1992) provides further evidence of Keynes’s socialist economic vein. 
During the Second World War, American and British intellectuals debated regarding the 
post-war order, especially in economic and monetary terms. Two different conceptions 
regarding this rearrangement emerged: on the one hand, American officials endorsed a 
system featuring open trade; on the other hand, British officials spoke out for economic 
stability and full employment by means of imperialism and bilateral agreements (1992, 
p.289). To further summarize the antagonistic positions, it is possible to state that the 
American side aimed at a multilateral and impartial trading regime, while the British 
counterpart advocated economic groupings according to preferences. In the end, the 
economic reestablishment featured a liberal world economy to the surprise of many (1992, 
p.289). The Anglo-American order paved the way for a multilateral trade and payment 
regime having at its heart the harmonisation of trade expansion and openness in relation to 
economic stabilization and full employment. This system soon became known as the 
“political miracle” (Gardner, 1985/6, cited in Ikenberry, 1992, p. 290), the starting point of 
the “30 Glorieuses [30 glorious years]” (Fourastié, 1979) as well as the “Edad de Oro del 
capitalismo [Golden Age of Capitalism]” (Barciela, 2005). According to Ikenberry (p. 294), 
the post-war settlement mainly reflects American interests which can be explained by 
structural factors. Still, the decision to choose this particular post-war order is not completely 
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explained by structural factors: first, in fact several different post-war orders could have been 
compatible with American interests. The answer to the question why this particular post-war 
order was elected resides in the voicing/delineation of interests and their (hidden) purposes. 
Second, it is worth inquiring how the different negotiation parties came to a joint result. For 
Ikenberry (1992, p.291), power and interests do not provide a complete explanation to this 
question while Keynesianism does. Indeed, public views regarding the role and duties of the 
state in foreign policy and national economies had undergone transformation in both United 
States and in the United Kingdom since the interwar period (1992, p.292). The restructuring 
of American foreign policy with respect to internationalist thinking combined with the so-
called Keynesian revolution played a decisive part in establishing an innovative post-war 
economic order satisfying public demand (1992, p.292). 
As noted before, the liberal and socialist economic dynamics existed in parallel. 
However, invoking international law economic internationalization had been recognized and 
enacted since the 19th century, see the forced Treaties of Nanjing (1848), Tianjin (1848) as 
well as the Convention of Beijing (1860) for China and trade Treaties from 1854 and 1861 
between Japan and the United States, France, Prussia, the United Kingdom, Russia and 
Holland (WTO, 2007, p. 35). Keynesianism, in opposition, remained at a national level with 
almost autarkic purposes (Keynes, 1933).  
Crouch never invokes Keynes as an economist; however, his allusions to public 
management and Keynesianism go hand in hand and appear as the high tide of democratic 
blossoming. Crouch’s nostalgic view on public demand management and Keynesian 
economics in an era of internet and housing bubbles, financial and economic crises has been 
echoed following the 2008 financial crisis in a renewed interest in Keynesianism.  
This revived interest in both expanding monetary policy and fiscal stimulus comes at 
a time of financial crisis that has often been compared to the 1930 Great Depression (Reddy, 
2009; Bowman, 2009). Both academics and policy-makers took up Keynesian ideas anew: 
Crouch (2009) talks of a privatized version of Keynesianism while Posner (2009), coming 
from a former liberal position, embraced in 2009 Keynesian economics; both Brown and 
Darling saw Keynesian economics as a solution to the financial crisis (Stratton and Seagor, 
2009) while Obama even went as far as limiting banks’ speculative power and announcing 
stimulus plans to combat economic recession (Cho and Appelbaum, 2010).  
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Posner (2009) discusses in the column How I became Keynesian his valuation of 
Keynesian economics in the light of the housing bubble, financial crisis, underestimated 
economic consequences, the failure of orthodox monetary policy as well as over the lack of 
consensus regarding how to boost the economy. Keynes’ General Theory seems to convince 
Posner in combatting the main obstacle to pave the way for a blossoming economy: 
unemployment. Posner’s (2009) perceived parallels between the 2008 financial crisis and the 
1930 Great Depression lead him to embrace Keynesian economics. In contrast, Crouch 
(2009) does not support the revival of traditional Keynesian economics among both 
academics and policy-makers; however, he sees a revived privatized version among the 
people. For Crouch the emergence of privatized Keynesianism in the late 20
th
 century (in 
terms of a boom in personal debt) accounts as another watershed in post-democracy.  
e) Crouch’s Account on Privatized Keynesianism 
The exchangeability in semantics, see capitalism being synonymous for democracy 
and vice versa, sealed for Crouch the fate of capitalism’s take off and democracy’s demise: 
“Following the fall of communism at the end of the 20th century it became common to equate 
capitalism with democracy” (Fukuyama, cited in Crouch 2009a, p. 382). The equation was 
strengthened by a growing and historically novel preference of governments in the United 
States […] democracy was considered to produce polities within which citizens would ask 
governments to do less and, by implication, markets to do more.” (Crouch, 2009a, p. 382). As 
the genesis of privatised Keynesianism can be counted the mismarriage between capitalism 
and democracy. These systems and regimes working together have been so far addressed by 
two different political-economic approaches intending to tackle, or to brush aside, the 
different ambitions of democracy (functioning at a national level) and capitalism 
(encompassing on a global level): public demand management as embodied by Keynesianism 
and privatized Keynesianism understood as “a system of markets alongside extensive housing 
and other debt among low- and medium-income people linked to unregulated derivatives 
markets.” (Crouch, 2009a, p. 382). The movement from Keynesianism to its privatized 
counterpart consists of two characteristics: “the availability of alternative ideas and the 
existence of a class, the service of whose interests would serve a general interest. It is often 
claimed that at the present juncture we lack the former (Skidelsky, 2009) while no one 
notices the latter. The absence of ideas is considerably exaggerated in these discussions; the 
question of a leading class is more important.” (Crouch, 2009a, p. 395). In more general 
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terms, privatised Keynesianism means the relaxation on private bank lending that allowed for 
a massive increase in personal debt to fund economic demand. 
Crouch identifies instability as both another source of privatized Keynesianism and as 
a weakness of neo-liberal ideology. Instability in turn advanced the development of privatised 
Keynesianism “the growth of credit markets for poor and middle-income people, and of 
derivatives and futures markets among the very wealthy. This combination produced a model 
of privatised Keynesianism (Crouch 2008; Bellofiore and Halevi (forthcoming)) that occurred 
initially by chance, a real case of market entrepreneurship, but which gradually became a 
matter for public policy so important as to threaten the entire neo-liberal project.” (Crouch, 
2009a, p. 390). Otherwise, the emergence of privatized Keynesianism is bound to the 1970s 
inflationary crisis leading to Keynesianism’s abandonment. With the emphasis on avoiding 
inflation at any cost, the new economic orthodoxy came about. Organizations such as the 
Organization for Economic Co-Operation and Development, the World Bank and the 
International Monetary Fund contributed to its legitimation (Crouch, 2009a, p. 386).  
Risk counts as another basis of privatized Keynesianism. As Crouch states “Through 
markets in derivatives and futures the great Anglo-American finance houses learned how to 
trade in risk. They found they could buy and sell risky holdings provided only that purchasers 
were confident that they could find further purchasers in turn; and that depended on the same 
confidence. Provided markets were free from regulation and capable of extensive reach, these 
trades enabled a very widespread sharing of risk, which made it possible for people to invest 
in many ventures that would otherwise have seemed unwise (see also Leyshon and French 
2009, in this issue). Meanwhile, the liberation of global finance markets brought funds 
located in ever more extended parts of the world to share the burdens of risk-bearing.” 
(Crouch, 2009a, p. 392). Risk has been the basis for economic crises in the late 19th century 
as much as in the late 1920s. The main shift to notice from Keynesianism to privatized 
Keynesianism is the move beyond politics from social democracy featuring a strong work 
force supporting the government to a neo-liberal conservative class stemming from the 
financial sector.  
Globalization further contributed to privatized Keynesianism’s take off by valorizing 
private transnational corporations. However, Crouch’s denotes one fundamental problem in 
the interplay between capitalism and democracy: “if the instability of free markets had to be 
overcome to usher in the mass consumption economy, how did the latter survive the return of 
the former?” (Crouch, 2009a, p. 390). The answer resides in the increase of credit markets 
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targeting the middle and the poor class of society as well as future market opportunities for 
the affluent class. These two new markets on the one hand saved neo-liberalism; on the other 
hand, they consolidated the advent of privatized Keynesianism that the government 
subsequently adopted as public policy. Privatized Keynesianism (i.e. personal debt 
escalation) counts as much as a threat as a rescue for Neo-liberalism (Crouch, 2009a, p. 390). 
The parallels of Keynesianism and its privatized version reside in the handling of 
debt, although at different levels: “Under original Keynesianism it was governments that took 
on debt to stimulate the economy. Under the privatised form individuals, particularly poor 
ones, took on that role by incurring debt on the market. The main motors were the near-
constant rise in the value of owner-occupied houses and apartments alongside an 
extraordinary growth in markets in risk. This regime collapsed, partly during a repetition of 
energy and other commodity inflation, but largely because of certain internal contradictions.” 
(Crouch, 2009b, p. 1) and in the harmonizing of capitalism and democracy: to “reconcile[e] 
the uncertainties and instabilities of a capitalist economy with democracy’s need for stability 
for people’s lives and capitalism’s own need for confident mass consumers” (Crouch, 2009a, 
p. 382). In comparison to its predecessor, the reconciliation undertaken by privatized 
Keynesianism turns out to be ephemeral.  
Both regimes also face the same tensions of insecurity and uncertainty as well as an 
ambivalent relation between firms and consumers “that between the insecurity and 
uncertainty created by the requirements of the market to adapt to shocks, and the need for 
democratic politics to respond to citizens’ demands for security and predictability in their 
lives […] within advanced capitalism itself, which needs on the one hand consumers on 
whose confidence firms can depend when planning their production, and on the other a 
capacity to respond to periods of declining demand by reducing the quantity and wages of 
labour, which in turn undermines consumer confidence. The tension can never be ‘resolved’ 
as it is endemic to the only successful form of political economy that we know; it has to be 
managed, by a series of regimes that will always in the end wear out and need to be replaced 
by something else.” (Crouch, 2009b, p. 1/2).  
Crouch also explains the flaws and novelties of privatised Keynesianism in 
comparison to other economic theories: “All theories of market economics depend on the 
assumption that market actors are perfectly informed, but privatised Keynesianism depended 
on what were presumed to be the very smartest actors concerned, the financial institutions of 
Wall Street and the City of London, having highly defective knowledge. More accurately, 
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financial entrepreneurs and accountancy firms developed forms of knowledge that 
encouraged eventually self-destructive decisions. This is the Achilles’ heel of the model, 
corresponding to the inflationary ratchet of original Keynesianism. In terms of distributive 
politics, inflation can be seen as granting many different groups a larger share of the cake by 
inventing cardboard cake—increases in money values of declining purchasing power. Under 
privatised Keynesianism vast quantities of totally fictitious cake were produced, on the basis 
of the notional values of which even vaster quantities of such cake were leveraged.” (Crouch, 
2009a, p. 393).  
The actual functioning of privatized Keynesianism bases itself on the explosion of the 
housing market, a growing number of credit cards and bank loans leading individuals to 
become the new debt takers. Crouch (2009a, p. 392) claims that this practice had already 
been used as public policy by the British government in the 1980s when the government 
privatized council housing making these estates available to a segment of society with 
moderate salaries: “as an initial implicit public policy boost to the [neo-liberal] model back in 
the 1980s when the privatisation of council housing enabled large numbers of people on 
moderate incomes to take on mortgages and, later, to explore the scope for extended 
mortgages. But the move to more explicit policies to have house prices constantly rising crept 
up during the first years of the 21
st
 century until the massive interventions into housing 
finance and the banking sector in general during 2007 and 2008” (Crouch, 2009a, p. 392). 
This led people to indebt themselves even more while house prices continued to rise. The 
state consequently had to intervene following the house market implosion as well as in the 
2008 banking sector crisis by bailing out banks (Watson, 2009, cited in Crouch, 2009a, p. 
392).  
Finally, Crouch maintains that “once privatised Keynesianism had become a model of 
general economic importance, it became a kind of collective good, however nested in private 
actions it was. Necessary to it was behaviour by banks that has to be defined as irresponsible, 
as it involved their not carrying out checks and accountancy practices that they were in 
principle assumed to do. Therefore that very irresponsibility became a collective good.” 
(Crouch, 2009a, p. 394). Moreover, privatized Keynesianism is also bound to develop into a 
new form, see “Sharing neo-liberal prejudices against government as such, frightened at the 
impact of regulation on growth and believing in the superiority of corporate directors over 
themselves at nearly everything, politicians increasingly rely on corporate social 
responsibility for the achievement of several policy goals. We should therefore anticipate a 
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shift from unregulated privatised Keynesianism to self-regulated privatised Keynesianism.” 
(Crouch, 2009a, p. 397). Nevertheless, the fundamental question remains the same as from 
the very beginning of Crouch’s analyses of post-democracy and privatized Keynesianism: 
how can the functioning of democracy and capitalism be harmonized? A more specific 
question regarding the development of privatized Keynesianism is: what are the ways to 
manage the financial irresponsibility which currently has been established as a public good?  
The former antagonistic forces of democracy and capitalism dissolved with the 
recognition of the work force as a political class as well due to Keynesianism, when mass 
consumption triumphed while the market expanded its scope. This golden era of capitalism 
made capitalism and democracy dependent on one another: “The virtuous spiral of the US 
Fordist model of mass production technology linked to rising wages and therefore to rising 
mass consumption and more demand for mass-produced goods was part of the answer. The 
more extensive approach to social policy of the kind emerging in the Scandinavian and 
British welfare states addressed the problem of insecurity. Confident, secure working-class 
consumers, far from being a threat to capitalism, could enable an expansion of markets and 
profits on an unprecedented scale. Capitalism and democracy became interdependent.” 
(Crouch, 2009a, p. 384).  
The interdependence of the two systems soon reached a stale mate: within the 
framework of a free market, both employment and wages are subjugated to fluctuations. 
Given that the state would not intervene to keep demand and investment levels up, the 
wealthier segment of society, the elite, feared for a decline in economic growth and the 
market becoming inflexible (Crouch, 2009a, p. 384).  The envisaged solution by neo-classical 
theory, the market adjusting itself quickly, did not occur for the following reasons: first, the 
stipulated and necessary ‘purity’ of the market to deal with this kind of shocks was not 
verified; second, the supposedly rational actor who would take risks in the economy did not 
crystallize. In fact, the generations living in the Keynesian framework either experienced one 
of two world wars, if not even two, wherewith their willingness to discount previous events 
when planning future expenses was diminished. Crouch illustrates this thought by the 
following sentence: “Their [people’s] most likely guide to the future is likely to be their 
experience of the past, and they will err on the side of risk aversion when making their 
judgements. The adult generations of the post-war period, with their experience of two world 
wars and a major world slump, were likely to be particularly risk averse.” (Crouch, 2009a, p. 
385). 
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Comparing Crouch’s initial conception of Keynesianism in Post-democracy (2004) to 
his understanding of both Keynesianism and its privatized version in 2009 shows in what way 
the perception altered. In Post-democracy (2004), Crouch conceives Keynesianism in more 
political terms when compared to his vision of Keynesianism only five years later. The initial 
conception revolved around opportunities provided by Keynesianism to formerly 
marginalized classes, in particular the working class. Following the disastrous years of 
WWII, the era of public management was marked by prosperity and a high support for the 
democratic regime in place among the population. Prosperity, demands for more rights and 
better work conditions as well as an expansive Welfare state appear to be the main 
characteristics Crouch attributes to Keynesianism in post-democracy. This positive view 
alters when compared to Keynesianism’s depiction in the two papers from 2009 dealing each 
with privatized Keynesianism as an unacknowledged policy and ways to overcome this new 
economic regime.  
In fact, Keynesianism is treated from an economic perspective. This different 
assessment enables Crouch to point to financial and economic parallels between these two 
systems. Traditional Keynesianism as well as its privatized version is defined as a “policy 
regime […] [that] succeeded in reconciling the uncertainties and instabilities of a capitalist 
economy with democracy’s need for stability for people’s lives and capitalism’s own need for 
confident mass consumers.” (Crouch, 2009a, p. 382). Public demand management’s 
weakness does not emanate from politics but from economics: “The importance of neo-
corporatism for present purposes is that it addressed the Achilles’ heel of Keynesianism: the 
inflationary tendencies of its politically determined ratchet.” (Crouch, 2009a, p. 387) While 
exhibiting political and economic power “Keynesianism had become emblematic of a far 
wider range of policies of regulation, welfare provision and subsidy” (Crouch, 2009a, p. 387), 
and the capacity to frame capitalism for some time “Combined with Fordist production 
systems, the model now appears to characterise a particular historical period and a stage in 
the development of capitalism, or a distinctive accumulation regime (Boyer 2004a, 2004b and 
2005). Seen from one perspective (Giddens 1998) it was suited to a mass industrial working 
class producing standardised goods and accepting standardised government and welfare 
services. This was not just a production regime, but virtually an entire society.” (Crouch, 
2009a, p. 387/8).   
In Post-democracy, Crouch mentions Keynesianism in relation to democracy’s high 
tide of both Northern America and Western Europe: “In most of Western Europe and North 
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America we had our democratic moment around the mid-point of the 20
th
 century. […] For 
the first time in the history of capitalism, the general health of the economy was seen as 
depending on the prosperity of the mass of wage-earning people. This was clearly expressed 
in the economic policies associated with Keynesianism, but also in the logic of the cycle of 
mass production and mass consumption embodied in so-called Fordist production methods. 
In those industrial societies which did not become communist, a certain social compromise 
was reached between capitalist business interests and working people.” (Crouch, 2004, p. 7). 
Keynesianism’s links to politics, and above all its repercussions, cannot be overlooked, see 
the abandonment of Keynesianism triggered the vanishing of the working class, which in turn 
altered the existing relationship between the electorate and political parties.   
The readings published respectively in 2004 and 2009 still evidence Crouch’s 
conception of Keynesianism to be intimately bound to social-democratic democracy as well 
as to the Fordist model of production. These two sides of the Keynesian coin allowed in 
Crouch’s view the integration of formerly marginalized classes, see the working class, which 
both called for more political and social rights while collaborating with business in making 
the economy thrive. Nevertheless, it seems as if the political advantageous side of 
Keynesianism was on the one side greater important to Crouch than economic implication 
when dealing with public demand management; on the other hand, the economic side of 
Keynesianism sees itself to be upgraded in its privatized version. Regarding privatized 
Keynesianism, the main associated topics revolve around debts, the housing markets as well 
as the dissolution of capitalism’s and democracy’s difference. These characteristics enable 
one to state that Crouch’s outlook on the future worsened when speaking of privatized 
Keynesianism. Bearing in mind that the privatized version already depicts the economic 
situation faced by many people in times of financial crisis, Crouch’s opinion does not come 
as a surprise.  
To sum up, Crouch’s perception of Keynesianism carried a political connotation in 
Post-democracy (2004) when compared to Privatized Keynesianism: An unacknowledged 
Policy Regime (2009a) and What will follow the Demise of Privatized Keynesianism? 
(2009b). Discussing both Keynesianism and privatized Keynesianism five years later it 
transpires that Crouch now sees these kinds of demand management from a more economic 
perspective. This shift in perspective also has to be assessed within a broader context. In 
2004, Western Europe as well as Northern America paid more attention to political events 
such as European Union enlargement as well as to the War on Terror. Five years later, the so-
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called global financial crisis was under its way, although its global encompassing character is 
debatable. National debts and (youth) unemployment reach new heights while the Euro 
currency underwent a severe crisis leading many academics to compare this crisis to the 
Great Depression. Within this context, economics partially crowded politics out of 
newspapers headlines, governmental discussions and civil manifestations. Therefore, 
Crouch’s move in assessing Keynesianism is hardly surprising, even more so in the light of 
Crouch’s writing focusing on political economy.  
1.3 CONCLUSION 
This chapter outlined Crouch’s understanding of post-democracy as well as his 
conception of democracy and his related political-economic framework. Crouch does not 
understand post-democracy in a purely political sense, but also adds sociological, media and 
economic aspects. In fact, Crouch sees post-democracy as a non-acknowledged battle ground 
between politics and economics, where economics appears to infiltrate politics to create a 
regime best suited for dominant private interests. Through this infiltration, political actors 
turn away from their initial purpose of claiming rights from the state and questioning societal 
arrangements with other political parties, to supporting dominant economic interests when 
holding office. As such, political office is corrupted and becomes a tool in reaching particular 
economic ends. In the chapter it was pointed out that Crouch’s (2004) high point of 
democracy has been identified by both Habermas (1962) and Debord (1967) as the high time 
of mass media. So, Crouch (2004) account on mass media is not novel whilst the supposed 
Keynesian high point of democracy is debatable. 
This scenario holds true according to Crouch in the era of Neo-liberalism. This era 
emerged following the oil crisis in the 1970s when Keynesian demand management, was 
abandoned in favour of Neo-liberalism, known as new public demand management. Crouch 
seems nostalgic for Keynesianism throughout his depiction of post-democracy which he also 
describes as being the high point of democracy. Weakness of Keynesianism were identified 
as the lack of attention paid by Keynes to conditions of production, reasons for 
unemployment and technological progress. Risks carried by Keynesian demand management, 
in contrast to Crouch’s (2004) idea of Keynesianism as high point of democracy, are the 
removal of the citizenry from politics by Keynesian technocratic demand management.  
Whether Keynesianism could have survived in its established form following the 
1970s oil crisis has been discussed in the second part of this chapter. The weaknesses laid out 
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showed why this public management order could not have been sustained as it was then 
configured. However, Crouch offers a very interesting account on Keynesianism’s privatized 
aspects which turn out to be reminiscent of former state actions such as bail-outs, fiscal 
stimulus and a personalized debt driven model of demand.   
While Crouch’s opinion that democracy blossomed under Keynesian public 
management holds true in the light of social democracy and after the disastrous years of 
WWII, the neo-liberal privatized version of Keynesianism raises questions. The mere fact of 
two political economies co-existing in one delineated group of countries within one global 
capitalist system is fundamentally noteworthy. Today people incur debt in a way similar to 
states during traditional Keynesianism.  Banks were publicly bailed out by states during the 
2008 financial crisis. Who would take on the cost of bailing out people that proclaimed 
themselves bankrupt? ‘Bailing out’ the huge number and overly indebted citizens would 
bankrupt most Western states and is hence economically inconceivable. Traditional, 
privatized and new Keynesianism all suffer from the same flaw: in order to stimulate the 
economy huge borrowing takes place. Crouch observes that privatized Keynesianism had to 
be supplemented by new state Keynesianism to bail out the banks. He therefore says that state 
Keynesianism is not only superior to any other kind of Keynesianism, but essential.  
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CHAPTER 2:  POLITICAL PARTIES AND THE GLOBAL FIRM IN  
CROUCH’S POST-DEMOCRACY 
This chapter reflects upon the two different institutions: one that is subject to a post-
democratic transformation according to Crouch resulting in its hollowing out; the other one is 
unveiled by Crouch as the driving force of the post-democratic order. The first institution is 
the political party, while the second institution is the global firm. Political parties are 
generally assumed to embody a particular ideology. Moreover, political parties serve as a 
means of ideological representation on a governmental level. Crouch’s post-democratic party 
analysis focuses on left political parties in general and the British New Labour party under 
Tony Blair in particular. Other political parties such as the German socialist party (SPD), the 
Italian social-liberal Reformist party (Riformisti Italiani) and the centre-right party Forza 
Italia (Movimento Politico Forza Italia) also receive minor attention. The attention paid to 
these political parties serves to either illustrate their same fate which is also experienced by 
other European left political parties or to either demonstrate the convergence of left and right 
political parties not only in terms of values and ideologies but also by the origin of their 
supporters.  
According to Crouch the second institution, the global firm, appears in contrast to the 
hollowed out and passive political parties as the active as well as expansive institution in 
pursuing the post-democratic order. This driving is facilitated by both the phenomenon of 
globalization and in overcoming potential nation state level barriers, such as political parties, 
by means of infiltration. The infiltration occurs according to Crouch mainly in left political 
parties which formerly aimed at instituting egalitarian politics. The act of infiltration also 
contains the spread of free-market principles into other spheres than economics. The 
hollowing out of political parties allows the firm to advance its institutional model – a replica 
of its functioning transposed onto the state.  
This chapter deals in the first part with Crouch’s account of political parties’ role in 
fostering the post-democratic order. The chapter then reviews three different opinions that 
support, nuance and contradict Crouch’s account of New Labour’s leading part in post-
democracy. The next part deals with the role of the global firm in post-democracy disclosing 
supportive and contrary arguments relative to Crouch. Finally, two cases are provided where 
the new institutional model of the firm has been applied.   
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The fourth chapter of Crouch’s (2004) book entitled ‘The Political Party under Post-
democracy’ deals with the challenge encountered by the political party/association in post-
democracy. The main challenge posed by the post-democratic regime to the political party 
can be summed up as the dissolving of class structure paralleled by the ascending power of 
the firm. Consequences for the core of the party are regular revisions of the leadership as well 
as the incorporation of lobbyists and advisors within the party ranks. The disappearance of 
political programmes and internal policy debates comes about. 
Crouch (2004, p. 70) divides the traditional constituency of political parties into 
several fluid concentric circles: the leader emanates from the activist circle, while the 
activist’s circle in turn originates from party membership belonging to the manual working 
class. Hence historically the interests and worries of the designated electorate were voiced. 
The existing intermediaries between the leadership and the electorate function in a two-way 
mechanism passing by/through the various circles. Crouch (2004, p. 76) then transposes this 
functioning onto the Labour party and claims that this specific party construction is crucial to 
the self-image and self-perception of working-class parties. This statement rests on the fact 
that working class parties once manifested themselves as social movements and then 
crystallized into political parties (Crouch, 2004, p. 71).   
According to Crouch (2004, p. 77), the political party today exhibits simultaneously 
democratic and pre-democratic features. Mass party structure and its elected leadership 
remain important for ideological reasons while the elected leadership also becomes 
increasingly dependent on managers, experts and lobbies. In the post-democratic order, 
opinion polling and policy work carried out by experts become the norm in policy formation. 
Pre-democratic characteristics are an unequal access to the political arena and unequal power 
within it. It is the ruling elite that enjoys a privileged access to the political sphere and an 
unequal power in the political and economic spheres. An example of pre-democratic features 
is the reappearance and the enforcement of privileges (Crouch, 2004, p. 77). In post-
democracy it is the firm and other economic/business interests that enjoy advantages. In 
Crouch’s understanding (2004, p. 77), centre-left parties illustrate well the tension 
experienced in the post-democratic order. Moreover, the lack of new parties shows the 
binding of new capital with an old political organisation. 
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2.1 CROUCH’S POST-DEMOCRATIC PARTIES ANNIHILATING THE LEFT-
 RIGHT DICHOTOMY IN POLITICS  
a) A Post-democratic Left Political Party: New Labour in England 
Crouch (2004, p. vii) states that towards the end of the 1990s the interest of the 
wealthier segment of society was further extended at a time when most European Union 
governments were centre-left. This paradox is explained, Crouch (2004, p. viii) suggests, by 
so-called ‘experts’, ‘lobbyists’ and ‘focus groups’ infiltrating left parties such as British New 
Labour. This process is defined by the quest for a new identity by the British socialists. With 
the progressive shrinking of the manual working class, the Labour party faced an electoral 
vacuum. Within the Labour party’s elite circles, such a decline in the traditional manual 
working class core vote justified the admission of new non-traditional members such as 
business lobbyists. The defeat in 1979 left the Labour party weak and spurred a leftward 
move. However, after 1983 there was a general shift to the right. According to Crouch, this 
move to the right also implied a disassociating stance from the party’s past justifying the 
party’s declining attention upon social justice. Crouch (2004, p. 64) further claims that the 
semantic change from Labour to New Labour reflects the move from a political party suited 
for democracy to one suited for post-democracy. Crouch feels uncomfortable with the new 
political class developing around New Labour. These associations not only displaced the old 
party structure but also relativized the affiliation to a fixed social class. Besides these 
observations, Crouch (2004, p. 60) also denounces the party’s apparent narcissism: the party 
leaders are only interested in their own well-being leaving aside concerns of their electorate. 
In fact, “They [New Labour Members of Parliament] are encouraged to seek no means of 
social improvement other than for themselves and their children obediently to climb the 
career ladders established by business elites.” (Crouch, 2004, p. 60). This egocentrism occurs 
at the cost of political, economic and social causes such as cuts in education and arts, the 
rolling back of the state in economics and the devaluation of public services. This disinterest 
in engaging in redistributive politics is reflected in New Labour party members’ response to 
posing a credible rivalry to the centre-right parties. This potential rivalry stems from the fact 
that if “New Labour in Britain are at last successfully rivalling the centre-right in their appeal 
to them [the centre-right electorate], it is because they have started doing the same, not 
because they are articulating wider concerns of these groups [lower middle-class interests], 
which might be uncomfortable for the corporate elite. They are represented as having no 
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discontent except with the quality of public services – which is increasingly taken to mean 
that they want them privatized.” (Crouch, 2004, p. 59/60).  
Crouch (2004, p. 64) further notes the ‘floating’ feature of parties voided of their 
traditional electoral base, an important characteristic of post-democracy. This vacuum is the 
antithesis of politics. This vacuum was soon filled up with economic agents in the case of 
New Labour. Reflected in its social and economic policy agendas, a clear cut differentiation 
between the post 1997 socialist government and the former neo-liberal conservative 
government is hard to identify. Crouch (2004, p. 64) then alleged that New Labour converged 
and co-operated in more details with businesses than the antecedent conservative 
government. This collaboration, perhaps surprisingly, contributed to the British socialist’s 
popularity among the electorate. Comparing the British case to Germany and Italy, the two 
continental European countries’ socialist parties (Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands 
(SPD) and the Democratici della Sinistra) did not endorse such an open approach as New 
Labour vis-à-vis business, although the German and Italian socialist parties headed in the 
same direction. This, Crouch (2004, p. 65) argues, can be explained in the light of the 
significance of trade unions and other actors from the industrial society. Crouch (2004, p. 63) 
locates the problem of contemporary reformism within several centre-left parties. The 
German SPD with the Neue Mitte strain, the Riformisti trend in the Italian Socialist Party and 
the Third way rhetoric of New Labour are examples of problem struck reformism. All of 
these parties had to face in the past a significant decrease in their social base. Following from 
this fact, Crouch (2004, p. 63) holds that contact points between the leadership and the 
electorate could no longer be sustained and the prospects of a future-oriented party and 
programme fell away. Evoking the future-oriented character of socialist parties is crucial: this 
political camp once took care of incorporating the working class into a new political system 
hence challenging legacies stemming from previous regimes, such as monarchies, where 
political decision making belonged to elites.  
b) Retracing the Convergence of Left and Right Political Parties in England 
For Crouch, on one hand, left parties were the democratic moment of politics as they 
brought the masses, i.e. the demos, into the political arena. As he states; “…if politics is 
becoming post-democratic…the political left will be experiencing a transformation that 
seems to reverse most of its achievements during the twentieth century. During this period 
the left struggled…to admit the voices of ordinary people into affairs of the state.” (Crouch, 
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2004, p. 4). Conservative parties, on the other hand, are inherently fused with pre-democratic 
features and privileges. Similar to left parties, Conservative parties also underwent a change 
in their values and composition. Traditionally, these parties represented feudal interests, 
imperialism and the monarchy; the wish for a strong army, restrained social policies, the 
defence of the church and low tax. In the middle of the 20
th
 century, however, the 
government of the Conservative Prime Minister Macmillan showed a more leftist inclination 
in politics when compared to Conservative party aspirations at the end of the 19
th
 century. 
Macmillan endorsed a mixed economy approach in economics while introducing corporatist 
policies for encouraging growth. Macmillan’s Premiership also implemented several social 
reforms: the Clean Air Act (1956), the Housing Act (1957) and the Factories Act (1961) are 
just a few examples (Middleton, 1997, p. 422). Investigating the Conservative party today, 
the concept ‘Big Society’ is on the tip of everyone’s tongue. The aim behind this term is to 
strengthen local communities by providing them with more power. By transferring power 
from Whitehall to local communities, for example by creating ‘Community First’ so as to 
financially support local social actions and community groups as well as the establishment of 
the ‘National Citizen Service’ that intends to engage young people from different 
backgrounds to team up, the British Conservative Party hopes to see more engaged citizens 
(Conservatives, 2013). Conservative support does not solely emanate from the top/elite to be 
implemented in a top-down fashion, but arises from the citizens across the social spectrum. 
As a response to ‘Big Society’ social policy, New Labour now promotes the concept of ‘Blue 
Labour’ as well as the formerly conservative ‘One Nation’ concept (Labour, 2013).  
With the surprising defeat of Labour at the 1992 General election, the need to amend 
elements of the socialist party in terms of philosophy and ideology became evident. A. 
Giddens, proposed the concept of ‘Third Way’ as distinct from liberal capitalism with the 
embedment of free-market superiority and democratic socialism by focusing on the essential 
role of the state in demand management (British Broadcasting Corporation, 1999). This 
distinction was not to everyone’s liking: some people characterized this approach as the 
“Loch Ness Monster of British politics” (British Broadcasting Corporation, 1999) or as sheer 
“benevolent pragmatism” (British Broadcasting Corporation, 1999). Narrowing down the 
goals, this altering synthesis of left- and right-wing politics supported growth, 
entrepreneurship/innovation, the creation of wealth, the global firm and a strong focus on the 
state’s role in fostering social justice. This approach also relied on the following values: 
belief in the significance of community, duty to provide equality of opportunity and to act 
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responsible. Moreover, Giddens saw problems arising for the framework of the traditional 
nation-state within a Third way perspective: according to Giddens, the nation-state neither 
responds to small scale problems nor handles the issues exceeding its framework (British 
Broadcasting Corporation, 1999). 
Considering the Third Way approach as innovative is debatable: moving from 
Butskillism to Blatcherism, New Labour’s pledge after the victory in 1997 to respect the 
antecedent Conservative government’s spending limits, to implement political right and 
political left positions, and the frequent usage of stake-holding and communitarian 
vocabulary gave the impression of no clear distinction between the former Conservative 
government and the elected New Labour government (Gamble and Wright, 1997, p. 53, cited 
in Kingdom, 2003, p. 302). Other evidence of supposed conservative inspiration stems from 
the pursuance of a so-called “Downsian strategy” (Gamble and Wright, 1997, p. 227, cited in 
Kingdom, 2003, p. 302) in gathering socialist votes while disrespecting traditional political 
principles/convictions. The quote that “Blair […] successfully plundered the centre-right 
wardrobe, the Conservatives could find little to wear” (Kingdom, 2003, p. 303) addresses the 
practise of political confusion (Peele, 1988, p. 145, cited in Kingdom, 2003, p. 303).  
In 2011 New Labour selected M. Glasman as the party’s seminal theorist who forged 
the oxymoron ‘Blue Labour’. This term stands for the attempt to remove the lack of attention 
payed by the Labour party with respect to the significance of the family, tradition and 
religious faith in uniting society. Glasman also points to the necessity to concentrate on local 
activism and the arising opportunity to incorporate citizens in policy-making (Partridge, 
2011). Glasman’s first statement has been picked up by J. Rutherford, who justifies this 
absence of attention by the working class culture in the post-WWII years. Stears, another 
contributor to the book entitled ‘The Labour tradition and the Politics of Paradox’ advices 
Labour to implement community organizing as did the current President of the United States, 
Barack Obama (Partridge, 2011).  
The confusion between left and right parties also is perceptible among centrist parties 
such as the Liberals Democrats. Forming the coalition government with the Conservative 
since 2010, the Liberal Democrats managed to extend spending cuts to the military, a 
traditional conservative sphere. Partridge claims that in order for New Labour to retard 
Cameron’s programme, the usage of pressure groups and intensive opinion polling becomes a 
requirement Partridge, 2011). To relate Partridge’s view to Crouch’s (2004, p. 74) argument 
vis-à-vis New Labour’s post-democratic character, focusing to win elections by opinion 
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polling cannot go hand in hand with a genuine strong political programme as attention 
derives from the opinion of voters. This development gives rise to so-called ‘sound bites’ by 
politicians so as to win over the electorate’s vote by the means of populism. Populism often 
conceals the truth regarding problems. Another criticism addressed to ‘Blue Labour’ which 
portrays New Labour’s post-democratic stance is the idea of mutualisation and 
decentralisation resulting in “the American model of charity and philanthropy which would 
lead to the unwelcome position of a progressive party leaving people dependent on hand-outs 
from wealthy individuals” (H. Blears, cited in Partridge, 2011, p.1).  
c) A Post-democratic Right Political Party: Forza Italia in Italy 
Crouch (2004, p. 75) takes Forza Italia as an example of a centre-right post-
democratic new capitalist political party in demonstrating the party’s inherent firm based 
networking character. According to Crouch, Forza Italia’s roots stem from interests voiced by 
both financial and political elites. Apart from the party’s top-down implementation, Crouch 
also notes a personal cult surrounding the party’s leadership. This is for Crouch another 
characteristic of the post-democratic party. However, Crouch (2004, p. 75) then goes on to 
declare that our time is not yet ready for the solely network based party type: with years 
passing, the once post-democratic features slowly vanished and the party transformed into a 
somewhat more ‘classical’ party in the traditional meaning: this change is seen by the 
expanding voluntary groups based at local levels contributing to Forza Italia’s success. 
Crouch attributes this change to the importance of Italian local government. Nevertheless, he 
notes the role played by the former Italian Prime Minister S. Berlusconi and former head of 
the party in downplaying the significance of local elections. National politics almost absorbed 
local politics which could have further encouraged disengagement as well as political 
confusion/tiredness in the local electorate.  
The comparison between New Labour and its Italian centre-right counterpart is based 
on their shared reliance of economic agents as members: the British socialist party tries to 
win over corporate firms with the prospect of financial support and binding contracts for 
purchased services while party affiliation based on mass membership and trade unions falls 
away (Crouch, 2004, p. 76). The increasing cost of electoral campaigns, including mass 
media representations and professional services, pressurize the party to broaden their 
electoral scope and membership precisely because costs have risen while traditional sources 
of income have reduced. Nevertheless, relying solely on new elite financial benevolence 
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without any political affiliation proves to be short-sighted given that the party needs money 
on an on-going basis. Moreover, these wealthy donators might sponsor the party under the 
circumstances of the party accepting (political) demands which otherwise would not have 
appeared on the political agenda. An issue of legitimation arises. This could harm the party 
by voters turning away. Therefore, it remains crucial for the party to keep traditional political 
voters for two reasons: financing and legitimating. This double practice in securing funds 
points towards tensions. 
2.2 THREE VISIONS ON BLAIR’S PRIME MINISTERSHIP  
FROM 1997 UNTIL 2007 
a) New Labour as a Novel Party Discarding its Socialist Past 
Crouch is joined in his perception of New Labour under the leadership of A. Blair as a 
post-democratic centre-left party by A. Applebaum (1997). She claims that “the British 
Labour Party was genuinely socialist. Its members believed in a planned economy and 
nationalized industry, preferred state housing projects to private developments, and thought a 
"fair" society could be created with taxes as high as 90 percent of income...” (Applebaum, 
1997, p. 46). With the victory of New Labour in the 1997 general election headed by Blair, a 
new era began discarding the party’s commitment to its former goals, among them socialism. 
Applebaum provides as proof of the New Labour era by the following facts: first, Blair’s 
expressed admiration for Thatcher in renewing her party published in the conservative 
newspaper The Daily Telegraph (1997, p. 46); second, the abandonment of the socialist 
cornerstone, Clause IV, that aimed at “securing for the workers by hand or by brain the full 
fruits of their industry, and the most equitable distribution […] that maybe possible, upon the 
basis of common ownership of the means of production, distribution, and exchange." (1997, 
p. 47); third, the declaration made by the chancellor of exchequer and future Prime Minister 
G. Brown to keep the same level as the previous Conservative government of personal 
income tax as well as of public spending during the general election campaign give an 
impression of Conservative policies’ continuation and endorsement by New Labour (1997, p. 
47); fourth, the cutting down on the Welfare State, see the right to public housing (1997, p. 
47).  
Applebaum also paints another picture of Blair: one of a politician who presses ahead 
pragmatically with policy proposals. This surging ahead gives an impression of indiscretion 
as potential policies are dropped as soon as they encounter criticism. The example of Blair’s 
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envisaged stakeholder economy illustrates well this mechanism: in 1996 while visiting 
Singapore, Blair made a eulogy with respect to the Asian Tigers’ economic success and 
values besides voicing his wish to transpose the Asian Tiger’s economic regime onto the 
British economy: “The creation of an economy where we are inventing and producing goods 
and services of quality needs the engagement of the whole country. It must be a matter of 
national purpose and national pride ... The economics of the centre and centre-left today 
should be geared to the creation of the stakeholder economy which involves all our people, 
not a privileged few." (Blair, 1996, cited in Applebaum, 1997, p. 49). Blair further elaborated 
his conception of stakeholder economy by pointing to the empowerment of the individual, the 
opportunity to develop oneself and therefore support the national development as well as the 
involvement of a wide range of people in opposition to only a few. Because of criticism from 
the Conservative party and little support from his own party, the supposedly umbrella concept 
was soon dropped.  
Another point noted by Applebaum with respect to Blair is the politician’s employed 
semantics that positioned him close to the Conservative party. His emphasis on responsibility 
and duty, his open discussions on the deteriorating situation of public housing, his 
denouncement of antisocial behaviour, see his statement regarding hardly ever donating 
money to mendicants, all these different statements establish for Applebaum (1997, p. 51) 
Blair’s sympathy for Conservative policies.  
To nuance Applebaum’s view first referring back to the before mentioned historic 
convergence of British left and right political ideologies and parties embodied in Butskellism 
show that Blair’s display of sympathy and rapprochement are neither unique nor new.  
b) A Nuanced Account of Blair’s New Labour Government  
J. Gray (2004) sees Blair’s government in retrospect as comprehensive with respect to 
the irreversibility of Thatcher’s economic policies. Although Gray’s opinion on New Labour 
appears at first sight reminiscent of Applebaum’s view, their opinions differ. Gray maintains 
that Blair envisaged a more inclusive version of Thatcher’s economic regime, one that sought 
to combine social cohesion and fairness by means of the free-market (Gray, 2004, p. 39). 
From this standpoint it is possible to argue that New Labour disrespected its past by 
endorsing the inherited conservative economic regime. However, Blair developed the 
inherited system even further driving conservative claims away. The development of the 
system translated into neo-liberal aims of modernization in both social and economic spheres: 
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the public sector experienced the infiltration of a market mentality, especially with respect to 
health, justice and education. The neo-liberal model transformed formerly independent social 
institutions into firm like institutions featuring a high level of bureaucracy. Gray (2004, p. 39) 
also denotes that the destructive character of the policies pursued along with the decision to 
support the United States of America in their Iraq intervention eventually soured and, 
perhaps, even foreshortened Blair’s term as Prime Minister. The parallel between Thatcher’s 
and Blair’s career end could not be more striking: Thatcher’s victory and stamina as Prime 
Minister stems from the Labour party’s internal conflict provoking the secession and 
emergence of the Social Democrats. By the same token, Gray (2004, p. 40) claims that the 
New Labour government could not have remained in power from May 1997 to May 2010 
without Thatcher’s destructive consequences for her own party.  
Gray (2004, p. 42) joins Applebaum (1997, p. 48/9) in her opinion regarding Blair’s 
lack of defined ideology. Concepts such as transcending the left-right dichotomy were thrown 
into political discussions as much as the adoption of Clinton’s mechanism of triangulation 
(Third Way). The implicit emphasis on centralization that accounts for a core element of 
Thatcherite politics as well as the urge to control the media also were topic of discussion 
without yielding results. Nevertheless, some policies can be detected as genuinely novel 
although if not all of them originated from Blair: “the devolution of power to Scotland was a 
commitment going back to the time of John Smith. Transferring the authority to set interest 
rates to an independent committee of the Bank of England was a historic act and a politically 
shrewd move, but it emanated from the office of Gordon Brown.” (Gray, 2004, p. 44).  
Overall, Gray provides a mixed account regarding Blair’s rule with the negative 
characteristics dominating. On the one hand, the Conservative legacy in economics could 
neither be overlooked nor be reversed. Besides accepting and embracing the Tory legacy, 
Blair added some leftist elements such as social cohesion and equality on top (Gray, 2004, p. 
39). On the other hand, Blair took Thatcher’s economic policies to an even further level by 
deregulating the postal services and commercializing the National Health Service (Gray, 
2004, p. 43).  
Moreover, Blair can be qualified as a post-modern Prime Minister. Features of this 
qualification centre on the abrogation between reality and presentation. The special usage of 
media was not only confined to his person and government, but also aimed at providing a 
young and fresh image of the British nation. The image of a rejuvenated country was 
advanced by “his [Blair’s] early alliance with popular musicians, his involvement in the 
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Greenwich Dome and his response to the death of Diana, Princess of Wales…” (Gray, 2004, 
p. 45). It seems as if Blair intended to change society by changing society’s self-perception in 
the media. The advent of mass media ushered the displacement of beliefs and turned into a 
new opportunity for the government to both exercise and fuel its power. Blair acknowledged 
mass media as a tool that allowed the shaping of public perceptions (2004, p. 45).  
The most important aspect to note in Gray’s account of Blair’s rule is the frequent 
reference to Neo-liberalism in relation to New Labour: “his recurrent genuflection to a 
defunct One Nation Tory tradition and his intermittent allusions to the Third Way, a neo-
liberal model of modernization underpins all of his economic and social policies” (2004, p. 
39), “Neo-liberal ideology was undoubtedly important in the intellectual formation of New 
Labour…” (2004, p. 43), “The pervasive influence of neoliberal ideas in the 1990s shaped the 
New Labour world-view. New Labour was founded in the neo-liberal belief that only one 
economic system could deliver prosperity…” (2004, p.42), “new policies were needed that 
reflected a world very different from that which existed when Labour was last in power. Its 
weakness was its assumption-which it took from neo-liberal ideology-that capitalism had 
overcome its propensity to periodic crisis.” (2004, p.43). Without explaining anew the neo-
liberal system, see for explanation Chapter two, it is necessary to inquire whether Crouch 
does not contradict himself in his theory of post-democracy. Given that the prevailing post-
democratic regime is supposedly privatized Keynesianism, the fact that New Labour relied on 
Neo-liberalism for its economic goals which even impacted on its party structure, for 
example the adherence of experts and lobbyists moving from enterprises to the party, is 
surprising and points to the two names (privatized Keynesianism and Neo-liberalism) for the 
same deregulated free market both of which have the same illusion as the state has to bail 
them out in the end. Following Crouch’s account of post-democracy, privatized 
Keynesianism prevails in the economic sphere while Neo-liberalism characterizes the 
political spheres. Indeed, the repercussions of Neo-liberalism in politics have been widely 
discussed (Desch, 2007/8; Orgad, 2010; Robison, 2006). Wolin (2003) sums up the most 
significant consequence of Neo-liberalism: ‘inverted totalitarianism’. He understands by the 
concept of ‘inverted totalitarianism’ “that while the current system and its operatives share 
with Nazism the aspiration toward unlimited power and aggressive expansionism, their 
methods and actions seem upside down. For example, in Weimar Germany, before the Nazis 
took power, the "streets" were dominated by totalitarian-oriented gangs of toughs, and 
whatever there was of democracy was confined to the government. In the United States, 
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however, it is the streets where democracy is most alive--while the real danger lies with an 
increasingly unbridled government.” (2003, p. 1).  
In order for this system to exist, the legislative system is the victim of repression 
while being submissive to the state, the legislature has no power and merely serves for 
appearance. The party system paves the way for a the corporate elite to take over the political 
sphere while the poor segment of the citizenry experiences apathy and hopelessness in 
comparison to the middle class which dreads unemployment and hopes for financial rewards 
as soon as economic activity takes off again (Wolin, 2003). In the ‘inverted totalitarian 
system’, corporate firms fund research and projects at universities, think tanks turn into 
propaganda agents and the media advance the political system.  
Wolin’s account of ‘inverted totalitarianism’ exhibits similarities with Crouch’s post-
democracy, in the role of the media, the apathy of the citizenry and the existence of 
spectacular politics. Neo-liberalism belongs as much for Crouch as for Wolin in the political 
sphere, wherewith privatized Keynesianism is confined to the economic sphere. Privatized 
Keynesianism is deregulated lending by private banks to private citizens so is a form of neo-
liberal practice at least until private banks go bankrupt and need to be bailed out by the state. 
Therefore, privatized Keynesianism is a form of Neo-liberalism. Crouch is right with respect 
to the continued importance of state-based Keynesianism it is when the state re-floats the 
market whilst claiming to be fostering a free market that the political ideology of Neo-
liberalism is at odds with the economic reality of state Keynesian management. 
c) Putting into Perspective New Labour’s ‘Innovativeness’ 
R. Toye (2004) captures New Labour’s innovativeness and uniqueness in the most 
nuanced way. Generally, it is assumed that New Labour is a renewal of the ‘old’ Labour party 
sharing little in common. Crouch (2004), Applebaum (1997), Gray (2004) and Bevir (2003) 
endorse this view. Bevir (2003, p. 456) distinguishes New Labour for its ideological 
eclecticism in bringing Neo-liberalism, a conservative mind-set, and Institutionalism, a more 
social mind-set, together. The two-level neo-liberal ideology indicates “another significant 
similarity between New Labour and the New Right [that] lies in their overlapping rejections 
of the bureaucratic hierarchies associated with Old Labour” (2003, p. 463). Bevir does not 
tire of pointing out in the same tone as the previous scholars that “New Labour uses 
institutionalism and network theory to create an alternative to…Old Labour” (2003, p. 466) 
by “construct[ing] the dilemmas facing the state in a way that points to rejection of Old 
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Labour and the New Right and affirmation of social embeddedness, partnership, networks, 
and trust.” (2003, p. 469). The adjective ‘New’ in front of the Labour party seems to seal its 
fate not only a neologism but also as a party with little bonds to the former/past Labour party.  
Toye discards this opinion from the outset by first investigating the party history of 
Labour, second by analysing 1997 New Labour’s party members and political decisions. 
Toye distinguishes between two sorts of critiques: one side that claims that New Labour does 
not cherish its history, the other one is more optimistic in scrutinizing the party by declaring 
that core values still remain present in New Labour. Toye (2004) joins Fielding (2003) in 
assessing New Labour’s novelty. Fielding claims that Blair respected and showed attachment 
to his party’s past even if the social democratic foundation shrunk over time (2004, p. 3). 
New Labour embracement of capitalism stems from a desire to change the existing system for 
the better so the majority of people can profit from capitalism.  
The most important claim by Toye (2004, p. 371) centres on New Labour not 
replacing Old Labour but having co-existed with it for a long time. The ‘core values’ 
argument intends to prove New Labour’s connection to its past. First, to frame the core value 
argumentation, Toye states that New Labour was aware of its party history: in fact, G. Brown 
wrote his PhD on the Labour party history and published it. In 1995 Brown and Wright 
published together a collection on socialist writings while Blair aimed at appearing as 
someone from the Labour’s past (2004, p. 373). In order to further exhibit the connection to 
the past, Blair modelled himself on the academic and MP D. Marquand in articulating his 
vision of the Labour party. Marquand claimed that the party’s decay was due to its incapacity 
“to construct an enduring Labour-led equivalent of the heterogeneous, ramshackle, but 
extraordinarily successful progressive coalition which the Liberals led before the First World 
War” (Marquand, 1991/2, p. ix, cited in Toye, 2004, p. 373). Therefore, the genuinely 
inherent socialist character of the Labour party can be called into question right from the 
party’s beginning.   
Regarding the core value argument, Toye claims that the objectives of New Labour 
reflect the goals of the Labour party. It is merely the ways in which the stipulated goals are to 
be fulfilled that have changed. Moreover, Clause IV was considered a cornerstone of the 
Labour party programme. However, the Labour party’s historic approach to nationalization 
was as sober as it was pragmatic. Nationalization did not occur as a mass phenomenon, but in 
a considered manner. Clause IV was never completely implemented, nor even seriously 
54 
 
attempted, and Labour’s endorsement of this programme was always less than its critics 
expected (Toye, 2004, p. 375).  
Marquand’s quote and the fact of Clause IV being implemented to a lesser extent than 
anticipated sheds a new light on the Labour party. The Labour party was not as socialist as 
critics like Applebaum supposed. Moreover, the endorsement by Attlee’s government of both 
Keynes and Beveridge, who saw themselves as Liberals, demonstrates Labour’s primary 
sympathy for liberal ideas (Toye, 2004, p. 375). From this perspective, Blair’s endorsement 
of (Neo-)liberalism is not new for the Labour party. 
Blair’s social justice programme remained the same as under Labour. In fact, Toye 
declares that New Labour policies turned out to be even more contentious regarding the 
funding of public services and the advantages of public spending. Still, Toye (2004, p. 375) 
claims that New Labour’s attitude vis-à-vis equality and poverty can be set equal to present 
European social democrats and to the historical British Labour party.  
The novelty of New Labour does not reside in their support for the market. In fact, 
former Labour members such as J. A. Hobson and Neil Thompson already spoke out in 
favour of market principles in the 1920s. Although, public service reforms and privatization 
reached a new stage under the Blair government as it has been shown before. An important 
point to note is that during the Attlee government, over 80% of the economy belonged to the 
private sector, while merely 20% were nationalized (2004, 381).  
According to Toye, New Labour existed along Old Labour for a long time and only 
rose to its recent prominence following four successive Tory general election victories and 
despair within the Labour party: “in a very real sense there has always been Old and New 
Labour…What is new in new Labour is that the forces of Old Labour are so weak. It is the 
dominance and self-confidence of the modernizers, not their novelty, which distinguishes the 
Blair party from its predecessors” (Coates, 1996, cited in Toye, 2004, p. 385). Blair’s 
government emerged from a shift of balance inside the Labour party and cannot be attributed 
of having undergone a total ideological transformation.  
2.3 THE GLOBAL FIRM IN POST-DEMOCRACY 
a) Crouch’s Account of the Global Firm 
The key institution behind Crouch’s account of post-democracy is the global firm. 
The increasing importance of the enterprise as a model as well as an institution have been 
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acknowledged by Crouch. He writes about the ramifications of the firm’s ascent that: “the 
rising political importance of the global firm, the vacuum left by the decline of the working 
class, and the way in which a new political class of political advisers and business lobbyists 
was filling the vacuum all helped explain why governments social policy was becoming 
increasingly obsessed with giving work to private contractors” (Crouch, 2004, p. x). His 
wife’s profession and working environment as a senior education officer lead Crouch to 
declare that “I observed the pressure being increasingly placed by central government on her 
[his wife] and her colleagues throughout the country to offer aspects of their work and that of 
schools to private firms and to change the way in which public education services were 
conceived and structured so that they could easily be transferred to such firms – indeed, so 
that they would be more logically operated by firms than by public authorities.” (2004, p. ix). 
The political Left parties appear to have missed out on recognizing this development “For 
most of the twentieth century the European left completely failed to appreciate the 
significance of the firm as an institution.” (2004, p. 31).    
The predominant role of the firm has been noted as well by Kalev (2011), who makes 
similar claims to Crouch’s regarding the dominant character of the firm in the 21st century. 
This preponderance emerged in the second half of the last century due to mass consumerism 
during the heyday of macro-economic policies embodied by Keynesian economics (Crouch, 
2004, p. 31). Given that most people considered the firm as “a convenient milk-cow” (2004, 
p. 31), paving the way for the firm to behave to its liking is not surprising: “In some ways this 
suited the firms themselves: in setting a context of economic stability and not becoming 
involved in the fine details of what firms did, governments did not intervene much in their 
affairs.” (2004, p. 31). With the breakdown of Keynesianism, neo-liberal ideology took over 
as the new model to be adhered to in economics by implementing micro-economics. From 
this adjustment in policy derived rapid changes in technology as well as innovation by 
ignoring the gradual problems posed by the firm. Demands emanating from consumers and 
global competition reached new heights, transforming the key institution into a “robust and 
demanding creature” (Crouch, 2004, p.32). The government experienced this tenaciousness 
as did the work force. Ascending to such behaviour and position, enables the firm to threaten 
government with delocalization besides repeatedly influencing decisions vis-à-vis the labour 
and the taxation regime. Hence, changes in policies can be partly traced back to impulses 
from the firm which are revealed to be “...far more effectively than” impulses from “its 
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nominal citizens, even if they [firms] do not live there, have formal citizen rights there, or 
pay taxes.” (2004, p. 32).   
Crouch (2004, p. 33) compares the present situation to pre-revolutionary France with 
respect to power and taxation: today, as then, it appeared to be legitimate that a small fraction 
of the population, the elite and respectively the aristocracy, enjoyed monopolized power 
without any constraints, while lower classes, i.e. the middle classes and peasantry 
respectively, had to pay taxes.  
In order to become and/or remain attractive for the firm, the government and political 
parties make citizens aware of the dysfunctional work system along with the related labour 
rights by emphasizing the urgent need to alter both the system and rights (2004, p. 33). The 
citizenry then actively votes for deregulation. Another means to attract firms is diminished 
corporation taxes, which again gets back to the citizens. Because of the lack of revenue 
received by the government, citizen subsequently face even higher taxes. Again, a vicious 
circle begins as the following election will probably be won by the party proposing the largest 
tax cuts, wherewith the deterioration of public services only becomes a question of time 
(2004, p. 33). 
Crouch (2004, p. 36) defines the two main characteristics of the firm that foster its 
phantom-like existence: first, the replacement of the Japanese model of production by the 
Anglo-American model allowing the firm’s identity to alter rapidly; second, the rise in 
casualization with respect to the work force. Regarding the first point, the Anglo-American 
model differentiates itself from the predecessor by no longer exhibiting a ‘whole company 
approach’. Crouch understands this approach as “shaping everything about them [the firms] 
for targeted pursuit of competitive success. In particular, the personalities of their employees 
and the quality of their loyalty to the organization were to be fashioned according to a central 
plan. […] For many firms this became an argument why they should not allow external trade 
unions to represent their workers, or employees’ association to represent their own interests 
in collective bargaining, or even trade associations their more technical and marketing 
interests. They had to be free to act and lobby for themselves. This helped set the stage of the 
new prominence of the individual firm…” (2004, p. 35/6).  
Bearing in mind that different asset holders own a firm and that varying combination 
of workers work for the enterprise, the envisaged invisibility becomes true. The latter indeed 
can be viewed as an effective weapon when accusations arise. Nevertheless, eloping is not as 
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easy: the identity of corporate wealth owners’ change more slowly than ever before; still, the 
new ethos of the firm is unchallenged (2004, p.38).  
The individual firm, although remaining global in its scope, continuously reinvents 
itself due to company take-over, mergers or simple reorganization of the enterprise. These 
changes respond to the requirement of flexibility stemming from the consequences of 
financial deregulation: uncertainty of markets, the increase in shareholder value as well as the 
predominant centralized role of stock exchanges (2004, p. 36). In order to remain competitive 
and respond to these new challenges, casualization of the work force ensues given that 
economic activities change rapidly. Casualization contributes to the labours force’s short-
term and/or casual employment whereby uncertainties originating from the market can be 
easily dealt with due to the high amount of flexibility. The main tool to enforce such a mode 
of production is sub-contracting and out-sourcing. The firm’s new goal no longer centres on 
providing good quality products but on constructing interdependence between images, 
publicity, brands and concepts (2004, p. 37).  
The actual goal behind the global firm is “to locate itself primarily in the financial 
sector, because this is where capital is at its [most] mobile, and to sub-contract everything 
else it does to small, insecure units.” (2004, p. 37). By doing so, the firm is liberated from any 
managerial tasks, providing the freedom to focus exclusively on brands, and concepts, as 
explained before. Crouch worries about this development as well as regarding fusions given 
that “the phantom character of firms which constitute temporary, anonymous financial 
accumulations for the electronic co-ordination of a mass [of] disaggregated activities, lead 
many commentators to see here the final dissolution of capital as a socio-political category, a 
major stage in the end of the class division of old industrial society […] The early twenty-
first century firm can thus seem a weaker institution than its predecessors: no longer the solid 
organization with a large headquarters building and strong presence, but a soft, flexible, 
constantly changing will of the wisp.” (2004, p. 37/8).  
Two important aspects from the last quote have to be noted: first, that with the rise of 
the global and individual firm, the traditional class structure of society appears to fall away; 
second, that the firm currently is less ‘present’ in a physical manner than might be expected 
(hard power), albeit its influence cannot be overlooked (soft power). Regarding the first 
point, Crouch declares that one of the symptoms of his theory is the falling away of social 
class consciousness due to technological innovativeness during the 1990s that lead to the 
abandonment of industrialism. Previously, industrialism had replaced agricultural activity 
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(2004, p. 55). The traditional British working force experienced a particular rough end that is 
to say a triple crisis: “particular rapid deindustrialization resulting from the weakness of the 
country’s industrial base; profound conflict within the Labour Party; and a disastrous 
organized coal-mining strike” (2004, p. 55/6). Concerning the second point, the firm not only 
gains prominence in the economic sphere, but also as an institutional model to be followed by 
governments. By adhering to a firm-like institutional model, the lines between the 
commercial/economic supply executed by the government and the need of universal access to 
public services are annihilated (2004, p. 40). Ensuing from the blurred distinction between 
commercial supply and the universal access to public services, the government further loses 
faith in its handling of public services and turns to the private sector in search of sub-
contracting consultants. Neo-liberal ideology slowly creeps into the government, which 
consequently aims at providing the highest level of freedom to the sub-contracted firm. This 
move (un)consciously further assimilates the government to the functioning of an enterprise 
and contributes to the corporate elite’s seizing of political power. Leaving the firm taking 
care of the government’s organization, Crouch even goes so far as to acknowledge the 
government’s diminished confidence vis-à-vis the firm (2004, p. 41). Crouch depicts this 
development as follows: “Government becomes a kind of institutional idiot, its every-ill-
informed move being anticipated in advance and therefore discounted by smart market 
actors.” (2004, p. 41).   
The infiltrated market mode of thinking of the government resulting from the 
emergence of a corporate elite is another aspect of Crouch’s (2004, p. 51) declared parabola: 
the re-emergence of the corporate political privileged class in a time of Neo-liberalism only 
can occur where the private and public interests have become one. Differential access to 
politics is a milestone on the way to post-democracy. The rise of the corporate elite cannot 
co-exist with an agile, creative democracy as the former aims at silencing egalitarian 
demands (2004, p. 52).  
The media corporation especially deserves to be investigated because of its 
contribution in diminishing choices of available information and downgrading the quality of 
employed political semantics as well as of communication (2004, p. 46). These three aspects 
count as major indicators of democracy’s poor health. With the ascending incorporation of 
the press, the radio and television into the commercial part of society, the information 
delivered comes to be modelled on a particular kind of marketable product (2004, p. 46). 
Moreover, with the expansion of the commercial sector people’s attention becomes even 
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more superficial due to the sheer amount of information available. Catching one’s attention is 
a challenge resulting in both the degrading of quality and the sensationalisation of news. 
From this development, the citizenry transforms into an incompetent political actor (2004, p. 
47). Crouch notes that “The commercial model is therefore triumphing over other concepts of 
mass political communication. Politics and other types of news have been increasingly 
redefined as items of very short-term consumer spending. The consumer has triumphed over 
the citizen.” (2004, p. 49).     
Crouch discloses one more fact of contention vis-à-vis the role performed by the 
media, press, television and radio: their ownership. A small group of people and corporations 
own most of the media. In the case of the United Kingdom, “(News Corporation) is a satellite 
television monopolist (BSkyB), owns newspapers as diverse as The Times and The Sun, and 
has interlocking relations with other media providers.” (2004, p. 49). Crouch thinks that 
diversity in the mass media market is only likely to emerge when media provision do not aim 
at increasing their target audience. Another solution would be to redefine the mass society by 
different segments and then elaborate programmes according the respective segment’s 
preference (2004, p. 50).  
b) Explaining the Rising Influence of the Firm in Politics 
Crouch’s perception of economic predominance in politics originates among other 
factors from the writings of the American scholar Charles E. Lindblom: “Lobbies on behalf 
of business interests always have an enormous advantage, for two separate reasons. First, as 
argued convincingly by Lindblom (1977), a disillusioned former celebrator of the US model 
of pluralism, business interests are able to threaten that, unless governments listen to them, 
their sector will not be successful, which will in turn jeopardize government’s own core 
concern with economic success. Second, business interests can wield enormous funds for 
their lobbying, not just because they are rich to start with, but because success of the lobbying 
will bring increased profits to the business: the lobbying costs constitute investment.” (2004, 
p. 17/8).  
In 1977, Lindblom published his book entitled Politics and Markets: The World’s 
Political-Economic System dealing with the incompatibility of democracy and the corporate 
firm. The discrepancy of both institutions results from discretionary power exhibited by the 
corporate firm in particular and business in general; business’s ensuing influence vis-à-vis the 
state and its magnitude to indoctrinate different segments of society by making society 
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endorse and hold up business interests. Lindblom’s research interests centre on the interplay 
of the market and democracy, a field which according to the scholar has not been sufficiently 
investigated (Lindblom, 1995, p. 684). In order to better understand the interaction between 
the market and democracy, Lindblom provides the following explanations: first, the market 
represents not only an institution or infrastructure; the market also organizes social 
coordination involving a vast number of both actions and people requiring a steady level of 
control. Lindblom claims that “No method or feat or accident of social organization competes 
with it – it is a class by itself.” (1995, p. 684). Another important aspect to note is the 
scope/extent of the market which remains unchallenged. Within this framework, people 
endorse the role of being sellers and buyers. The given example of consuming coffee, from 
its harvest in Columbia to the shipping over to different countries in order to process the 
beans, package them and put the product in a supermarket to be bought. Comparing by the 
before mentioned depiction the market and democracy, the market is operating at a global 
level, while democracy is set predominantly in a national context. Potential adversaries of the 
global market hardly exist at a comparable global level of coordinated action. In fact, there is 
no global state, but there exist a few international organizations which could match the 
market in its global scope.  
Lindblom (1995, p. 685) points to the disparity in power between the market (a giant) 
and the state (a dwarf) embracing democracy. Nevertheless, the absence of a state severely 
threatens the market’s scope for existence, while the state is able to execute tasks without the 
need of a market system. One of the most significant points in the comparison between the 
state (democracy) and the market are the different scales of coordination involved. Bearing in 
mind that exporting democracy became the Leitmotiv of the United States of America 
following the end of the Cold War; people might be inclined to disagree with Lindblom on 
this point. According to Freedom House (2012) 152 countries were supposedly democratic in 
that year to varying degrees. Democracy is globalising but these varying degrees can be seen 
as proof that democracy is not easily transplantable, or integrated, into a unified global 
political system.  
In another part of Lindblom’s investigation of the state and the market, a similarity of 
both democracy and the market is given: their function to readjust claims bearing conflict 
potential so as to ensure the peaceful order of society (Lindblom, 1995, p. 685). Market 
systems in isolation provide peace in the sense of that “no one can effect any increase in 
personal claims other than through offering someone else a benefit sufficient to induce the 
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other to grant the claim. Market rules do not permit one simply to appropriate what one 
wants. Appropriating another person's labour we call slavery, and appropriating assets we call 
theft.” (1995, p. 685). Democracy provides peace by “maintain[ing] popular control over the 
[…] elites who are authorized to make decisions.” (Lindblom, 1995, p. 685).   
Democracy’s and the market’s interdependence has another characteristic: both 
institutions present “competing and complementary methods of popular control over … 
elites” (1995, p. 385). Elites handle the readjustment claims enabling them to make decisions 
embodied as both business executives and government officials. The task of organizing 
society is split equally between the two kinds of elite, economic and political elites. 
Controlling these elites can be done in two different ways: either by casting a vote, or by 
giving one’s vote by buying products. The main difference between these two ways of 
controlling elites resides in the following fact: in the “market popular controls aim largely at 
results, at outcomes, while democratic popular controls aim largely at process, at inputs.” 
(1995, p. 686).  
Lindblom notes the inequality between the economic and political elites by claiming 
that the market impacts on democracy more than the other way around. In fact, the market 
increasingly assumes responsibilities for tasks once executed by the government. These 
handed over responsibilities can centre on tasks as crucial as wealth and income distribution, 
which could be used to finance political campaigns and/or to buy votes. Lindblom (1995, p. 
686) suggests that democracy can exist without a market system, while regarding the 
opposite, he raises doubts. Moreover, as both democracy and market are complementary 
mechanisms of popular control, it is important to investigate whether people would rather 
endorse one way or another to control the elites. 
The subordinated interdependence of democracy within the market has paved the way 
for a decline in the quality of political discourse. This development contributes to the 
weakening of popular control over elites (1995, p. 687). Unilateral communication also 
reaches a new level: “An important supplementary hypothesis is that with the rise of 
democracy and the decline of undemocratic coercions, elites have become increasingly 
dependent on controlling minds in order to maintain their elite advantages, thus giving to 
unilateral communication a central place it never before had as an instrument of social 
control.” (1995, p. 687).  
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Having elucidated Lindblom’s understanding of the market and democracy, the 
framework for explaining his concept of ‘Privileged position of business in Polyarchy’ is 
presented. This concept highlights the dominant influence of business/corporations “tied 
directly to a widespread and fundamental societal fealty to its core belief system, one rooted 
in the discursive elements of free market capitalism, private property rights, freedom of 
individual choice, and minimal government--the language and belief system of the 
consumer.” (Guber and Bosso, 2007, p. 17). Parallel to this development, Lindblom (1977, p. 
202) states that the opportunity exists for citizens to become indoctrinated; pushing aside 
their own will while endorsing business oriented priorities. Because of this appropriation 
citizens transform into accomplices of businessmen wherewith the privileged position of 
business becomes accepted. This acceptance means that in the political sphere, business 
interests do not have to face any struggle in establishing themselves. The limits of this 
concept come about when the public discourse is no longer subjected to the core values of 
business (Guber and Bosso, 2007, p. 17).  
Public discourse demonstrated the importance of the semantics employed in winning 
over the citizenry in policy debates. Values such as ‘freedom’ and ‘choice’ belong to the 
rhetoric employed by businesses while advertising campaigns and public relations do not go 
short of funding thanks to the help of conservative institutions such as the Cato Institute and 
the American Enterprise Institute (Guber and Bosso, 2007, p. 18).   
Lindblom turns out to be as much Crouch’s inspirational source as a factor 
undermining the novelty of Crouch’s post-democratic age. In fact, Lindblom already 
mentioned back in the 1970s the favourite position of business in politics as well as the 
tensions inherent in the relationship between the market and democracy. Comparing 
Lindblom’s and Crouch’s accounts on the tensions between democracy and the market, 
Crouch does not add new insight in Post-democracy to the already established scenario by 
Lindblom. However, it has to be said that Crouch goes beyond the political-economic 
paradigm painted by Lindblom by adding sociological and media aspects. Therefore, the 
novelty of Post-democracy resides neither in the analysis of the market’s relationship to 
democracy nor in the government copying the functioning of the firm but in the bringing 
together of different interdisciplinary analyses resulting in post-democracy.  
c) Reasons Why the Firm Threatening the Government Does Not Always 
Work 
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Crouch (2004, p. 34) holds that the government not only imitates the firm in its 
functioning but also that the firm can dictate the government what to do by using the 
delocalization threat besides hollowing out the state. This threat however is for several 
reasons not as powerful as supposed and as portrayed by Crouch. This section reviews two 
different reasons why this threat does not hold true by focusing on the following economic 
theories: the sunk cost and the theory of insiders versus outsiders.  
i) The Sunk Cost 
Arguments against the firm’s scope to threaten the government with delocalization 
suggest relocation is  more challenging than assumed for the following reasons: first, because 
of the unprofitable sunk cost; second, due to the economic theory of insiders/outsiders. First, 
the sunk cost can be defined as a cost that has already been incurred and which can no more 
be revoked (Martin, 2002). Once such foundations are ‘sunk’ a firm can then decide either to 
continue building the fixed asset which could lead to it regaining this cost, or abandon the 
project as a whole. The sunk cost in any case causes a dilemma to the firm given that any 
project already is underway accumulates expenses that can only be redeemed if the project is 
taken to completion. On the one hand money has already been invested and abandoning the 
project for good would require to start from scratch with new costs; whilst on the other hand, 
sticking with initial investments may incur marginal costs greater than would have been 
incurred if the whole business was relocated (Martin, 2002).  
Crouch invokes the concept of sunk cost while speaking of the assumed global/ 
transnational character of firms. He claims that “In reality, not only are many firms far from 
global, but even transnational giants are constrained by their existing patterns of investment, 
expertise and networks from skipping around the world in search of the lowest taxes and 
worst labour conditions. They have what economists call ‘sunk cost’, which means that 
moving is costly.” (Crouch, 2004, p. 34). Crouch points to the sunk cost as one explicit threat 
mechanism used by the firm with respect to the government. Such delocalization which came 
to prominence in 2006 when the European Union Bolkestein Directive made the headlines for 
the danger of wage dumping. The last sentence points indirectly to the economic theory of 
insider and outsider (discussed below) increasing the costs of delocalization which may make 
relocation unprofitable.  
ii) The Theory of Insiders versus Outsiders in Economics 
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Closely tied to the discussion of delocalization is the theory of insider-outsider with 
respect to the production process. This theory “examines the behaviour of economic agents in 
markets where some participants have more privileged positions than others. Incumbent 
workers in the labour market, the “insiders,” often enjoy more favourable employment 
opportunities than the “outsiders.” The reason for this disparity is that firms incur labour 
turnover costs when they replace insiders by outsiders.” (Lindbeck and Snower, 2001, p. 
165).  
The last phrase points towards two negative aspects of delocalization: firstly, the need 
to train ‘outsiders’, that is to say the requirement to train a potential new work force located 
outside the firm’s mode of production which will involve additional cost for the firm. 
Although, wage levels as well as labour rights differ from country to country contributing to 
the firm’s intention to outsource parts of its production to perceived ‘cheaper’ countries, costs 
of training should not be underestimated. Secondly, setting up new workshops and acquiring 
the necessary tools for production can also involve more costs than initially expected. 
Lindbeck and Snower (2001) acknowledge these aspects by declaring that “The most obvious 
labour turnover costs are the costs of hiring, firing and providing firm-specific training, but 
further costs can arise from the attempts of insiders to resist competition with outsiders by 
refusing to cooperate with or harassing outsiders who try to underbid the wages of incumbent 
workers. Since these costs are borne, at least in part, by the employers, they give the insiders 
market power. The insiders use this power to push their wages above the market clearing 
level, but firms do not try to replace them with outsiders since it would be costly to do so. 
The insider-outsider theory then proceeds to examine the implications of this behaviour for 
employment and unemployment” (2001, p. 165).  
This section has provided reasons why economic pressure of delocalizing a firm’s 
production to another country does not necessarily threaten the government. Although, other 
places of production might appear cheaper to firms in terms of production costs, or have more 
favourable legislation about business, the fact that new workers have to be trained cannot be 
overlooked as it remains questionable whether initial workers would be willing to move 
country and to adapt or to cooperate in integrating new production centres. Therefore, new 
costs arise for the firm which could become a serious cost in delocalizing the production.  
d) Applying Crouch’s Model of the Firm to Contemporary Politics 
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The firm not only poses a danger to the government, but also to democracy. The 
danger faced by the state revolves around the privatization and contracting out of state 
functions, while media corporations threaten democracy. This threat emanating from media 
corporation is about favouring one candidate in comparison to others not due to his political 
expertise but due to his/her glossy appeal, for example managerial skills, slick appearance 
and advertising like eloquence, enabling him/her to gain votes within narrowly constrained 
policy limits. Political ideology is replaced by this glossy attraction. The enchanted citizenry 
then merely observes political and electoral spectacles. Moreover, the fact that media 
corporations are held in few hands also increases the ease by which newspapers and journal 
can be used for manipulating the mass to enforce the will of the people running the media 
who are often associated with the elite. The following section provides the example of the 
former Italian Prime Minister Berlusconi also counts as one of the most important 
shareholders of Mediaset, the most powerful national mass media firm. The following section 
addresses the threats posed by Berlusconi to Italian democracy.    
i) Media Corporations and Electoral Campaigns: Berlusconi as a Threat to 
Italian Democracy 
F. Duve, for whom media independence from government amounts as the cornerstone 
of any parliamentary-democratic regime, already noted in 2001 that media corporation 
threatened the Italian democratic system. The representative of the Freedom of the Media 
committee for the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe declared that in Italy 
Berlusconi’s political ascent threatened the clear distinction of powers between the media and 
the government (British Broadcasting Corporation, 2001). He further asked Berlusconi to 
draw a clear line between Mediasete, Berlusconi’s media corporation, and tasks that needed 
to be executed by the government. If the lines were indistinguishable, journalists would no 
longer be able to openly criticise government executives and the Prime Minister (British 
Broadcasting Corporation, 2001).  
2.4 CONCLUSION 
This chapter has provided accounts of the development of political parties and the 
global firm in post-democracy. Crouch blames the move from Keynesianism to Neo-
liberalism as much as the takeover of politics by the global firm for the undermining of 
national political parties. Applebaum (1997) joins Crouch in his denunciation of New 
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Labour’s economic direction while maintaining that no clear break between Blair’s party and 
its conservative predecessor is perceptible. However, a discontinuity between Labour and 
New Labour is perceptible according to Applebaum (1997). Gray (2004) takes a more 
nuanced view of whether New Labour is all that new. In fact, he declares that similarities 
between Blair’s and Thatcher’s policies are visible although the former New Labour Prime 
Minister added a gloss of equality and social cohesion on top of Thatcherite inegalitarian 
policies. Toye (2004) holds the most nuanced opinion when compared to Crouch’s outline of 
New Labour’s departure from the older Labour party’s character. Toye draws attention to the 
fact that ‘New’ Labour and Labour co-existed as streams within one and the same political 
party. Indeed, both streams even share the same goal but intend to reach them through 
distinct channels.  
Crouch’s account of the global firm portrays the former as an avaricious, 
manipulative institution which subjugates the political system and its actors to its powers. By 
hollowing out political parties the firm can shape the policy framework to its liking. By doing 
so, the public sector loses ground while the private sector sub-contracts services once carried 
out by the state. Crouch’s analysis might be for some readers reminiscent of Charles E. 
Lindblom’s (1977) favoured position of business in politics in the United States. Lindblom 
points to the dialectic running through the relationship between democracy and the market 
which seems even more prominent and widespread nowadays.  Perhaps what Crouch calls 
Post-democracy is just an ‘Americanization’, the transition from social democrats to 
corporate dominated politics. However, see chapter two where is noted that the state is not 
totally powerless and hollowed out. Two reasons were given as to why outsourcing of jobs to 
cheaper labour markets abroad should not work as a means of threatening the government: 
the sunk cost, and the insider versus outsider theory in economics that states and politicians 
collude with the global firm in as much from internal cooption as external threat.  
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CHAPTER 3:  BAUMIER’S POST-DEMOCRACY 
Following Crouch’s account of post-democracy, the chapter deals with Baumier’s 
vision regarding the object in question. In retrospect, post-democracy seems for Crouch to 
amount to spectacular politics where the government no longer assumes its functions by 
ceding them to the firm. Within this context, the state needs to contract out its services to the 
private sector and, subsequently, not only loses its former capacities but also its confidence. 
This situation is reflected within the citizenry. The takeover by the firm of the state is 
paralleled by the infiltration of economic agents, such as business advisors, into political 
parties. As such, political parties in turn become advocates of economic goals; no longer 
displaying any political ideological programme. Politicians support political parties by 
appealing to the citizenry thanks to their managerial like appearance and ideologically void 
programmes while advancing elite economic goals. In sum, Crouch sees post-democracy as a 
mismarriage between economics (capitalism) and politics (democracy) with distinct 
sociological and media characteristics.  
Baumier is the author of novels and of essays, the best known being L’anti-Traité 
d’athéologie: le système Onfray mis à nu (in English this is The anti-Treaty of atheology: the 
Onfray system exposed) published by Presse de la Renaissance in 2005. Baumier also acts as 
a literary critic collaborating with diverse review journals such as La Revue des Deux 
Mondes and La Sœur de l’Ange. The reader of Baumier’s book has an idea in which period 
post-democracy occurs according to Baumier; “With the fall of the Berlin wall, a chapter of 
your history ended and another one began. Post-communism generated post-democracy, in 
which formal democracy replaces real democracy.” (Baumier, 2007). The consequences of 
post-democracy are the following: 1) the role of spontaneous media in ‘derealizing’ reality by 
portraying real facts as inventions; 2) the disrespect for the rule of law as well as the incorrect 
counter posing of the notions of freedom and rights (the  incorrect exchange of freedoms 
versus rights); 3) spectacular politics and the all-encompassing character of left ideology in 
French society; and, 4) the belief held by the French mass with respect to the superiority of 
radical democracy in comparison to liberal democracy. These characteristics are just the most 
significant of many. I chose these characteristics as they are the most relevant in 
understanding Baumier’s post-democracy thesis.  
Baumier states already in the title of his book, The Totalitarian Democracy: Thinking 
the post-democratic Modernity, that his conception of post-democracy is related to 
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totalitarianism as well as being anchored in a particular period of time, modernity. Baumier 
divides his book into two parts entitled respectively ‘Post-democracy inverts the real world’ 
and ‘Post-democracy inverts the true side of the human being’. These parts consist in turn of 
four and three chapters.  
Baumier begins the first part with a baseline study of the French democratic situation 
in 2007. Throughout the first part of the book, Baumier (2007, p. 19) outlines what he sees as 
the illusions from which the French citizenry suffer. In the context of these illusions, left 
ideology takes a central role as it supposedly upholds two key illusions: first, by making 
people believe that they live in a liberal and representative democracy; second, by 
proclaiming that radical and social democracy is a better option to the existing democratic 
system. In the following chapters comprising the first part, Baumier (2007, p. 53) evokes the 
deterioration of the traditional composition of family. As the people no longer live in close 
contact, individualism comes about. With the demise of solidarity and the rise in 
individualism, the common good comes under threat. He (2007, p. 59) then continues to paint 
the post-democratic scenario by evoking the complicit role played by the media with respect 
to the oligarchy’s post-democratic project. Following these analyses, Baumier (2007, p. 119) 
claims that war, which repeatedly occurs unnoticed in Western societies, should be 
understood as the elimination of difference. The elimination of difference results in the 
diffusion of a unique thought, which in turn is supported by the spontaneous ideology of the 
media (2007, p. 149). This ideology is “based on the fact that media actors belong to the same 
media networks, attended the same schools, learn and speak the same language, share the 
same interests ... This is a very small world, closely linked to the political and 
industrial/economic spheres. What ties them together? A community with shared interests, 
which do not need to be formalized, nor verbalized ...” (Baumier, 2007, p. 149). Bearing in 
mind the shared characteristics between media actors and their close relation with both 
political and economic spheres, Baumier deduces that politics and economics are very likely 
to influence the way in which news are reported.   
Baumier’s vision of post-democracy encompasses a wider array of topics, notably 
religion, philosophy, media, politics, and psychology. As such it is possible to note that 
Baumier engages with different themes to define post-democracy. The quantity of themes 
however does not reflect the quality and the validity of his argument. In order to assess 
Baumier’s post-democratic argument, chapter three deals with the constituent elements of 
Baumier’s post-democracy for subsequently scrutinizing his initial idea of democracy. 
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Chapter three also addresses the mechanisms conducive to the post-democratic development 
to then critically assessing them. 
According to Baumier, the post-democratic state displays diverse characteristics. 
These features touch upon many disciplines, such as politics, law, sociology, religion and to a 
lesser extent economics. His main focus in post-democracy lies in politics, sociology as well 
as psychology and, finally, religion which appears as the remedy to the post-democratic 
condition. Baumier’s account reflects above all his emotional opinion and vision of the 
development of democracy and modernity since the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989. 
Baumier’s qualitative reflections do not go further than a depiction of his conservative 
opinion on events and developments.  
The first part of this chapter discloses several main elements of Baumier’s post-
democratic order such as the illusion held by the French citizenry to be living in an Aronian 
moment of democracy, the belief in radical democracy as betterment of Aronian democracy 
and the hostage taking of the French state by left political parties and movements. The second 
part of the chapter aims at scrutinizing Baumier’s idea of post-democracy by looking at 
whether political identification in France is ideology or party driven before investigation 
political left and right affiliation and class consciousness in France.  
3.1 FEATURES OF POST-DEMOCRACY AS UNDERSTOOD BY BAUMIER 
a) Illusions Encountered by the French Public Leading to Post-democracy 
i) The Belief in Embracing the Aronian Moment of Democracy 
Baumier begins by claiming that two illusions administered by the government haunt 
the French population: first, that the majority of society believes they live in a democratic 
moment such as was understood by the French historian Raymond Aron, the ‘Aronian 
moment’. Raymond Aron is best known for his book Democracy and Totalitarianism 
published in 1969. The original title in French – Sociologie des sociétiés industrielles, 
esquisse d’une théorie des régimes politiques (Paris: Editions Gallimard) was according to 
the author himself more explicit and accurate (Scott, 2011). In the book, Aron analyses the 
relationship between (political) parties and regimes with a special attention to democratic and 
totalitarian regimes. For the purpose of my thesis, Aron’s conception of democracy will be 
explained. Subsequently, I will discuss Baumier’s use of Aron’s conception of democracy.  
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To begin with, for Aron democracy amounts to a regime “. . . in which the peaceful 
rivalry for the exercise of power exists constitutionally.” (Aron 1969, p. 41). The democratic 
idea is understood by Aron as “the dialogue among citizens, the control of the governors by 
the governed, the opportunity for everyone to be free.” (Aron, 1957, p. 109). The definition 
provided of democratic regimes and ideas convey a sense of competitiveness as well as 
idealism. Considering Aron’s definition of democracy and its ideal character, it comes as no 
surprise that Aron sees constitutional-pluralistic systems as “the moral verity of our time” 
(1957, p. 109).  
Pierce (1963) notes Aron’s preference for calling democratic regimes constitutional-
pluralist systems (see definition above). This preference testifies the particular sort of 
democratic conception: one that consists of several legal parties, “a constitutional 
organization of the competition and the exercise of power in a legal manner by the victors in 
the competition.” (Pierce, 1963, p. 27). Pierce (1963) claims that Aron’s conception of 
democracy is reminiscent of Schumpeter’s idea of democratic regimes, although differences 
exist between the two scholars’ conceptions. In the introduction of the thesis it was stated that 
Schumpeter has an elite conception of democracy. Pierce (1963) claims that the key 
difference between Aron’s and Schumpeter’s ideal democracy is in the way in which 
competition for political power is decided. Schumpeter sees the popular vote as key 
determinant of political power, while Aron in contrast does not mind how peaceful 
competition for political power is conducted nor how political power is exercised.  
Aron reveals himself to be skeptical about some democratic procedures and 
institutions. He sees universal suffrage as “a late and debatable institution of the political 
order” (1955, p. 269), and attributes to the parliament a jousting character – “parliamentary 
jousting is one technique, among others, of government by opinion” (1955, p. 269). In fact, 
electoral competition can take different forms in Aron’s thinking: “the institutions by which 
the democratic idea is expressed, elections, parliamentary deliberations, the responsibility of 
the ministers to the elected deputies, are one technique among other possible ones.” (1957, p. 
109).  
Aron’s qualification of democratic procedures and institutions comes across as 
skeptical, if not even cynical, in the light of the idea of democracy allegedly being more 
fundamental for Aron than processes and institutions that breathe life into and actually realize 
the democratic idea (Pierce, 1963). Pierce (1963) explains Aron’s disregard of democratic 
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procedures and institutions by the fact that he believes any existing procedures and 
institutions will reflect democratic values if such values are dominant at the level of social 
consciousness within a constitutional-pluralistic system. The democratic will of the people 
prevails by the force of their will, which shapes how institutions function not vice versa. In 
sum, the following characteristics of Aron’s constitutional-pluralist regime can be 
enumerated: first, its reliance on multiple parties; second, legitimation of the system is gained 
by electoral competition; third, the system follows the principle of respecting legality while 
maintain a sense of compromise; and fourth, the civil society living under such a regime is 
both heterogeneous and organized into groups (Scott, 2011). Examples of constitutional-
pluralist systems would be both presidential and Western parliamentary systems (Scott, 
2011). Yet, for Aron democracy lies in the will and consciousness of the people, not in 
institutional arrangements as such.  
Pierce (1963) discerns both advantages and disadvantages in Aron’s two fold 
definition of democracy. One the one hand, the flexible character of Aron’s democratic 
setting allows constant reforms and improvement of the constitutional-pluralistic order due to 
the system’s lack of fixity. On the other hand, the several separable parts of Aron’s 
democracy result in each part’s lack of capacity in standing alone. In order to understand 
Aron’s democracy, all parts have to be present. Moreover, a fragmented definition runs the 
risk of one element being overemphasized to the detriment of the others and therefore of the 
overall definition of democracy (Pierce, 1963). Another disadvantage is Aron’s lack of 
preciseness in how competition for political power in a constitutional-pluralist system can be 
peaceful and how the rulers this particular system should be elected.  
Aron’s work has to be seen a defence of both liberal political freedom and democratic 
pluralism (Scott, 2011). For Aron, liberalism “participates in the enterprise of the new 
Prometheus; he strives to act accordingly to the lessons, however, uncertain, of historical 
experience, in conformity with the partial truth he assembles rather than by reference to a 
falsely total vision” (Aron, 1984, p., 81/2).  
Baumier repeatedly asserts the illusion of the ‘Aronian democratic moment’ he claims 
the French public believes they life in. Nonetheless, Baumier does not explain what he 
understands by the ‘Aronian moment of democracy’. As previously stated, the ‘Aronian 
moment of democracy’ amounts to democracy as the will of the people despite the 
democratic limits of institutions. For Baumier the illusion lies in this belief today; where he 
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believes institutions have been fully post-democratized whilst the population remains 
comfortably deluded.   
Another point worthy to notice is Baumier’s choice to use Aron’s political sociology. 
Aron’s political sociology – his attempt to explain the degeneration of democratic regimes – 
seems in line with leftist scholars such as Crouch (1999; 2001; 2004), Marquand (2004) and 
du Gay (2002) (Scott, 2011), but this is not fully true. Whilst left critics see democracy 
undone by capitalist forces, for Aron it was technocratic managers who were replacing the 
people with industrial rationality. For Baumier, the European Union is this ‘technocratic’ 
threat hiding beneath the illusion of popular will. 
The second illusion, held by the radical left, is that to cure liberal and representative 
democracy’s deficiencies requires a social or radical extension of democratic principles. 
Because Baumier (2007, p. 20) thinks liberal and representative democracy already has 
ceased to exist, any social change could only be executed by elites as the democratic base of 
society has dried up. Aron’s conception of democracy dates back to the Cold War era and 
“[...] does not define itself in political terms that is to say as a type of regime, but rather as a 
state of society. Therefore, democracy is not a way of governance.” (Baumier, 2007, p. 35). 
In Baumier’s understanding, the Aronian moment of democracy can be betokened as liberal 
in the sense of asserting personal liberties based on a representative regime and aiming at 
formal equality and not egalitarianism of condition. Speaking of liberties, Aron refrains from 
stating a unique formula for freedom, as in his view no such exclusiveness exists (Aron, 
1998, cited in Baumier, 2007, p. 36).  
b) Radical Democracy as Betterment of Aronian Democracy 
i) The Exchangeability of Freedom and Rights 
Another confusion enacted by the post-democratic state on its citizenry is, according 
to Baumier, the exchangeability of the principle of freedom and the principle of equality. This 
confusion stems from and has been appropriated by the French political Left. The French 
political Left sees radical democracy as the betterment of the democratic Aronian moment. 
Baumier (2007, p. 25) highlights his encountered problems with leftist organisations such as 
Ras l’Front or Act Up: these advocacy groups officially fight for freedom and equality, 
expressing themselves in the name of specific communities. For this reason, Baumier reveals 
himself to be sceptical regarding the leftist organizations’ actions. He worries vis-à-vis fascist 
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means emanating from an anti-fascist movement, for example Le Cran rewriting dictionaries 
on a communitarian basis or the French Lesbian film festival being exclusively open to 
women. Baumier (2007, p. 26) denounces people’s blindness vis-à-vis their assaulted 
freedom by these groupings and claims that if other political groups would insist on these 
actions, protests would follow. This fight for freedom leading to its actual negation in the 
name of equality is according to the writer at the origin of the unperceived confusion ruling at 
many levels of the post-democratic order (Baumier, 2007, p. 26). The discussion between 
democracy and communitarianism can be reduced to a debate between the concepts of 
universalism and particularism. Universalism stands for the global relevance of an idea, a 
concept, etc. while communitarianism vouches for the particularities of groups, communities, 
characterized by cultural, linguistic, economic, and social distinctness.  
The tension between the principle of freedom and the principle of equality requires 
further explanation. Baumier (2007, p. 33) explains the concept of democracy as being based 
on the principle of freedom which altered radically in the last third of the 20th century. This 
progression went as far as incorporating the principle of equality causing an unprecedented 
confusion of terms. This specific disorientation in turn produces internal confrontations in 
democracy because of the recurrent tensions between the demands for specific rights by some 
communities (on the principal of equality) and the role played by the republican principle 
aiming at unifying citizens in a community of origin and responsibility (on the principle of 
freedom) (Baumier, 2007, p. 33). The novelty of this tension resides in its exacerbation: the 
core principle of modern democracy is egalitarianism which stipulates that “all human 
persons are equal in fundamental worth or moral status” (Arneson, 2013, p. 1) standing in the 
modern context for more equally distributed wealth and income among citizens. Drawing on 
the concept of ‘the iron law of oligarchy’ by R. Michels, Baumier states that the advent of 
oligarchy is only a question of time. Michels declared in his book Political Parties (1968) 
that each organization tends to produce an elite which would then institute an oligarchical 
system (Cassinelli, 1953). Nevertheless, Michels’ definition is very broad and attempts to 
narrow the term down have revealed challenges to the elements that can be used to constitute 
a political theory.  
The hollowing out of the Aronian democratic moment underlies the already 
mentioned inherent tension between equality and freedom. This imbalance however only 
came about with the disintegration of Communism as before “the Aronian democratic 
moment presented an equilibrium between the affirmed/declared ideal and the possible by 
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democracy. This equilibrium allowed Western democracies to resist Cold War violence” 
(Baumier, 2007, p. 40). Baumier claims that the equation, democracy equals the power of the 
people, has never been fully verified. Nonetheless, the Aronian moment allowed this equation 
to come close to reality.  
In Baumier’s view, the confusion between equality and freedom stems from two 
further illusions diffused by the French left fraction: the relevance of social or radical 
democracy in overcoming the deficiencies of the Aronian moment of democracy as well as 
the significance of left ideas. Baumier calls left ideas ‘cultural Trotskyism’. Social or radical 
democracy (as represented by Laclau and Mouffe, 1985) challenges the liberal and 
representative concept of democracy. The liberal/representative approach and the 
radical/social one are supposedly antagonistic to one another. However, for Baumier both 
democratic moments have ceased to exist. Moreover, he claims that the rupture of radical 
democracy, and its related diverse political movements, shows the willingness to break with 
its past by dismissing any bonds to totalitarianism of the 20th century. Unfortunately, Baumier 
does not give evidence what this radical democratic rupture was and when it occurred besides 
failing to explain how bonds relating to the totalitarian past were dismissed. 
A specific type of democracy is conceived in the French political system within the 
framework of alter-globalisation. The rise of this movement has enjoyed the support of 
philosophical critics in their interpretation of the world. The Italian philosopher Toni Negri’s 
(cited in Baumier, 2007, p. 27) primary claim is that capitalism evolves into an empire which 
would destroy itself from the inside by decentralised revolts by the multitude. For Baumier 
such ideas contain the most significant philosophical assumptions allowing the illusionary 
retention of radical/social democratic possibilities. According to Baumier’s understanding, 
this kind of philosophy is characterised by a total opposition to the status quo (2007, p. 28). 
Eric Voegelin’s (2000, cited in Baumier, 2007, p. 28) asserts that such political thought 
aiming at imposing a ‘real imaginary’ onto reality, leads to totalitarianism. Building upon 
Voegelin’s critique Baumier suggests that Negri’s adepts and Neo-Marxist thinkers in general 
ignore reality and exhibit totalitarian traits in wanting simply to exterminate ‘reality’ and to 
replace it with something wholly other.  
c) Hostage Taking of the State by Left Political Parties and Movements 
Another feature of post-democracy is the parallel existence and development of alter-
globalisation and radical Islamism given that both movements are in Baumier’s view, 
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“fighting for national liberation” (2007, p. 30) and are according to Bensaïd (2006, p. 18, 
cited in Baumier, 2007, p. 30) therefore naturally allied. The unique ambition of the far left is 
allegedly their willingness to recreate/overhaul the depiction of social and radical democracy 
although it’s time has long since passed. Attempts to prove the topicality of radical 
democracy in French politics simply unveils a contrary fact: “the continuous speech of 
radical democracy merely translates the permanence of its failure” (Baumier, 2007, p. 31). 
The same failure of social or radical democracy applies to liberal/representative democracy 
according to Baumier who does not explain why.  
i) The role of the Media Corporation 
The left radical camp jumped upon the wagon of alter-globalisation turning this 
movement into one of its cornerstones (Baumier, 2007, p. 22/3). The left radical camp 
showed capacity in undertaking actions by fighting/opposing all sorts of exclusion and 
bolstering social movements wherewith it acquired an apparent legitimacy by adaptation; 
according to Baumier this depicts the mechanism why French people suffer from an illusion 
as the radical left apparently won legitimacy on false premises. Under the Mitterand 
presidency (1988-1995), the government sought to incorporate the antifascist movement into 
the left general camp according to Baumier. For Baumier, since this time the French public 
has been held in an illusion by the government’s and media’s promotion of which he sees to 
be the radical democracy illusion baffling the public.  
These claims by Baumier are joined by a last account explaining the excessive 
presence of left political issues at the heart of the French political system: the space provided 
for investigation/analysis and other events happening within the national public space are 
broken down by the media. The media allegedly figures 80% of leftist journalists abiding to 
radical nostalgia (Baumier, 2007, p. 23). According to Baumier, on these grounds, radical and 
social democracy have appropriated French civil society. Baumier gives the example of the 
French left trade unionist Olivier Besancenot and his announced evening protests by 
revolutionary people, the dangerous class sweeping through the streets following the 
Constitutional referendum regarding the European Union. Baumier claims the reality did not 
comply with pictures aired on the French television channels (Baumier, 2007, p. 25). The 
divergence between Besancenot’s announced evening protests and the pictures of empty 
streets aired on television signifies for Baumier that the non-compliance between left claims 
and reality is just another proof of French media misrepresenting reality. 
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‘Cultural Trotskyism’ has been accredited by the former editor of the French 
newspaper Le Monde E. Plenel as the leading ideology in most medias and qualified by 
Baumier as an “intellectual haze/mist that better suits the concept of cultural leftism than 
cultural Trotskyism” (Baumier, 2007, p. 23). In contrast to Baumier, Plenel views the 
denomination ‘cultural Trotskyist’ in a positive light. Trotskyism implies global scope. 
Bringing together culture and Trotskyism, by cultural Trotskyites Baumier means 
cosmopolitan anti-nationalists. Even if the coined term might appear to consist of two 
synonymous terms, cosmopolitanism and anti-nationalism differ from one another with 
respect to identity. Cosmopolitans can be designated as citizens of the world whose national 
identity does not play a major role given that under the rule of a world government national 
difference no longer exists, while anti-nationalists reject the nation state to foster their own 
personal identity (McKim and McMahan, 1997, p. 121). According to Baumier, the French 
media promote an ideology hostile to republican democracy and a national demos – the 
people – resulting in the fostering of the post-democratic state.  
3.2 SCRUTINIZING BAUMIER’S IDEA OF POST-DEMOCRACY 
In Baumier’s and in Crouch’s depiction of post-democracy, politics is of central 
interest. Baumier sees politics as another sphere of influence monopolized by Left ideology 
that contributes to the gradual disappearance of democracy per se. Democracy is understood 
by Baumier (2004, p. 20) in its commonly acknowledged sense meaning equality among 
people and the right to various freedoms, see freedom of expression, freedom of thought and 
freedom of association among others. This definition of democracy reflects the concept’s 
most simple sense without including social factors such as habitus as understood in the 
Bourdieuian sense of cultivating cultural practices on a regular basis, economic factors such 
as disposing of financial means to literally ‘buy’ culture by investing in books, knowledge, 
travel, and eventually cultural/educational factors that can be summoned by having graduated 
from public or private schools for example. The list of other factors forging a person’s 
character and impacting on exercising citizen’s democratic rights is as long as it is 
exhaustive. This is the reason why democracy cannot produce ‘total’ equality merely by 
assuming that all citizens are formally equal to one another. The afore mentioned social, 
economic and cultural/educational differences existing within a given society would need to 
be acknowledged and addressed for such ‘total’ equality to be sought. In societies that are 
aware of these differences the mechanism known as positive discrimination is often used to 
77 
 
enable marginalised groups and people to gain positions in the working space and rights that 
they normally would not have accessed and exercised/enjoyed.  
In Baumier’s understanding, positive discrimination contradicts the basic democratic 
principle of equality and freedom. First, in his conservative understanding giving work 
positions to people simply because they are from marginalised groups goes against the 
principle of meritocracy that postulates that the most adequate person receives the position. In 
fact, meritocracy turns out to be a strong argument against positive discrimination. However, 
it is possible to observe that Baumier rejects the argument for positive discrimination on the 
grounds that adopting such a paternalistic mechanism for selection removes human agency 
from achievement and makes a person’s position dependent upon bureaucratic favour rather 
than personal competence.  
To make a bridge between the violation of meritocracy and totalitarianism, it is 
necessary to investigate law. Law grants rights to recognized communities; see for example 
the right of Muslims in Germany not to work during their religious celebrations (Saint-Paul, 
2013). For Baumier, the right of same-sex marriage in France (Le Monde, 2013) or 
homoparental adoption not only distorts traditional conservative values. They also undermine 
the freedom of other citizens. Given that these laws address the needs of a minority at the 
national level, Baumier sees a rise in totalitarianism due to the cut back of individual rights of 
all citizens. Moreover, the fact that left ideology and left political parties endorse 
multiculturalism and social diversity leads Baumier to the following conclusion: to equate 
totalitarianism with left ideology and political parties. Needless to say, he opposes this fusion 
and therefore can be called a conservative.  
The first sub-part of the next section investigates whether French citizens vote 
according to either ideology or according to a political party programmes. The study by 
Bélanger, Lewis-Beck, Chiche and Tiberj (2006) suggests that political identification in 
France occurs by adhering to a particular ideology. Therefore, citizens vote in elections 
according to ideology and not to political programmes put forward by political parties. 
According to Bélanger, Lewis-Beck, Chiche and Tiberj (2006) political systems resting on 
ideological political identification are more prone to conflict in opposition to systems in 
which identification occurs through political parties. As such, Baumier’s claim is that French 
people adhering to left ideological thought that is being diffused by the cultural Trotskyist 
elite causes a democratic break-down. Left totalitarianism epitomises this break-down. 
Following from Belanger et al.’s political identification study, Baumier declares that French 
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citizens live in a totalitarian regime where the radical Left monopolize the media and claims 
turned into rights by marginalized groups cut back on the freedom of the mass. Dommett’s 
(2012) investigation into the relationship between ideology and political parties suggests that 
political party programmes do not always reflect a distinct ideological stance. Nevertheless, 
she concludes that political parties and associations are the most frequently used tools to 
embody ideology. Following from this claim, Baumier blames the French left parties and 
associations for the reigning totalitarianism. However, De Benoist’s (1995) article found 
declining French class consciousness and the fading support for the political Left-Right 
dichotomy among the French citizenry. This finding undermines the validity of the left 
totalitarian state ideology thesis in the light of fewer and fewer people identifying themselves 
with political parties and ideology. Therefore, it seems that people become increasingly 
apolitical instead of carrying a distinct political ideology.  The final sub-section addresses the 
supposedly shared feature between left and right ideologies, that is to say totalitarianism.  
a) Political Identification in France: Ideology or Party Driven?  
Debates on party or ideology identification has been a popular topic in assessing 
voting behaviour in Western Europe. In France, these debates seem to be even more salient as 
two camps emerged analysing the voters’ psychologies: Fleury and Lewis-Beck claim that 
“Ideology, not party, is the premier psychological anchor of the French voter, according to 
this [their own] analysis of the 1967 French National Election Study” (Fleury and Lewis-
Beck, 1993, cited in Lewis-Beck and Chlarson, 2002, p. 491). Campbell (1966, cited in 
Lewis-Beck and Chlarson, 2002, p. 489) maintains the importance of French party 
identification even if this particular level of significance cannot match the level in the United 
States of America.  
In the case that voters identify with parties, academic observations point to a stable 
party system (Bélanger, Lewis-Beck, Chiche and Tiberj, 2006). In the case of voters’ 
identification through ideologies, the party system is supposed to be less stable and parties 
less enduring due to individual switching (Bélanger, Lewis-Beck, Chiche and Tiberj, 2006). 
With respect to Western Europe, a third comprehensive approach combining the two outlined 
identifications tools can be applied so as to analyse the (dis)continuities of the prevailing 
party systems. 
How does this discussion relate to Baumier’s post-democratic analysis? This analysis 
of the French voting behaviour supports Baumier’s militant account of post-democracy. In 
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fact, Bélanger, Lewis-Beck, Chiche and Tiberj (2006) claim that electoral behaviour based on 
ideological identification translates into unstable political regimes. These characteristics 
unveils an internal contradiction in Baumier’s thought: if post-democratic war that is being 
fought daily is synonymous with the elimination of difference, than democracy as understood 
exclusively in terms of equality between all humans by Baumier counts as supreme kind of 
war. Any kind of existing difference between humans is abolished rendering them uniform 
and therefore reminiscent of totalitarian regimes. 
Returning to the discussion of the link between ideology and political parties as 
psychological anchor, it is still true to say that political parties still aim at representing 
political ideologies. In order to live in a democracy and to cast one’s vote, political parties are 
at present the only possible representations acting on a national level. 
b) A Similarity Unveiled Between Left and Right Ideologies: Totalitarianism 
To further critically assess Baumier’s conservative idea of democracy, comparing his 
account of left ideology with accounts addressing current right ideologies results in an 
unexpected outcome: a shared characteristic that is totalitarianism. Baumier believes that the 
Aronian moment ceased to exist simultaneously with the fall of the Berlin wall. This belief 
implies the fading away of the dynamic state of society. These thoughts partly relate to 
Fukuyama’s “End of History” thesis. This expression stands for the triumphal perpetration of 
liberal representative democracy throughout the world by both the Washington Consensus 
and the New World Order. This specific kind of democracy embraces neo-liberalism as its 
ideology and supposedly fosters peace due to shared economic dependence in global markets. 
Fukuyama claims that liberal democracy as experienced in the Western countries comes at 
the end of the 20
th
 century to the “unabashed victory of economic and political liberalism” 
(Fukuyama, 1989, p. 1). The victory of Western liberal democracy also results in the “the end 
point of mankind's ideological evolution and the universalization of Western liberal 
democracy as the final form of human government” (Fukuyama, 1989, p. 2). The scholar 
maintains that the omnipresence of this particular regime type does not imply the end of 
ideology. However, it is worth asking to what extent and for how long citizens will continue 
to identify themselves with the prevailing ideology before loosening their sense of 
identification with respect to neo-liberalism. 
The following example provided by the former dramatist and President of the Czech 
Republic V. Havel testifies in the political essay entitled The Power of the Powerless (1978) 
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the progressively disappearing identification and rising complacency of people vis-à-vis the 
then prevailing communist ideology. Havel gives the example of a greengrocer who has 
hanging in his shop window a poster with communist paroles, see “Workers of the world, 
unite!” (Havel, 1978). The dramatist then inquires in what way people think about and agree 
with such statements: 
“I think it can safely be assumed that the overwhelming majority of shopkeepers 
never think about the slogans they put in their windows, nor do they use them to express their 
real opinions. That poster was delivered to our greengrocer from the enterprise headquarters 
along with the onions and carrots. He put them all into the window simply because it has 
been done that way for years, because everyone does it, and because that is the way it has to 
be.” (Havel, 1978). 
Following Havel’s reasoning pressure, fear as well as habit account as pillars of the 
communist ideology. With Fukuyama’s depiction of a unilateral ideological world, it is 
possible to compare the degree of ideological endorsement in the former communist regime 
with the future prospects of the newly emerged neo-liberal regime due to their global 
aspiration.  
Another paradox worth noting is the before mentioned emotions, pressure, fear and 
habit, that can also be found in S. Wolin’s study of democracy’s illiberal aspects, also known 
as ‘inverted totalitarianism’. The aftermath of 9/11 had major impacts on the government and 
society of the United States: so as to guarantee ‘national security’ individual rights and civil 
liberties fell prey to cutting backs and violations. With these developments, the government 
consolidated its illiberal democratic traits while empowering itself (Desch, 2007/8).  
Therefore, Baumier’s claim of the French State’s capture by Left ideology has to be 
nuanced: in fact totalitarianism no longer seems solely to be related to Left politics and 
ideology. The Communist regimes as well as the present liberal democratic system both 
count as totalitarian, although they feature supposedly antagonistic ideologies.  
c) Left and Right Political Affiliation and Class Consciousness in France 
Baumier’s conception of the French Republic falling prey to the Left ideology is 
further called into question by Alain de Benoist’s (1995) article entitled End of the Right-Left 
Dichotomy. De Benoist’s (1995) article addresses the progressive annihilation of the belief in 
distinct and antagonistic political ideologies by the French citizenry. Moreover, another 
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aspect suggests this political dichotomy is rapidly decreasing: the sentiment of class 
consciousness in the French context. De Benoist (1995) bases his study of political 
dichotomy and class consciousness on the French political barometer Sofres Polls which 
indicates the following trends: back in March 1981 33% of the population did not believe in 
the ideological differences of the French conservative party, the Republican Party, and its 
socialist counterpart, The Socialist Party. Only three years later, this proportion increased to 
46% while in March 1988 45% of the French citizenry endorsed this perspective. 
Simultaneously after the disintegration of communism in November 1989 less than 50% of 
the French citizenry expressed their belief in this ideological rivalry (De Benoist, 1995, p. 
73). 
Paralleling this declining belief, it is necessary to delineate the percentage of French 
nationals still supporting the political divide: first, during the decade 1981 to 1991, the 
proportion of people upholding this separation diminished from 43% to 33%, that is to say by 
10% (De Benoist, 1995, p. 74). Although fewer people expressed their skepticism instead of 
support for political ideologies, in 1991 64% of the French population still claimed to be 
conscious about their class belonging. During the 1960s, 90% of the French population 
characterized themselves as class conscious. In 1981 this consciousness fell to 73% (De 
Benoist, 1995, p. 74). 
Moving on to French class consciousness, the two selected dates 1960 and 1981 assert 
a very strong disparity. This disparity translates into 1960 with a very high level of class 
consciousness while 1981 saw the contrary, a comparable low level. As potential reason for 
this sharp decline in class consciousness is the disappearing of the working class. The later 
transmitted strong class values that featured and still do to some extent in trade unions for 
instance. Comparing the French case with the British one, it seem as if the later witnessed the 
height of workers’ class consciousness in the era of social democracy by calling for an 
improvement in work conditions, a greater voice in political affairs and an expansion of the 
Welfare state (Crouch, 2004, p. 2). As such, the emancipation of the working class can be set 
equal with the zenith of democracy. In the French context, democracy is guided by the motto 
‘liberté, égalité, fraternité’ stemming from the 1789 French Revolution as well as by 
Tocquevillian (1835) principles enounced in Democracy in America that centre on people’s 
sovereignty, the existence of public opinion and the leveling of conditions.  
De Benoist’s (1995) work supports Baumier’s account of the state’s capture by Left 
ideology in demonstrating that Baumier’s view that the French citizenry believes in class, 
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politics and ideology, but rather that they have been ‘captured’ by an ideology. Already in 
November 1989 before the Aronian moment ceased to exist and the Left’s apparent take over, 
French people no longer believed in the Right-Left ideological dichotomy nor did they 
identify themselves with a specific class.  
The chapter intends to show which actors and what mechanism helped in fostering 
Baumier’s post-democratic scenario.  The actors originate from different spheres, be it from 
power structures such as the oligarchy whilst other come, from groups fighting for their 
identity to be recognized and to claim rights (such as the gay community). Baumier’s account 
of mechanisms centres on the distortion of truth by the media and communitarianism limiting 
citizens’ rights. Baumier’s selection of actors and mechanisms demonstrates the wide range 
of domains to which Baumier attributes both the emergence and structure of post-democracy. 
These domains stretch from social identities to politics to economics and media. These 
categorizations prove anew that post-democracy is understood in a very vast sense by 
proposing an encompassing analysis of causes and, consequences. The following part of this 
chapter sets out in the first part a summary of Baumier’s post-democratic scenario; second, 
three reasons for the democratic fragmentation resulting in post-democracy: the disregard of 
the French voters by the oligarchy over the European Union Lisbon Treaty which establishes 
a constitution; third, the rise of French communitarian law, the factor which in Baumier’s 
perspective mostly undermines the democratic order. 
i) The French Referendum on the Lisbon Treaty 
An important step of consolidating the French post-democratic order was the by 
disregarding of the results of the May 2005 European Union referendum. This vote showed 
division between the oligarchy and the people vis-à-vis the European project. The French 
popular ‘No’, was imitated a little later by the Dutch people for the same reasons, such as the 
end of a social welfare state and fear of a neo-liberal takeover. The directive Bolkestein was 
topic of discussion and associated with the Lisbon Treaty in the media. Although, the results 
were acknowledged and made public, the French oligarchy overruled the citizenry’s vote: 
“We experienced the real division between the oligarchy and the people. We saw the virtual 
reality of “democracy”. The May 2005 referendum is a stage in the expression of Post-
democracy: the on-going democratic atrophy exposed itself in the broad day light.”  
(Baumier, 2007, p. 59). This overruling also contributed to the following understanding by 
Baumier: “A few days were sufficient for us to note that we changed the state of our 
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democratic society. Because, if the people said no, the oligarchy which  holds in reality 
political, economic, social and media powers, under the pretext of democratic representation, 
said no to the people’s no.” (2007, p. 60). This result came as a surprise to the oligarchy 
according to Baumier given that the route for the envisaged result had already been laid out: 
“May 2005 will remain engraved in French history as the symbolic moment of post-
democracy’s emergence: in this regime, expressed choices by the people are endorsed – after 
having been prepared, or not, - by the pretending democratic oligarchy, according to whether 
the people’s choices point in the same direction as do the oligarchy’s choices.” (2007, p. 60). 
With the oligarchy disregarding and discarding the actual result, post-democracy overcame 
another decisive stage: even though the referendum in the French case did not work out the 
way envisaged by the oligarchy, the latter is not constrained in respecting the results and can 
act freely even against the will of the people (Baumier, 2007, p. 60).  
Baumier not only attributes the oligarchy disrespecting citizens’ vote to France, but 
also to the United States of America “The same process in other countries, see the United 
States, during the 2001 presidential election as one part of the votes had not been counted so 
as that candidate who had to win would win them in a certain manner.” (2007, p. 61). 
Baumier then goes on to state that the omitting of votes in the 2001 American presidential 
election qualifies as a coup d’état while still abiding to democratic principles: “The coup 
d’état by George Bush still fitted with historic customs which we inherited by democracy: the 
Republican candidate was not the first politician ascending to power by rigging electoral 
results. The disregard of the French No vote is not reconditioned by the elite during the next 
election which happened to be the 2007 presidential election: […] the preparation for the 
2007 presidential election carefully avoids to refer to this referendum, which had been a true 
cataclysm, inaugurating the end of liberal democracy; everything goes by as if this 
referendum never happened, as if the people had not clearly removed any legitimacy claims 
from the ruling “elite”. Let’s be frank: if we still lived in the state of a liberal democratic 
society, employers, journalists, policy analysts and elected politicians would have all 
resigned. […] It is by this way that post-democracy currently overcomes a decisive step: the 
oligarchic power can organise a referendum by being persuaded of victory, for then losing the 
referendum without being constrained to respect the results. […] The voice expressed by the 
people on the referendum exists without really existing: post-democracy is this moment in 
our history: the moment when democratic participation by the population … became virtual.” 
(2007, p. 61/2).   
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The referendum displayed the people’s weakness and the oligarchy’s power to abide 
by election results or not. The discrepancy between the people and the oligarchy not only 
translates into a difference in opinion but also in defining the political agenda.  
i) Communitarianism 
Baumier (2007, p. 269) claims that communitarianism causes the death of the 
republic. Communitarianism is conceived as the common good in contemporary post-
democracy. Before outlining how communitarianism advances the entrenchment of post-
democracy according to Baumier, a definition of communitarianism is provided. Charles 
Taylor (1989) is best known alongside Alasdair MacIntyre (1984), Michael Sandel (1998) 
and Michael Walzer (1983) for his communitarian critique of liberalism. Taylor (1985) 
critiques liberalism’s understanding of the self on two grounds: first, he disputes liberalism’s 
conception of human nature and secondly for liberalism’s failure to recognize that even 
individuals in a liberal society when promoting individualistic values, for example freedom 
are creating a shared communities of such values. Communitarianism is, for some, the 
opposite of liberalism and as such often employed to critique liberalism (Abbey and Taylor, 
1996). Taylor however argues this apparent dichotomy between liberalism and 
communitarianism is misleading. Ontological speaking someone could be a communitarian 
even whilst at endorsing liberal values as well as individual rights (Abbey and Taylor, 1996). 
Calling on society, states and law to ‘respect’ the individuals, is itself a call for communal 
(shared) values. He claims that the apparent dichotomy flows from the absence of a concrete 
definition as well as from the multiple definitions of both communitarianism and liberalism 
in circulation (Abbey and Taylor, 1996).  
In a nutshell Rawlsian Liberalism can be defined as a call for fair distribution of both 
economic resources and liberties by the government to enable individuals to lead their lives 
as freely as possible (Rawls, 1971). Rawlsian Liberalism was criticized in the 1980s by both 
Sandel (1981) and Taylor (1985; 1989) for its reliance on an individualistic conception of the 
self. According to Rawls’ line of reasoning, every person has primary interest in their 
personal life-plan pursuing and revising these over time. Both Sandel (1981) and Taylor 
(1985; 1989) argue that Rawls does not pay enough attention to the fact that individuals are 
related to one another in various ways, be it by societal, family or religious bonds. If an 
individual was to pursue her or his personal life-plans at any cost these essential social bonds 
are highly likely to be damaged (Bell, 2012). Following from this view, Sandel (1981) and 
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Taylor (1985; 1989) called for politics not to focus exclusively on individuals’ empowerment 
and improving their access to power, but to promote social values and well-being.   
The ontological call by communitarians to revise political goals originated from 
Taylor’s 1985 essay entitled Atomism. In Atomism, Taylor (1985) rejected the liberal 
assumption that people are inherently self-sufficient and life outside society. On the contrary, 
Taylor endorses and supports the Aristotelian account that “Man is a social animal, indeed a 
political animal, because he is not self-sufficient alone, and in an important sense is not self-
sufficient outside a polis” (Taylor, 1985, p. 190). Bell (2012) further criticizes the atomistic 
outlook on men and society by claiming such a liberal account fails to acknowledge that 
liberalism itself assumes individuals to be members of and support a society that upholds 
liberal values, e.g. freedom.  
Communitarianism’s main concern is the establishment, maintenance and 
reproduction of societal ties. Although Taylor is considered to be one of the leading scholars 
on communitarianism (Abbey and Taylor, 1996), he admits to having reservations regarding 
the term communitarianism as the term was and is used by several people in different ways. 
As such, a concrete definition of communitarianism is needed. In his understanding of 
communitarianism, Taylor sides with “[…] social democrats who are worried about the way 
that various forms of individualism are undermining the welfare state […]” (Abbey and 
Taylor, 1996, p. 3). Taylor further clarifies his communitarian position by declaring that in 
ontological terms, he is a communitarian endorsing the importance ‘irreducibly social’ goods 
– goods that bear a commonly understood and agreed upon goodness (Song, 2007) - while at 
an ethical level Taylor also advocates communitarian values. Taylor rejects the ideal of a 
neutral state as in his view such a state cannot exist. Taylor (1989) also supports ‘higher, 
strongly evaluated goods’ and envisages by this term goods which are at the origin of moral 
obligations of societal members’. The maintenance of such collective goods may require 
limits being placed upon the immediate preferences of society members as individuals. The 
social order of a society stipulates according to Taylor (1989) which goods are lower or 
higher and, as such, these higher goods’ moral obligations. According to Taylor (1989), 
liberal individuals who adopt a highly individualistic moral stance miss out on the shared 
moral experience of members in a society motivated by social values, even whilst ignoring 
the instrumental benefits of living in a society. 
86 
 
For Taguieff communitarianism constitutes “an ideology whose function is to 
legitimate the reconstruction of individual groupings based on their origin, precisely of 
communities in the framework of modern nation states founded on the normative principle of 
cultural and/or ethnical homogeneity. Communitarisation accounts for an internal 
contestation of the national framework” (Taguieff, 2003, cited in Baumier, 2007, p. 269). 
Baumier also sees communitarianism as a threat to the unity of the republican nation state by 
stating that “We assist the inversion of the community idea to the benefit of the resurgence of 
reintroduced peculiarities at the heart of the Republic under the name of communitarianism. 
Several self-proclaimed communities claim a “right to difference”, in the name of the 
Republic […] not realizing that this claim posits the end of the Republic in terms of a 
communion bringing together the entirety of the nation in a political entity giving the primacy 
to the collective good over the individual good.” (2007, p. 272). Baumier then alludes to the 
rule of a minority imposing their wishes onto the large majority: “In other words, whatever is 
‘good’ for an individual or an internal group within the national community is not necessarily 
‘good’ for the entirety of the community, particular claims cannot be set equal to a ‘right’, 
even less to a ‘human right’. This is the place where lies the communitarian rupture that 
threatens the Republic.” (2007, p. 272). Communitarianism also exhibits expansionist 
features in Baumier’s reasoning: “Communitarianism tending to exacerbate itself in all 
directions and is a way of destroying the Republic…This destructive will is not a result per 
coincidence. The destruction of the Republican foundation as a characteristic of post-
democracy which currently develops is a result of the synchronicity of a philosophical 
outlook on the world (an ultra-individualist materialism and hedonism), paired with the 
history of communitarian claims […] and by the concomitant constitution of pressure groups 
and lobbies which are not presented as such.” (2007, p. 272/3).   
R. Esposito supports Baumier’s view regarding communitarianism as destroying force 
of democracy. Esposito claims that “one constantly has to remember the double face of 
community; on the one hand it is the most adequate, or even the unique dimension of the 
animalistic «human», while on the other hand, it is the deduction which can dissolve power” 
(Esposito, 2000, cited in Baumier, 2007, p. 273). Following this reasoning, Esposito further 
states that res publica and community are two distinct entities. He then further describes in a 
detailed way the incompatibility between communitarianism and democracy. 
Communitarianism is said to be: “a negation of the Republican concept through the common 
good concept, a eulogy of the individual as an end in itself, a unilateral definition of the 
87 
 
human as an animal – to the point that one seriously starts to question whether the human is a 
dog like any other”, whilst he gives “… a definition of the Republic as anti-individualistic 
drift…” (2007, p. 274).  
The ideological and totalitarian rejection of the real has been advanced in the name of 
one ‘true and real world’. The ‘true and real world’ was proclaimed by the general public.  
From the general public’s point of view, “communitarianism perceived as vector of 
individual liberation emerged in France with the successful claims by the gay community...” 
(2007, p. 275). Martel speaks of a system by which he means a social movement by “pink 
khmers” (2007, p. 275) which laid the foundations for other communitarian claims to emerge 
which nowadays are at the heart of political debates and which were at the heart of the 
presidential campaigns in 2007.  
The communitarisation of the French Republic expanded between the 1990s and 
2000s with laws paving the way for civil unions (PACS), then with the law against 
homophobia. The next stage would be the right of same-sex marriage and the right to adopt 
by same-sexed couples. For Baumier, these rights need to be debated. He claims that “the 
right to adopt by same-sex couples would merit at least a true debate in society, which is 
rejected in the name of simplicity: a claim is equal to a right.” (Baumier, 2007, p. 276). 
Baumier further states that the laws had been passed due to pressure and actions undertaken 
by political party’s lobbies, outside of any national debates without respecting democratic 
rules. He further points to the fact “the thing [avoidance of debates] is even more shocking in 
the light of lobbies in question not representing their community at all. They only represent 
themselves.” (2007, p. 276).  
In sum, communitarianism is viewed as the prime vector in the destruction of the 
democratic Aronian moment which in France exhibits republican traits. The 
“communitarisation of the French political space is both anti-democratic and anti-republican, 
and […] occurs in the name of some Aronian democratic values. By this, this process is an 
example of post-democracy.” (Baumier, 2007, p. 270). Post-democracy no longer guarantees 
the equalities of its citizens nor independent debates as communitarian groups insist that their 
claims be turned into rights something the legislators support. The democratic fragmentation 
also is linked to a rise in individualism following Baumier’s thinking: the claiming of rights 
might be beneficial for one group while destructive for another one. As the democratic 
principle of equality no longer holds true, communitarianism appears as the stepping stone 
for individualism.  
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3.3 REFLECTIONS ON MECHANISMS FOSTERING POST-DEMOCRACY 
 ACCORDING TO BAUMIER 
a) Political Parties’ Support for the French Referendum on the 2005 
European Union Constitutional Treaty 
On 29 May 2005, the French public voted against the European Union (EU) 
Constitutional Treaty, also known as the Lisbon Treaty. This treaty resulted from the 
European Council’s Laeken Summit that took place in December 2001. The Summit had set 
the agenda for discussions about “a special Constitutional Convention on the Future of 
Europe.” (Hainsworth, 2006, p. 98). The former French president V. G. D’Estaing oversaw 
the Convention which, eventually, presented in July 2003 a treaty outlining the potential 
European Constitution (Hainsworth, 2006, p. 98). Following the French negative vote on the 
referendum of the European Union Constitutional Treaty, The Netherlands headed in the 
same direction only three days later in early June 2005, while Ireland abandoned its planned 
referendum on the Constitutional Treaty. The French referendum turned out to be one with 
the highest percentage of electoral participation; almost 70% of the French public cast their 
vote, 55% of these voters rejected the Constitutional project of the European Union. Before 
investigating the reasons for the French ‘No’, the media representation of the referendum 
Baumier’s claim of a Left ideological capture of the event, and the position of the French 
political parties is addressed.  
As soon as the then French President Chirac declared that a referendum would be held 
on the Lisbon Treaty, French political parties sought for a viable position. Beginning May 
2005 the mainstream branch of the conservative Union For A Popular Movement (UMP) 
party’s national council expressed their support vis-à-vis the ratification of the Lisbon Treaty 
by a large margin, that is to say by 91% (Hainsworth, 2006, p. 100). The less dominant Union 
for Democracy France headed by D’Estaing joined the dominant UMP in their support for the 
European constitutional project. The conservative parties situated on the margins such as the 
Front National (FN), The Movement For France (MPF), The National Republican Movement 
(MNR) as well as the Rally For France (RPF) all rejected the constitutional endeavor. Within 
the mainstream UMP a minority of deputies such as Nicolas Dupont-Aignan advocated the 
‘No’ vote (Hainsworth, 2006, p. 100).  
The No option was popular among French left political parties, see the French 
Communist Party (PCF), The Revolutionary Communist League (LCR), Worker’s Struggle 
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(LO), Worker’s Party (PT) and social movements, see Attac and the Peasant Confederation 
(CP) (Hainsworth, 2006, p. 101). Other left political groupings such as the New Socialist 
Party (NPS) and the New World Network (NWN) much contributed to developing the ‘No’ 
campaign. In any case, the most important dissident from the French Left was the Minister of 
the Economy, Finance and Industry who currently serves as Holland’s Foreign Minister: 
Laurent Fabius. Many PS members resented Fabius’ opposing of the European constitutional 
project and called for his expulsion (Hainsworth, 2006, p. 101).   
The mainstream left political parties such as the Socialist Party (PS) and the Green 
Party (LV) pronounced no clear cut position: the official position of both parties was 
supportive of the European Constitutional Treaty. However, a closer look at internal party 
politics shows, only 59% of PS members supported the treaty while only 53% of LV 
members did so. Hainsworth (2006, p. 101) claims that such support as there was mainly 
stemmed from the party’s leading figures such as Hollande for the PS and Wehrling, Mamère 
and Cohn-Bendit for LV.   
Following the referendum, the Left political landscape experienced difficulties. The 
position regarding the European Constitutional Referendum had fractured the socialist party, 
a fact that was not eased by the two 2004 political victories at European and regional 
elections (Hainsworth, 2006, p. 111). The secretary of the PS, Holland, faced calls for 
resignation, while Fabius consolidated his position as a politician at a national level. Still, 
Fabius’ empowerment did not carry any advantages for his potential presidential candidature 
due to his exposed differences with the socialist party.   
Following from the analyze of the French political parties’ position towards the 
referendum, it is possible to critically assess Baumier’s claim that the referendum was a proof 
of the left leaning oligarchy’s overruling of the citizens’ vote and opinion as well as his 
claims regarding the false depiction of the event by the vast majority of cultural Trotskyist 
journalists. First, Hainsworth’s evidences (above) about political positions concerning the 
2005 referendum evidences that right political parties, in particular the UMP, at 91%, 
expressed a higher proportion of support than left political parties; see the PS with 59%. As 
such seems that of the two main French political parties, the conservatives proved to be more 
Europhile than their socialist counterpart. Generally speaking, this situation appears paradox: 
conservative parties normally convey values such as strong feelings towards national 
sovereignty. Socially inclined parties usually advocate integration at both international and 
national levels and support the idea of multiculturalism. In the French case, these 
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generalizations hold true to a certain degree; however, these generalizations turned out to be 
false with respect to the European constitutional project.  
As such, Baumier’s claim that it was a cultural Trotskyist French oligarchy that 
overruled the popular ‘No’ vote seems indefencible: the highest proportion of advocates 
regarding the referendum emanated from the conservative ranks. Moreover, the fact that 
Chirac, the then conservative President introduced the referendum calls into question the 
French oligarchy’s ideological and political affiliations. If it is true, as Baumier claims, that 
the oligarchy enforces its will on the broad mass, then the ruling elite must endorse both 
conservative ideology and the conservative party. This conclusion turns out to be the first 
failure for Baumier regarding the political left ideological hostage-taking of the state.  
The stirring question about the no-vote remains whether this vote reflects France’s 
turning away from the European project. In fact, Veit (2005, p. 2) claims that the no-vote has 
to be acknowledged in a pro-European context and points to the French people’s hope of 
negotiating the Constitutional Treaty and further advancing European integration. The current 
French Minister of Exterior Affairs, Fabius, who is known for his pro-European stance, 
appears as having contributed to the socially acceptable no-vote (Veit, 2005, p. 2). This 
position can be explained by Fabius’s perception of the Treaty: he held the view that by 
supporting the Lisbon Treaty Neo-liberalism would eventually find its way into the member 
states meaning the end of a ‘social Europe’. Therefore voting against the constitutional 
project is set as equal to the approval of more social security and maintaining the same level 
of employment (Veit, 2005, p. 3). One more reason for the no-answer lies in the French 
public frustration with their government and its then head of state, J. Chirac. Another factor 
accounting for the negative outcome was confusion about the actual question being asked: the 
official question posed by the then President Chirac centred on the replacement of the Nice 
treaty by the Lisbon Treaty. The former Treaty, signed in February 2001 and which entered 
in force in February 2003, focused on reforms of European Union institutions as the total 
number of European Union member countries reached 25. In fact, the main changes occurred 
in the European Commission and in the European Council’s voting system (European Union, 
2013).  
The Lisbon Treaty signed in December 2007, and fully enacted two years later, 
aspired to democratize the EU, to render the organization more competent and improve of its 
way of addressing major problems such as climate change. Major transformations included 
an increase of powers for the European Parliament, again reforms in the voting regime of the 
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European Council and the establishment of a permanent president of the latter, the 
appointment of a High Representative regarding Foreign Affairs as well as setting up a 
diplomatic service representing the EU (European Union, 2013). Moreover, the Lisbon 
Treaty allocates power to the EU institutions as well as to the member countries and affirms 
which powers are shared. The concluding point to make about Baumier’s depiction of the 
Lisbon Treaty is that Baumier sees the referendum on the Constitutional Treaty as another 
proof of left ideology aiming at capturing the French state by advocating a greater level of 
EU integration. In Baumier’s view, EU integration means the end of the French nation-state 
and of the French sovereignty. He blames the French Socialist Party for the referendum’s 
initiation, while Hainsworth (2006) showed that the French referendum on the Constitutional 
Treaty was initiated under Chirac’s conservative presidency. French conservative party 
members also displayed greater support for the European constitutional project than their 
socialist counterpart. Baumier’s discussion of the Lisbon Treaty points to confusion over the 
question: for Baumier the Lisbon Treaty raises the question whether left ideology takes an 
even stronger hold on the French state than before, whereas for the electorate the question 
centred on expanding and empowering EU institutions.  
The Lisbon Treaty referendum ties back to Baumier’s perception of post-democracy 
as the referendum is supposedly a particularly clear example of when the oligarchy ignored 
the wish of the French population as well as the moment when left ideology reached its zenith 
and displayed its power. However Baumier does not exclusive see the disregard of the 
citizens’ vote with respect to the 2005 referendum as the event consolidating post-democratic 
totalitarianism. In fact, other events such as Hitler’s eugenics programme from the 1930s 
(Baumier, 2007, p. 207), the recognition during the 1970s of gay rights in France (2007, 
p. 273), the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 (2007, p. 38), the American Patriot Act from the 
early 2000s (2007, p. 37) and the beginning of cloning in 2005 (2007, p. 198) all count as 
milestones in his view. For Baumier what each of these events has in common is the state’s 
rejection of national and traditional ‘limits’ and assuming the absolute (totalitarian) paves to 
‘play god’ with the very foundation of its citizens’ life and death.  
Bowler and Donovan (2002, cited in Schuck and De Vreese, 2011, p. 184) see 
referenda as a means to further advance political institutions’ legitimacy. Mendelsohn and 
Parkin (2001, cited in Schuck and De Vreese, 2011, p. 181) hold that with this kind of 
election citizens’ engagement raises. Barber (1984) sees them as a mean of civic formation. 
Therefore, referenda are assumed to combat political disinterest and aloofness. Resnick 
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(1997, cited in Schuck and De Vreese, 2011, p. 181) states that referenda hold as an 
advantage the low probability of undemocratic regimes to emergence. This statement is 
refuted by both Dalton (2001, cited in Schuck and De Vreese, 2011, p. 182) and Sartori 
(1987, cited in Schuck and De Vreese, 2011, p. 182) who respectively claim that the 
threshold for populism to develop is very low as is the threshold for political intolerance 
because of the straight forward nature of the posed question. 
The popularity of referenda can be explained by two antagonistic hypotheses. The 
hypothesis focusing on cognitive mobilization stipulates that the segment of better educated 
and more politically aware people in society are more inclined to participate in referenda 
because of their will to participate in the political sphere and their knowledge. This 
assumption results from the observations made by Dalton (1984, cited in Schuck and De 
Vreese, 2011, p. 183) and Inglehart (Schuck and De Vreese, 2011, p. 183) which found that 
political decision-making democratizes in situations in which citizens assume an active role.   
The 2005 referendum was not used officially as an affirmation of Chirac’s presidency. 
However, behind the party’s facade, discussions about choosing the party’s candidate for the 
2007 presidential election were at their promoting height. Referenda as explained above carry 
both positive and negative aspects. For Baumier’s analysis of post-democracy, the 
referendum was not only important in terms of directly influencing politics, but also because 
it could become a tool for populism by the elite for consolidating their position (Hawlett, 
2010). As elucidated before, the actual French elite in 2005 belonged to the conservative 
strain which therefore could potentially have (mis)used the referendum for conservative 
populism. Although the referendum first rejected the project which in 2008 was ratified by 
the French parliament, an atmosphere of past values as offered by Chirac surrounded the poll. 
According to Marlière (2013) “a movement that tends to draw its values from the past and 
which offers an ideological and sentimental landmark” counts as populist. Marlière (2013) 
further claims that discussions on populism reached its zenith during the French 2005 
referendum as the electorate sided with the ‘No’ answer expressed by marginal parties 
instead of sliding with the ‘yes’ answer by the mainstream parties and the media. Following 
the result, the UMP and the PS jointly reprehended the media and the allegedly unreasonable 
electorate. The Lisbon Treaty officially was ratified one year later. The citizenry could not 
express their opinion a second time towards the project as the Treaty was adopted outside the 
electoral sphere. Sarkozy imposed the Lisbon Treaty in an undemocratic manner evidencing 
the conservatives’ authoritarian, if not even totalitarian, traits. In order to nuance the bitter 
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taste of referenda, Laclau (Truong, 2012) declares that populism is a kind of constructing 
politics and relevant, if not even intrinsic and vital, to any democracy. It is characterized by 
the mobilization of the mass versus the elite and official institutions. As such, it is possible to 
say that referenda are merely one variety of political antagonism even if they carry memories 
of totalitarian regimes.  
Populism spreads through media. The rise in ‘tabloidisation’ of news has been noticed 
by Schuck and De Veer (2011) as well as by many other academics. Populism replaces 
quality in the press which translates into a rise in so-called ‘infotainment’, scandals and a 
decline in concrete news as noted both Franklin (1997, cited in Schuck and De Veer, 2011, p. 
191) and Langer (1997, cited in Schuck and De Veer, 2011, p. 191). Considering the rising 
commercial pressure and expanding competitive markets, newspapers experience pressure to 
sustain a constant readership. For this reason, Esser (1999, cited in Schuck and De Veer, 
2011, p. 191) notes that easy and quickly saleable information are on the rise. 
In the European Union (EU) context, referenda represent a way in voting both 
democratically and directly for the European Parliament for example. As such, EU referenda 
are a direct way to engage citizens in EU politics. Opponents of the referendum showed even 
more interest in using channels of direct democracy to express their opinion (Schuck and De 
Veer, 2011). As such, contrary to Baumier’s belief referenda serving as a tool of the 
oligarchy in pushing through its favoured laws, Schuck and De Veer (2011) maintain that 
referenda hold the advantage of allowing citizens to both express their political opinion and 
influence politics by a direct vote. Moreover, as the French referendum showed, the 2005 
referendum also bore a normative advantage in the sense of engaging people who normally 
are not politically interested and do not participate in political life.  
b) Communitarianism as a Destructive Force of Democracy?  
Kukathas (1996) shares Baumier’s scepticism and view regarding the combination of 
communitarianism with the concept of republic. Although republics do not necessarily 
feature a high commitment to or degree of democracy, this form of government is usually 
associated with democracy. As such, it is possible to ask whether comunitarianism is 
compatible with democratic regimes. Kukathas (1996) claims that communitarianism is 
generally seen as a critique of liberal democracy. Communitarians accuse liberals of 
neglecting both the existence of community as an entity/institution as well as of communities 
being the carrier of solidarity (Kukathas, 1996, p. 67). Liberals are confused when facing a 
94 
 
so-called community because of their strong belief in secluded and separated individuals 
constituting society. By believing in individualism, liberals cannot understand the 
communitarians’ outlook on the world (Kukathas, 1996, p. 67). Kukathas invokes Taylor’s 
(1989) ‘communitarian Republic’ concept by in order to subsequently address criticism and 
the failure of the idea of communitarianism.  
C. Taylor aims at bringing together the two antagonistic streams of thought, 
communitarianism and liberalism, in the concept entitled ‘communitarian Republic’. This 
concept not only tries to combine liberal and communitarian elements, but also features at its 
core a kind of republicanism that “better recognizes and appreciates the importance of 
citizenship, of patriotism, and of solidarity which ultimately underpins freedom.” (Kukathas, 
1996, p. 67). According to Taylor, communitarians and liberals differ over two main 
arguments: first, they disagree on the explanation of both social structure and action with 
respect to ontological matters; second, their understanding of individuals diverges. The 
problems faced on ontological matters can be summed up by the distinction between holists 
and atomists who respectively hold the view that identity and actions can only be encountered 
within society in contrast to the view that conditions, actions and structures occurring in 
social spheres reflect individual characteristics (Kukathas, 1996, p. 68). Undertaking social 
actions also entails advocating controversy when opposing a holistic view to an atomized 
one: either the collective good is emphasized or individual freedoms and rights are favoured.  
Taylor’s concept of communitarian Republic rests on the following elements: an 
alleged superior ontology, a more comprehensive understanding of the origin and the nature 
of society, and a kind of republicanism which can be traced back to the civic humanist 
tradition. These elements put together result in a perspective which sees society as the 
expression of a common good in contrast to the perspective inherent to liberals that see 
society as an agglomeration of isolated individuals. According to Taylor (1989, cited in 
Kakuthas, 1996, p. 69) societies are animated by common goods. The relationship between 
citizens is reminiscent of friendship. In such a setting the citizenry views laws as a reflection 
of their dignity. The ideas of dignity and solidarity can be easily combined with the idea of 
patriotism as the later turns out to be of significance for a society that is established on a 
belief in a shared destiny. The bonds of solidarity which are conducive to the emergence of 
republican patriotism also count as the basis for freedom according to Taylor. He holds that 
solidarity in a republican setting “underpins freedom because it provides the motivation for 
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self-imposed discipline; ... it is essential for a free regime because this calls on its members to 
do things that mere subjects can avoid.” (Taylor, 1989, cited in Kukathas, 1996, p. 69). 
The criticism put forward by Kukathas (1996) focuses on the validity of Taylor’s 
social ontology as well as on his stipulated strong relationship between freedom and the 
communitarian Republic. Kukathas claims that Taylor’s social ontology is not feasible 
because of poorly defining what he means exactly by the expression ‘irreducibly social 
goods’ (Taylor, 1995, cited in Kukathas, 1996, p. 71), albeit the reader learns that culture and 
community are social goods. Taylor’s failure to define why communities and cultures count 
as ‘goods’ leads Kukathas to explain his position as follows: “The benefit I get from my 
culture is my benefit even though it may be constituted in part by my actions and beliefs as 
inculcated by that very culture. Just as with material goods, collective production or provision 
does not entail collective consumption' (Hardin, 1995, cited in Kukathas, 1996, p. 73). In 
short, consumption is executed on an individual level and not on a collective one.  
Kukhatas’ second criticism of Taylor centres on the alleged freedom gained through 
the communitarian Republic. Kukathas holds that the statement is not valid because society’s 
nature is characterized by both cooperation and conflict. Taylor’s argument is rejected when 
it comes to the ruling power in his communitarian Republic. Kukhata claims that politics is 
generally a set of power games carried out within the ruling elite. Although the governing 
body in republics are supposedly the citizenry, Kukathas (1996, p. 73) claims that political 
power is generally controlled by a limited group of people. He then goes on to claim that 
participatory self-rule is an illusion. The supplementary criticism of the tying together of 
freedom and self-rule concentrates on the fact that freedom not only means the ability to 
participate in self-rule but also the freedom to oppose and resist the dominant political 
paradigm. This point is valid in the sense of that the dearth in freedom is perceptible in 
regimes where it is difficult to oppose official governmental positions (Kukathas, 1996, p. 
74). 
Communitarianism has been popularized by Etzoni during the Spring 1995 lecture 
series at Washington University. Etzoni sees communitarianism as “a social movement 
aiming at shoring up the moral, social and political environment. Part change of heart, part 
renewal of social bonds, part reform of public life.” (Etzioni 1994, cited in Newman and De 
Zoysa, 1997, p. 628). Reforms focus on reconstructing communities as well as on expanding 
the space of public inquiry among other things while aiming at strengthening bonds of 
solidarity between communities via social cohesion and stability. These reforms rely on self-
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help as much as on ideas of duty and individual responsibility (Newman and De Zoysa, 1997, 
p. 629).  
Although Baumier’s and Kukathas’ perspectives on communitarianism locate this 
train of thought on the left side of the political spectrum due to communitarianism’s critique 
vis-à-vis unrestrained capitalism and the rule of the free-market paired with energetic politics. 
However, authors such as D. Willet (1992, cited in Newman and Zoysa, 1997, p. 630) state 
that the British Conservative Party conveys communitarian values while expanding the 
welfare state and advocating the free market. Gray (1993, cited in Newman and Zoysa, 1997, 
p. 630) who was once a fierce supporter of the radical neo-liberal right now calls for the 
implementation of Disraeli’s ‘one nation’ concept of conservatism which still features among 
current Conservative party policies. Lastly, Etzioni shows common points between 
communitarianism and the American Progressive Movement from the beginning of the 20
th 
 
century. Academic contributions to the development of communitarianism such as that of de 
Maistre as well as Schmitt have respectively influenced totalitarian ideologies. In the first 
case Mussolini’s fascism while in the case of Schmitt the concept of racial superiority 
employed by the Nazis. As such, here was a time when socialism, change as well as 
democracy counted as antipode to communitarian thought. The relationship between 
communitarianism and conservatism was, at that time self-evident.  
In my view, communitarianism is a mean for greater social equality as ‘pure’ 
egalitarian democracy does not take account into social inequality. Social inequality has 
repercussions on a person’s level of education, health and delinquency for example. Albeit 
the range of the repercussions cannot be generalized, they hold true in many cases. By the 
means of positive discrimination, greater social equity can be reached as persons who in a 
perfect egalitarian society might not ascend to a specific position and could not voice their 
opinion, can do so. In contrast for Baumier, communitarianism undermines egalitarian 
democracy and cuts back citizens’ freedom by turning claims of specific groups into rights 
without the consens of the larger population. 
3.4 CONCLUSION 
This chapter laid out Baumier’s vision of post-democracy as well as the mechanisms 
he identified as contributing to post-democracy. His depiction of the post-democratic order 
spans various topics. These topics range across disciplines such as politics, sociology, 
philosophy, psychology, media, power, humanism and war. Baumier’s account is founded on 
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his personal opinion and analysis of events: he neither uses quantitative methods for 
supporting his statements, nor does he state from the beginning the use of a qualitative 
methodological approach. As such the academic validity of this work is questionable, and is 
rather a manifesto of his own opinion. In sum, post-democracy is for Baumier the disregard 
of the democratic vote of the masses by a small delineated group of powerful people 
imposing their will. This small delineated group of powerful people, referred to as an 
oligarchy by Baumier, consists of politicians and journalists. Baumier’s account of post-
democracy explains the illusions he claims the French citizenry are subject to. This illusion is 
two-fold: on a first level, the French citizenry think they are living in an Aronian moment of 
democracy, an expression standing for the constitutional-pluralist system as can be found in 
Western parliamentary and presidential systems. Within this belief, a part of the people think 
radical, or social, democracy to be an improvement on the constitutional-pluralist system. 
Baumier declares that both parties, that is to say the people endorsing liberal and 
representative democracy and the people who believe they are living in representative 
democracy but support social and radical democracy, are mistaken and living in an illusion. 
As long as these two illusions are up held, post-democracy can further develop.  
Subsequently, this chapter showed how Baumier claims the capture of the media by 
left ideology as highlighted in the example of the French newspaper Le Monde. Baumier 
calls the editors of Le Monde and by extension also the ruling elite ‘cultural Trotskyists’. 
Journalists and the elite emanate according to Baumier’s account from the same social 
circles, attended the same schools, share the same interests and, therefore, speak the same 
language. For Baumier the media is used as a tool in advancing the post-democratic state, 
wherewith the elite and journalists act in concert. Baumier sees the masses misled into 
accepting the claims of the elite. Even the fate of citizens as human beings is undone, he 
claims. With this situation in place, citizens are said to be turned into post-humans who no 
longer represent an obstacle to the ruling power. The exceptional few who remained as 
challengers to the developing regime are muted by post-democracy’s fermenting of a 
‘political correctness’ designed to silence dissent and enforce conformity.  
The second part of this chapter elaborated the mechanisms that Baumier claims are 
leading to post-democracy and outlined the actors that contribute to post-democracy’s 
entrenchment. These mechanisms belong to different domains, such as politics, media and 
sociology. The May 2005French  referendum on the EU constitutional treaty represented for 
Baumier an important stage in moving closer to the post-democratic regime. This regime is 
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defined by the disregard by the elite of the expressed vote of the citizenry. The ruling elite of 
the country intended to persuade the electorate to vote in favour of the draft treaty. However, 
the citizenry chose to reject the draft, an outcome which, according to Baumier, both 
surprised the oligarchy and led them three years later to use an undemocratic channel to ratify 
the treaty. Finally, communitarianism was invoked by Baumier to describe the slow process 
of fragmenting the French res publica. The second part of this chapter called into question 
Baumier’s mechanisms. First, evidence was given that the 2005 ruling elite was conservative 
and not socialist as Baumier suggests. Moreover, the usage of referenda popularized by 
French conservatives suggests hidden benefits that this political party expected to receive. 
Second Taylor’s account on communitarianism challenges Baumier’s claim that 
communitarianism fragments the democratic republic. Communities advocate common goods 
whilst liberal individuals pursue their individual interests that challenges the emergence of 
public goods. Finally, Etzioni’s depictions of communitarianism’s right past challenges 
Baumier’s claim that communitarianism is intrinsically left-wing by giving the example of 
the American Progressive Movement of the early 20
th
 century.  
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MAIN CONCLUSION 
The conclusion of the thesis will first provide a short summary on the different 
chapters before then moving on to contrasting both Crouch’s and Baumier’s analysis of post-
democracy. Chapter two delineated the different characteristics constituting Crouch’s 
conception of post-democracy. Post-democracy appears as much as a “...situation[s] where 
boredom, frustration and disillusion have settled in after a democratic moment; when 
powerful minority interests have become far more active than the mass of ordinary people in 
making the political system work for them; where political elites have learned to manage and 
manipulate popular demands; where people have to be persuaded to vote by top-down 
publicity campaigns.” (Crouch, 2004, p. 20). This situation is further intensified by the gain 
in and loss of power by the following actors: “The rising power political importance of the 
global firm, the vacuum left by the decline of the working class, and the way in which a new 
political class of political advisers and business lobbyists was filling that vacuum all helped 
explain why the government social policy was becoming increasingly obsessed with giving 
work to private contractors. This debate was also part of the post-democratic debate, and in 
fact provided a major example of the practical consequences of post-democracy.” (Crouch, 
2004, p. x).  
The chapter then outlined different key characteristics of Crouch’s post-democracy. 
First there are spectacular elections. Whilst “elections certainly exist and can change 
governments, public electoral debate is a tightly controlled spectacle, managed by rival teams 
of professional experts in the techniques of persuasion, and considering a small range of 
issues selected by those teams” (2004, p. 4). Then there are politicians’ questionable 
strategies to win votes where “personality-based election campaigning used to be 
characteristic of dictatorships and of electoral politics in societies with weakly developed 
systems of parties and debate. [...] Promotion of the claimed charismatic qualities of a party 
leader, and pictures and film footage of his or her person striking appropriate poses, 
increasingly take the place of debate over issues and conflicting interests” (2004, p. 26).  
By outlining Crouch’s post-democratic account, it was then possible to reconstitute 
the constituent elements of his account of democracy. The second part of chapter two 
explained why Keynesianism allowed democracy to function by encompassing a greater 
number of participants than Neoliberalism currently does. Then, the weaknesses of 
Keynesianism public demand management and reasons for its non-sustainability were dealt 
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with. Crouch’s view on Keynes’ alleged social inclination was subsequently scrutinized in 
the light of Keynes qualifying himself as both liberal in the ideological sense and a Liberal 
meaning a supporter of the then British liberal political party. Although Keynesian public 
policy has been abandoned following the 1970s oil crisis, Crouch points to the development 
of a privatized version of Keynesianism by which he highlights Keynesianism’s continuous 
relevance. Considering events such as the housing bubble leading people to run up high 
amounts of personal debts, the existence of privatized Keynesianism is noteworthy. 
Additionally, the fact that governments undertook measures such as fiscal stimulus in the 
2008 financial crisis proves the relevance of Keynesianism in the so-called neo-liberal era.   
Chapter two gave evidence of the fate of political parties under post-democracy, 
assessing Crouch’s claim that the 1997 New Labour government was a continuation of the 
previous conservative rule: “Labour in Britain are at last successfully rivalling the centre-
right in their appeal to them [lower middle-class interests], it is because they have started 
doing the same, not because they are articulating wider concerns of these groups, which 
might be uncomfortable for the corporate elite. They are represented as having no discontent 
except with the quality of public services – which is increasingly taken to mean that they 
want them privatized.” (Crouch, 2004, p. 59/60).  
Three different academics views on Crouch’s claim regarding New Labour being a 
continuation of the previous conservative government were provided: Applebaum (1997) 
shares Crouch’s opinion on New Labour’s novelty divergence from former Labour 
governments even whilst not diverging from Thatcherism. She claims that with the 1997 New 
Labour’s victory of the general election, the Labour party’s former political goals were 
abandoned. Moreover, Blair’s declared sympathy and admiration for Thatcher’s party 
renewal (1997, p. 46) as well as the abolition of Clause IV (1997, p. 47) hinted at New 
Labour’s non-socialist outlook on politics. Other measures undertaken by New Labour 
reminiscent of conservative rule were maintain the same level of personal income tax as well 
as the cutting down on Welfare provisions (1997, p. 47). Gray’s (2004) view on Blair’s 
Labour renewal is more nuanced when compared to Applebaum’s: in fact, Gray sees Blair’s 
government in retrospect as comprehensible with respect to the irreversibility of Thatcher’s 
economic policies. Blair envisaged a broader extension of this economic regime, one that was 
in general paired with social cohesion. The free-market would it was claimed accommodate 
fairness and should be further deregulated (2004, p. 39). Finally, Toye (2004) puts into 
perspective New Labour’s innovativeness and uniqueness in the most nuanced way. Toye 
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(2004) also comes closest to New Labour’s substance by investigating the British Labour 
party’s longer history. Toye’s study concludes that New Labour is not ‘new’. Given that Toye 
(2004) is the only scholar out of the three visions on New Labour who actually investigates 
the British Labour party’s history, it is possible to conclude that his account is the most 
pertinent of all to assessing Crouch’s claim that New Labour is the new face of post-
democratic politics. Toye’s analysis suggests New Labour is not that new, even if the 
economic power confronting them has shifted. Long standing struggles between critical and 
accommodating strands within Labour remain even whilst New Labour reflects the rising 
influence of pre-capitalist elements. 
Chapter two also gave evidence of the firm’s primordial role in post-democracy. 
Crouch acknowledges the global firm as the main actor in post-democracy whose 
significance had for a long time not been taken into consideration: “For most of the twentieth 
century the European left completely failed to appreciate the significance of the firm as an 
institution.” (Crouch, 2004, p. 31). With the Monetarist move from macro- to micro-
economic management, the state came to endorse the view that the ‘firm’ was the best 
(rational) agent of economic decision-making. Demands emanating from consumers and 
global competition reached new heights, transforming the global firm into a “robust and 
demanding creature” (Crouch, 2004, p.32). In order to become and/or remain attractive for 
the firm, governments and political parties made citizens aware of the dysfunctional work 
system along with the related labour rights by emphasizing the urgent need to alter them 
(2004, p. 33). The citizenry then actively votes for deregulation.  
The actual goal of the global firm is “to locate itself primarily in the financial sector, 
because this is where capital is at its mobile, and to sub-contract everything else it does to 
small, insecure units.” (2004, p. 37). By doing so, the firm is liberated from any managerial 
tasks providing the freedom to focus exclusively on brands and concepts. The Media 
Corporation especially deserves to be investigated because of its contribution in diminishing 
choices of available information and downgrading the quality of employed political 
semantics as well as of communication (2004, p. 46).  
The subsequent subsection of the second part dealt with Lindblom’s (1977) study of 
the market’s and democracy’s incompatibility. Crouch mentions Lindblom in Post-
democracy and points to Lindblom’s study of the favourite position of business in politics. 
Therefore, the novelty of Crouch post-democratic paradigm is debatable though Crouch’s 
Post-democracy may be simply the coming Americanization of European politics. Following 
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this discussion, reasons were provided why the firm cannot after all be as powerful and 
threaten the government with outsourcing jobs to foreign countries. These reasons were 
partially addressed by Crouch in terms of sunk cost, while the economic theory of the insider 
versus the outsider further provided grounds to explain why outsourcing does not always 
work. Therefore, the idea of the powerful firm was partially refuted as outsourcing to cheaper 
labour places might hold at first sight advantages, while at a second glance, training new 
workers and the cost of delocalizing limit the threatening power by the firm. The final 
subsection outlined Crouch’s idea of the media diffusing propaganda while being owned by a 
small group of delineated powerful people. The example of Berlusconi was given to support 
Crouch’s post-democratic scenario in Italy for the following reasons: This threat emanating 
from the Media corporation is about favouring one candidate in comparison to others not due 
to his political expertise but due to his glossy appeal, for example managerial skills, slick 
appearance and advertising like eloquence, enabling him to gain votes within narrowly 
constrained policy limits. Political ideology is replaced by this glossy attraction. The 
enchanted citizenry then merely observe political and electoral spectacles. In the case of 
Berlusconi, who besides having served as Prime Minister also owns part of the Italian mass 
media firm Mediaset, political issues and television entertainment converged bringing about a 
new paradigm with important ramifications for Italian democracy, known as paparazzi 
democracy (Abruzzese, 1994; Musso, 1994; Statera, 1994; Padovani, 2005 cited in 
Consentino, 2011, p. 3). These repercussions centre on the demise of political communication 
and the diffusion of propaganda. Speaking of both post-democracy and paparazzi democracy 
in the Italian context is valid as one person embodies both being an owner of the main mass 
media and ran for a political offices. As such it is questionable to what extend the mass media 
Mediaset can be qualified as ‘free’. Regarding ‘Paparazzi Democracy’ an intrusive attention 
is brought by entertainment television programmes to the public to restricted information 
circulating in the political backdrop bearing significant political results (Consentino, 2011, p. 
14).  
Chapter three set out the constituent elements of Baumier’s post-democracy thesis. 
These elements included two illusions haunting the French citizens. Firstly, French society 
still believes itself to live in a democratic moment such as it was understood by the French 
historian Raymond Aron, the ‘Aronian moment’ (2007, p. 35). The second illusion, held by 
the radical left and its sympathizers, is that to cure liberal and representative democracy’s 
deficiencies requires a social or radical extension of democratic principles (2007, p. 30). The 
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following part of chapter three called into question some of Baumier’s claims by examining 
French political identification processes, that is to say ideological versus political party 
identification; the relationship between ideology and party representation; unveiled 
similarities between left and right totalitarianism; left and right political affiliation and class 
consciousness in France. The analysis of French voting behaviour appears to support 
Baumier’s militant account of post-democracy given that electoral behaviour based on 
ideological identification translates into unstable political coalitions (Bélanger, Lewis-Beck, 
Chiche and Tiberj, 2006) even as the underlying conduct of elite governance and power 
remains undisturbed and enforced.  
Baumier’s conception of the French Republic falling prey to the Left ideology is 
called into question by Alain de Benoist’s (1995) article entitled End of the Right-Left 
Dichotomy. De Benoist’s (1995) article addresses the progressive annihilation of the belief in 
distinct and antagonistic political ideologies by the French citizenry. Moreover, another 
aspect supporting political dichotomy’s rapid decreases is: the declining sentiment of class 
consciousness in the French context. De Benoist (1995) bases his study of political 
dichotomy and class consciousness on the French political barometer Sofres Polls. 
The next part of the chapter showed which actors and what mechanisms helped in 
fostering Baumier’s post-democratic scenario. First, an important step in consolidating the 
French post-democratic order had been undertaken by the oligarchy in disregarding the 
results of the May 2005 European Union referendum. This vote showed division between the 
oligarchy and the people vis-à-vis the project and ended with the French popular ‘No’. 
Although, the results were acknowledged and made public, the French oligarchy overstepped 
the citizenry’s vote: “We experienced the real division between the oligarchy and the people. 
We saw the virtual reality of “democracy”. The May 2005 referendum was a stage in the 
expression of post-democracy: the on-going democratic atrophy exposed itself in the broad 
day light.” (Baumier, 2007, p. 59). Second, the power of the oligarchy and its leading part in 
post-democracy was evidenced as was its collaboration with the media producing a little 
anticipated result: “Post-Democracy presents a series of aspects leading towards 
totalitarianism: a unique thought, a diffused, decentralized but unique party, unanimous press 
[...] an oligarchy relying on its privileges and its belief in a ‘truth’, propaganda, words and 
empty ideological discourses that are repeated by habit, description of a virtual world 
believed to be the real world...there is something reminiscent of the former Soviet Union in 
the present democratic evolution.” (2007, p. 64).  
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Communitarianism supposedly puts an end to a republic which is conceived as a 
common good in contemporary post-democracy. Baumier sees communitarianism as a threat, 
stating that “We assist the inversion of the community idea at the benefice of the resurgence 
of reintroduced peculiarities at the heart of the Republic under the name of 
communitarianism. Several self-proclaimed communities claim a “right to difference”, in the 
name of the Republic [...] not realizing that this claim posits the end of the Republic in terms 
of a communion bringing together the entirety of the nation in a political entity giving the 
primacy to the collective good over the individual good.” (2007, p. 272).  
The second part of chapter three scrutinized Baumier’s actors. It was revealed that 
Baumier’s claim regarding the left leaning oligarchy’s overruling of the citizens’ vote was 
flawed. Given that the French conservative party turned out to be more Europhile than the 
socialists as well as the fact that the French government was headed by the conservative party 
are reasons enough to discard Baumier’s statement that left ideology was overruling the 
people’s vote. Moreover, the usage of referendum did not imply to strengthen the ruling party 
and/or ideology, but to provide citizens with the opportunity to directly participate in 
European Union politics. Moving on to communitarianism’s socilist character, it should be 
noted that this school of political philosophy also features within conservative thoughts: D. 
Willet (1992, cited in Newman and Zoysa, 1997, p. 630) states that the British Conservative 
Party conveys communitarian values while expanding the welfare state and advocating the 
free market. Gray (1993, cited in Newman and Zoysa, 1997, p. 630), who was once a fierce 
supporter of the radical right, calls for the implementation of Disraeli’s ‘One nation’ concept 
which still features among present conservative policies. Lastly, Etzioni shows common 
points between communitarianism and the American Progressive Movement from the 
beginning 20
th
 century. Therefore, communitarianism cannot be attributed solely to one 
particular political ideology. Used by both conservatives and socialists, communitarianism 
views individuals as a product of society and not society as a product of individuals claiming 
rights on false grounds as Baumier suggests.  
This thesis attempted to explore two different accounts of post-democracy. First, the 
theory by Crouch (2004) was laid out for subsequently identifying potential holes. Crouch, in 
fact, also coined the term post-democracy in the early 2000s when he wrote an analysis of the 
weakening of Western democracies for the Fabian Society, a British think tank focusing on 
left political ideas and public policy issues (Fabian Society, 2013): “I then approached the 
Fabian Society to see whether they would be interested in a general discussion of this 
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phenomenon. I developed the concept of post-democracy, added a discussion of what seemed 
to me to be a key institution behind the changes (the global firm), and some ideas for how 
concerned citizens should respond to the predicament [...]. This was published as Coping 
with Post-Democracy (Fabian Ideas 598, London: The Fabian Society, 2000)” (Crouch, 2004, 
p. ix). The book explaining the present post-democratic paradigm is entitled Post-democracy. 
Crouch’s will to approach and write a book for this think tank already gives away an 
important fact: his tendency towards socialist inclined ideas and topics. Although Crouch 
(2004) never explicitly declares his political affiliation in post-democracy, the manner in 
which politics, public policy, political parties, politicians, economics and economic agents 
are dealt with and depicted allows one to claim that Crouch belongs to the left of the political 
spectrum. This claim is further supported by Crouch’s statement regarding the book’s 
intended audience “It is my contention that we are increasingly moving towards the post-
democratic pole. If I am right about this, the factors which I shall identify as causing the 
movement also help explain something else, of particular concern to the social democrats and 
others concerned for political egalitarianism for whom this book is principally intended.” 
(Crouch, 2004, p. 4).  
Baumier (2007) wrote a conservative account on post-democracy when compared to 
Crouch. Although, Baumier deals with post-democracy, he never mentions in the text or in 
the bibliography the book published by Crouch three years earlier. His book entitled The 
Totalitarian Democracy: Thinking the post-democratic Modernity promises a discussion 
revolving around the concept of modernity as well as authoritarian aspects of democracy. 
This promise holds true in the light of analysing democracy; however, the meaning of 
modernity is not explained and Baumier (2007) does not straightforwardly say that he 
actually totalitarian democracy in post-modernity.  
Having laid out the a short summary of the two key authors, the next sections of this 
conclusion concentrates on both similarities and differences of the books in question. Two 
similarities stand out: elections being a staged spectacle and media/journalists joining forces 
with the political and economic elite. Baumier takes the 2005 French referendum on the 
European Union constitutional treaty as prime example of staged elections: “May 2005 will 
remain engraved in French history as the symbolic moment of post-democracy’s apparition: 
in this regime, expressed choices by the people are endorsed – after having been prepared – 
or not by the pretending democratic oligarchy, according to whether the people’s choices 
point in the same direction as do the oligarchy’s choices.” (2007, p. 60). This event then led 
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Baumier to declare that “We experienced the real division between the oligarchy and the 
people. We saw the virtual reality of “democracy”.  
The May 2005 referendum is a stage in the expression of post-democracy: the on-
going democratic atrophy exposed itself in the broad day light.” (Baumier, 2007, p. 59). 
Baumier also points to a similar staged election occurring in the early 2000s in the United 
States: “The same process in other countries, see the United States, during the 2001 
presidential election as one part of the votes had not been counted so as that candidate who 
had to win would win them in a certain manner.” (2007, p. 61). Baumier then goes on to state 
that the omitting of votes as in the 2001 American presidential election qualifies as a coup 
d’état while still abiding to democratic principles: “The coup d’état by George Bush still 
fitted with historic customs which we inherited by democracy: the Republican candidate was 
not the first politician ascending to power by rigging electoral results. In 2005, the French 
vote has not been rigged. The problematic is another one: the voting results have been simply 
ignored, elided. As in the case of the United States one would believe. Except that in the 
French case, the results have been recognized, formalized, accepted and, nevertheless, these 
results do not form part of reality.” (2007, p. 61).  
Crouch in comparison depicts staged elections in the following scenario: “elections 
certainly exist and can change governments, public electoral debate is a tightly controlled 
spectacle, managed by rival teams of professional experts in the techniques of persuasion, 
and considering a small range of issues selected by those teams.” (Crouch, 2004, p. 4). This 
specific temporal character of post-democracy also articulates itself in the controlling of 
public election campaigns voiding them of any sense and only reinforcing its theatrical 
character all under the supervision of so-called spin doctors: neither any authentic political 
agenda nor co-operation can emerge giving way to a high degree of politicians’ 
personalization reminiscent of personal cult practiced formerly by people such as Stalin or 
Mussolini. Citizens adopt a passive, apathetic and intimidated attitude wherewith attempts to 
form associations fall short, see “The mass of citizens plays a passive, quiescent, even 
apathetic part, responding only to the signals given them” (Crouch, 2004, p. 4).  
The restricted political arena becomes the new playground of the political process 
where only the government and the elite, synonym for agencies’ economic interests, delineate 
political matters: “Behind this spectacle of the electoral game, politics is really shaped in 
private by the interaction between elected governments and elites that overwhelmingly 
represent business interests.” (Crouch, 2004, p. 4). Crouch main preoccupations revolve 
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around the following scenario “Under the conditions of a post-democracy that increasingly 
cedes power to business lobbies, there is little hope for an agenda of strong egalitarian 
policies for the redistribution of power and wealth, or for the restraint of power interests” 
(2004, p. 4). 
Similarly to Baumier, Crouch also denotes a qualitative decrease in journalism: 
“Popular journalism, like politics, began to model itself on advertising copy; very brief 
messages requiring extremely low concentration spans…” (2004, p. 26) while the writing 
style of official documents also underwent a devaluation “…mass-circulation newspaper 
discussion, government material aimed at the mass public, and party manifestos are totally 
different. They rarely aspire to any complexity of language or argument” (2004, p. 24). 
Crouch also hints at the consumerist character of citizens: “we take for granted that a party’s 
programme is a ‘product’, and that politicians try to ‘market’ us their message” (2004, p. 25). 
The progression from citizen to a ‘citizen-consumer’ serves as another proof of the change 
from Keynesianism to neoliberalism and the advent of post-democracy. 
The similarity of Crouch’s and Baumier’s account on elections in post-democracy 
cannot be overlooked. For both authors the division between the elite and the people becomes 
apparent in the event of elections in terms of outcomes already decided beforehand that suits 
the elite’s will. The collaborative role of media is addressed by Baumier and Crouch, 
although in different ways: Baumier sees journalists as collaborators with the left leaning 
oligarchy that wants to impose its regime. In order to do so, truth is portrayed in a distorted 
manner wherewith people are manipulated giving plenty of rope to the oligarchy. This 
freedom occurs at the disadvantage of the people who are not only manipulated but who also 
undergo transformations. Crouch sees the media as victim of post-democracy and the global 
firm. The infiltration of the latter into the state progressively empties politics and impacts on 
the writing style of reports and articles. The hollowing out of politics also turns politicians 
into empty characters who try to win votes via charisma and not by political programmes. In 
this sense, the media portrays politicians by evoking their personal qualities and life while 
aiming to sell a product to the readership without the need to reflect on any political problems 
or controversies. One last similarity between Crouch and Baumier that can be discerned is the 
apathy of the citizens and their lack of interest in politics. Both authors point to the changes 
in the citizenry, Crouch talks of ‘citizen-consumers’ while Baumier seems more absolute in 
speaking of ‘post-humans’.  
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Divergences between Baumier’s and Crouch’s account of post-democracy centre on 
the state as an institution. In fact, Baumier sees the state as hostage of left ideology, while 
Crouch sees the state as being hollowed out by global capitalist economics. Baumier states 
that the predominance of left ideology leads to the diffusion of a single conformist thought 
and therefore to a totalitarian state. Crouch, in opposition, sees post-democracy not as the 
empowerment of the state but as its hollowing out. In fact, economic agents infiltrate major 
political parties and hence the government, which then no longer executes tasks that are not 
in accordance with free-market principles. It is also possible to suggest that the state becomes 
the direct agent of capitalism. Reflecting on this first divergence, one can say that Crouch 
blames the global free-market economic framework while Baumier blames left ideology. As 
such, the two authors blame respectively right and left ideas for post-democracy.  
Another divergence centres on social class. Crouch claims that the demise of the 
British working class goes hand in hand with the demise of democracy. Baumier, on the other 
hand, claims that communitarianism, that is to say emphasizing groups’ rights, is at the origin 
of post-democracy. Following from this, Crouch views the lack of social class’ existence as 
runway to the unchallenged rule of the free market, while Baumier locates communitarianism 
as the fragmenting source of democracy and therefore as the cradle of post-democracy.  
In conclusion, both Crouch (2004) and Baumier (2007) see the spectacularization of 
elections and politics as a driving force behind post-democracy. Given that Baumier (2007), 
who is at the right of political spectrum and Crouch, who is at the left of the political 
spectrum, both identify the spectacularization of elections and politics behind the 
entrenchment of post-democracy, I conclude that both scholars might be right with their 
views. The examples of Italy, the United Kingdom, France and the United States as post-
democratic regimes given by Baumier (2007) and Crouch (2004) highlight the 
professionalization of politicians by the use of sound bites in these countries.  
The second common point between Crouch’s (2004) and Baumier’s (2007) analysis is 
the spectacularization of media. Both Crouch (2004) and Baumier (2004) agree that the elite 
incorporates spectacularized media so as to manipulate the citizenry. Crouch (2004) gives the 
example of the usage of sound bites by politicians and the decrease in quality journalism 
turning the citizens into consumers while for Baumier (2007) the electoral campaign of the 
May 2005 French Referendum testified the direct cooperation between the elite and 
journalists.   
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The observations regarding media’s spectacular character are not new. This is a 
potential criticism of both Crouch (2004) and Baumier (2007). Both Crouch (2004) and 
Baumier (2007) refer to the spectacularization of media as one of the driving forces behind 
post-democracy, while Habermas (1962) and Debord (1967) located the advent of mass 
media / media’s spectacular character during Crouch’s (2004) high time of democracy in the 
1950s and 1960s. Many of media’s spectacular characteristics discussed by Crouch’s (2004) 
and Baumier’s (2007) were already in existence in the 1950s and 1960s and addressed by 
Habermas (1962) and Debord (1967).  
Since the abandonment of Keynesian demand management and the move to 
Monetarist management at the end of the 1970s and early 1980s, post-democracy intensified. 
Habermas (1962) and Debord (1967) already offered insights with their seminal works on 
public spheres and the media into post-democracy. Yet, both Crouch (2004) and Baumier 
(2007) substantially contributed to the post-democratic concept of earlier writers. So, 
Baumier’s (2007) and Crouch’s (2004) concepts are valuable.  
The difference between Crouch’s (2004) and Baumier’s (2007) post-democracy may 
simply reflect that Crouch (2004) writes about the United Kingdom and Baumier (2007) 
about France. In contrast to France, the United Kingdom underwent Thatcherite deregulation 
that caused inequalities to rise. As such, both countries have distinct political, economic and 
societal trajectories. This conclusion raises the question whether Crouch (2004) is right about 
post-democracy in the United Kingdom and Baumier (2007) in France.  In my view, this 
conclusion is wrong. Baumier’s (2007) account of post-democracy in France is flawed as he 
only offers his emotional opinion without any academic credibility. In my view, Crouch’s 
(2004) account on post-democracy as the capitalist hollowing out of the state is more 
convincing due to the presented arguments.   
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